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This thesis analyses British policy in the final years of colonial rule in Aden and the
Aden Protectorate (South Arabia), the period 1959 to 1967. This work deals first with
the first century ofBritish rule in Aden, from the capture of the port in 1839 until the
end of the Second World War in 1945, examining the role of the Colony in British
overseas policy. Secondly, the thesis gives the international and regional background to
the period in question by giving a summary ofBritish overseas policy, the Cold War
and the Arab Cold War in the period 1945 to 1967. Thirdly, it tackles the history of
colonial rule between 1945 and 1959, covering the increasing value ofAden to British
defence policy in the Middle East, as well as the creation of a Federation among the
local rulers in an attempt to bolster Britain's closest allies in South Arabia. The fourth
point of the thesis is the examination of British defence policy, 1959 to 1963, which
saw the military base in Aden become vital to London's overseas policy. This period
saw Aden merge with the Federation, against a background of opposition from Arab
Nationalists, in an attempt to secure British interests. Fifthly, the thesis analyses the
gradual loss ofBritish control over events in Aden and the Federation as the Arab
Nationalist campaign became increasingly effective. The British Government finally
decided to grant independence to appease the opposition, but retain the base for the
defence ofBritain's overseas interests. The thesis then attempts to chart the rise of the
eventual victors in the conflict, the 'Marxist' National Liberation Front and its rivalry
with other Arab Nationalist groups. Finally, the thesis examines the final period of
British rule in Aden, from the Defence White Paper of February 1966, when the
decision was taken to cut many ofBritain's overseas commitments, including the base
in Aden, to the withdrawal ofNovember 1967. This period saw the disintegration of
the Federation and the inability of the British to prevent the Nationalists taking power.
The thesis concludes that towards the end of colonial rule, British policy in South
Arabia was incoherent and suffered from division among the different Government
departments. Furthermore, the inability to protect the Federation effectively enabled the
Nationalists to undermine Britain's only allies in the Protectorate.
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Note on Transliteration
The study of Yemeni history and politics can be confusing at times given the variety of
spellings of different place names and persons. For the most part I have standardised
the spellings to the most popular forms, such as Abdullah al Asnag, instead of al Asnaj,
except in quotations where I have kept the spelling used by the author.
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The ceremony to mark the handover of power from the British to a former colony was
generally marked by the lowering of the Union Jack whilst 'God Save the Queen' was
played followed by the raising of the newly independent state's flag. The case ofAden
Colony and Protectorate was markedly different, the military band playing the then
popular song 'fings ain't wot they used to be', an apt conclusion to the messy and
confused final years of British rule in South West Arabia. Moreover, the transition of
power was not from the colonial authorities to the local notable elite, the politicians and
rulers who had co-operated with the British in ruling the country. Instead the new
government was composed of the most hard-line nationalists, the National Liberation
Front (NLF) who established the People's Republic of South Yemen (PROSY). This
combination of a chaotic British withdrawal and handover ofpower to a 'Marxist'
group of nationalists mark out the history of South Arabia after World War Two as an
important exception to the pattern ofwithdrawal from empire elsewhere in the world.
However, this is an exception that has to a large extent been overlooked by historians of
the modem Middle East or the British Empire.
The Colony ofAden and the surrounding Protectorate was also largely overlooked by
British politicians and policymakers in the first century of rule from 1839 to the 1950s.
However, with the enforced withdrawal from other parts of the Middle East, in
particular Palestine in 1947 and the Suez Canal Zone in 1954, the importance ofAden
to British overseas interests was markedly increased. This was especially true
following the decision to make the Colony the headquarters ofBritish Middle East
Command in 1960 and one of the three major military bases in the remnants of the
Empire (along with the UK itself and Singapore). Whilst the Empire was no longer as
extensive as it had been, to the majority of British policymakers, both Conservative and
Labour, the UK was still a significant power overseas, a position which the politicians
wanted to maintain. The decision to withdraw from Aden in 1966, therefore, was
significant as it marked the beginnings of the final withdrawal from the Empire, a
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process which had started in 1947 with the grant of independence to India and Pakistan
and the relinquishment of the Palestine mandate. Unfortunately, too many historians
have marked the Suez crisis of 1956 as the 'end ofEmpire', at least as far as the Middle
East was concerned, a view which was not shared by either policymakers or the
populations of South Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Libya or even Cyprus who were still
under British control.
To redress this imbalance, this thesis aims to analyse the final years ofBritish rule in
Aden and the Protectorate, from the British perspective, with a view to placing this
history in the wider perspective of the end of the British Empire and the 'east of Suez'
policy of the 1950s and 1960s. The thesis argues that the base in Aden was the
cornerstone ofBritish defence and overseas policy in the Middle East, and as such more
should have been done to improve the economic and social conditions in the Colony
and Protectorate to consolidate the British position. This is therefore an analysis of
later British imperial and colonial history, primarily using documents from the Public
Record Office. The amount of British Government material available to the author was
considerably more than any previous historian of the period and issues in question.
However, these documents were not accepted uncritically and the papers used were
cross-referenced with other primary and secondary texts and oral sources. The
documents have also been contextualised in the period, placing them in the wider
picture of the 'east of Suez' policy.
This is not, however, an attempt at deconstructing British Government documents from
the period, as this was not in the scope of the thesis. Moreover, whilst the author has
tried to provide background information and details on the Arab Nationalist groups in
South West Arabia, this thesis is not an analysis of the politics, organisation or tactics
of the various Nationalist groups in either North or South Yemen during this period.
Information on these groups was limited, partly due to the language limitations of the
author, partly due to the lack of oral sources willing or able to discuss the events
covered in this thesis. A combination ofBritish Intelligence documents and secondary
sources did, however, provide sufficient material to fulfil the need for a certain amount
of coverage of the struggle between the Nationalist factions and between the
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Nationalists and the British. No analysis of the final years ofBritish rule in South
Arabia could be complete without coverage of the Nationalist campaign, but the latter is
not the central focus of this thesis. Furthermore, there is more detail in this thesis on
the Nationalists from a British perspective than was again previously available to other
historians. Thus, this thesis attempts to fill the gaps existing in other accounts of
British imperial history in Aden in the period in question, but it is not an analysis of the
Nationalist campaign.
The withdrawal from Aden has been covered by several books, but few have either
placed it as the main focus of the text, or had the access to sources that this author has
had. R.J. Gavin's 'Aden under British Rule, 1839-1967' is a comprehensive account of
the entire period ofBritish rule in South Arabia, which has the most detailed look at the
period 1839 to 1945 of any texts dealing with South Yemen. However, as Gavin
himself stated in his preface, the book was originally intended to cover this period
solely, but the ending ofBritish rule in 1967 "required that the story be carried forward
to its logical conclusion", although without dealing with the "deep complexities of the
last phase"1. Whilst this is not a fault with the book, it does leave some gaps in the
post-1945 history ofBritish rule in Aden which need to be filled. Probably the best
written and comprehensive account of the final years ofBritish rule is in Glen Balfour-
Paul's 'The end of empire in the Middle East', but Aden is only one of three episodes in
the book covering the relinquishment ofBritish colonies. Moreover, whilst the book
does place the Aden episode in the wider perspective ofMiddle East history at the time,
there is little about British defence policy, an important aspect given the nature ofAden
as a major military base.
There are other accounts of the end of empire in Aden and the Protectorate, but they
generally fall into one of two categories. Firstly there are autobiographies by former
colonial officials, and so subjective by their very nature. Secondly there are the texts
where the history in question is one of several dealt with by the book, and so unable to
give the case ofAden sufficient attention. The former group primarily consists ofTom
Hickinbotham's 'Aden', Charles Johnson's 'The view from Steamer Point', Kennedy
1
Gavin, R.J. - Aden Under British Rule, 1839-1967 (C. Hurst & Co., London, 1975)
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Trevaskis's 'Shades ofAmber' and Humphrey Trevelyan's 'The Middle East in
Revolution'. All of them are valuable sources of information and provide interesting
points of view and anecdotes, but only 'Shades ofAmber' covers the entire period in
question (Trevaskis served in South Arabia from 1953 to 1964, and is very critical of
British policy in the period after his service ended) whereas the others only deal with
the author's period in Aden. Moreover, with the exception ofMichael Crouch's 'An
Element of Luck' published in 1993, the autobiographies were published in the 1960s
without the benefit ofmore recent accounts to balance their accounts. Nevertheless,
autobiographies are a valuable source of information, and provide an alternative
perspective to the Government documents of the time. This is also true of the
autobiographies of the British politicians of the time, such as Harold Macmillan, Harold
Wilson, Denis Healey and Richard Crossman. These texts highlight the differences
among policymakers at the time, and also the differences between the politicians and
the colonial officials when the two sets of autobiographies are compared.
As regards the other group of texts, those dealing with Aden as part of a series of
examples of the end ofEmpire, they are again of interest, but have gaps which this
thesis aims to account for. Books such as J.B. Kelly's 'Arabia, the Gulf and the West',
Brian Lapping's 'The End ofEmpire', and Phillip Darby's 'British Defence Policy East
of Suez' are all valuable texts, but use British policy in Aden as part of a wider view at
British colonial or defence history. The impact ofBritish colonial, defence and foreign
policy on Aden, however, is not looked at in as much detail, with the possible exception
ofDarby's in-depth examination ofBritish defence policy after WorldWar Two.
Unfortunately the number of texts examining the issue ofBritish rule in Aden from an
Arab Nationalist perspective is limited. The only authors to tackle the issue are Helen
Lackner in 'P.D.R. Yemen', Fred Halliday in 'Arabia without Sultans' and Joseph
Kostiner in 'The Struggle for South Yemen'2, again all of value to an examination of
the history of South Arabia in the 1950s and 1960s. These three authors are the only
ones to attempt a study of the NLF, its organisation and tactics, as well as other
2 It should be pointed out that Kostiner is, at times, guilty ofnot questioning the NLF position and
evidence. However, there is still much of value in 'The Struggle for South Yemen', especially when
cross-referenced with other sources.
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Nationalist groups, but their coverage ofBritish policy is limited, largely because it fell
outside the scope of their books.
The other sources used in this thesis are primarily British Government documents from
the Public Record Office, and this author was among the first to examine the documents
covering the end ofBritish rule which were only released under the thirty-years rule in
the mid-1990s. An examination ofForeign Office, Colonial Office and Ministry of
Defence files from the late 1950s to mid-1960s has uncovered large amounts of
information which has been incorporated into this thesis. These sources are new to any
text dealing with the history of South Arabia in the 1960s, and so of significant value.
Moreover, no book dealing with the period in question published to date has
incorporated the amount ofprimary information about British policy in Aden that this
thesis contains.
Through a thorough examination of all these sources and texts, this author has
attempted to provide a detailed and original account of the final years of British rule in
Aden and South Arabia. Many questions arose, in particular the crucial issues of how
the final years ofBritish rule were so chaotic, and how the most extreme group of
Nationalists were able to take power in 1967. Obviously the two issues were linked,
but there are also different reasons for the two events occurring. Therefore, the issues
of the impact of British overseas policy on local politics, as well as how the NLF were
able to break free of the dominant regional influence ofNasser's UAR have to be
answered. The author of this thesis has attempted to resolve these issues and fill in the
gaps of other accounts of the period in question, as well as give a synthesis of all the
new information provided by the release of government documents concerned with the
period.
The first three chapters of this study are intended to give the local, regional and
international background to the focus period of 1959 to 1967. Chapter One is a
summary of the first century ofBritish rule in Aden and South Arabia, a period when
the Colony was governed from the Empire of India and was of little significance to
policymakers in both London and Bombay. Chapter Two gives a brief synopsis of
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international relations in the Middle East after 1945, in particular the decline ofBritish
influence and the development of the Cold War with its effect on the Arab world. The
aim of this chapter is to place colonial rule in South Arabia in an international context
and to help explain policy decisions taken by the British in the 1950s and 1960s. The
immediate post-war period is also the focus of Chapter Three which covers the period
1945 to 1959 when the Federation of the Arab Amirates of the South was created in the
Aden Protectorate. The growth of the Federation and its merger with the Colony of
Aden in 1963 is covered by Chapter Four, as well as an in-depth analysis of British
defence policy at the time and the impact it had on South Arabia. Chapter Five deals
with the years 1963 to early 1966, including the tensions between policy-makers in
London and British officials based in Aden and the differences (or lack of them)
between the Conservative and Labour Governments towards the remnants of the
Empire. A history of the Nationalist groups active in South Arabia in the 1960s is the
focus ofChapter Six, in particular the NLF, its development, structure, relations with
Nasser's Egypt and internal divisions. Finally Chapter Seven details the last two years
ofBritish rule in Aden, from Defence Secretary Denis Healey's 1966 White Paper to
the final withdrawal of British troops in November 1967 and the establishment of the
People's Republic of South Yemen.
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Chapter One: A History of British Rule in South Arabia, 1839-1945
Introduction
The capture of the port ofAden on 19 January, 1839 by a small British squadron under
Commander S.B. Haines was the first Colony taken by Great Britain in the Middle East
and the first during the reign of Queen Victoria. Aden had a natural harbour and lay on
the lines of communication between Britain and India and the Far East and so would
have made an ideal staging post for the numerous ships travelling from Europe to the
Indian Ocean and beyond. However, the following century saw minimal development
of either the port and town ofAden or the surrounding region, despite its geographical
and strategic benefits. Instead 'Fortress Aden' was the dominant policy for Aden in the
nineteenth century as British defence interests were the top priority. Policy-makers in
both London and Bombay (which had immediate responsibility for South Arabia)
regarded the new Colony as a defensive outpost for the Empire of India and also as a
second barrier for the defence of the Suez Canal after 1869. Thus, the strategic
importance of the Colony was paramount, but not so important as to merit any serious
attention. This was to change after 1945 when other colonies were relinquished (or the
British were forced to withdraw), but before that point Aden was of distinctly little
interest to any of the British Government departments. The result was that by World
War Two, the British presence had brought little benefit to South Arabia, other than to




Aden before the British
By the time Aden was captured by the British, South Arabia was of little significance
beyond the immediate region and consisted of numerous small sultanates, sheikhdoms,
amirates and nomadic tribes. Aden itselfwas little more than a fishing village of 1,289
inhabitants and belonged to the 'Abdali Sultan of Lahej1. However, the region had not
always been in a poor state and had supported a much larger population and been of
greater significance in earlier times. The incense empires such as Saba, Qataban, and
the Hadhramaut had flourished in pre-Islamic Arabia. Their wealth and fame were
primarily derived from incense, a valuable commodity to the religious communities in
the ancient Middle East, but also, as Gavin points out, these empires must have had a
large population to build their monuments, and so must have had a prosperous
agricultural system to feed the population2. These empires declined before the arrival
of Islam and the region was reduced to subsistence agriculture. There was another
period of power and prosperity under the Rasulid dynasty which ruled over an
independent Yemen from 1232 until the mid-fifteenth century3.
Even during regional declines, however, Aden remained an important regional trading
centre, in particular when the Red Sea route was the primary trading route to Asia (by
the same token, when the Persian Gulf route was in ascendancy, Aden suffered). Under
the Rasulids, Aden became the terminus for commerce with India, Ceylon, China and
South-East Asia (this was also partly due to the Mongols conquering the Tigris-
Euphrates region and disrupting the trading system there). Marco Polo visited Aden in
1276 and found a city of 80,000 with 360 mosques4. He also commented that the
1
Gavin, R.J. - Aden under British Rule 1839-1967 (C. Hurst & Co., London, 1975), p. 445 - other
historians such as Helen Lackner (who used Gavin as her main source for this period) and Gordon
Waterfield cite the figure at 600 inhabitants, but according to the Aden Records that Gavin used this was
the figure for the Arab population only, there was also a Jewish community of a similar size, and smaller
Somali and Indian groups
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wealth of the "Soldan of Aden" was based upon taxes and the trade with India, Aden
"being the most considerable mart in all that quarter for the exchange of commodities,
and the place to which all trading vessels resort"5. After the Rasulids, Aden continued
to prosper for some decades under the Tahirid dynasty (from 1450) which was a less
powerful and more localised regime. This meant that the Tahirids did not have to
spread their disbursements as widely as their predecessors and so maintaining Aden's
prosperity6.
Aden also benefited from Portuguese trading in the Middle East as they controlled the
Red Sea route, although increasingly Aden was only one commercial centre among
many rivals in the Arabian Peninsula. This was the last period of prosperity until the
British arrived, since Aden's position as the regional trading centre ended in 1535 when
the town was taken by Ottoman forces who were driving the Portuguese out of the Red
Sea. From then on Aden was part of the Ottoman province in the Yemen and its status
was relegated to that of the province's southern fortress. The Ottoman-Portuguese war
certainly helped the decline of Aden, but in economic terms the real decline was due to
the rise in coffee trading. The Ottomans chose Mokha as their main port in the Yemen
because it was closer to the main coffee-growing areas and Aden suffered as a result.
The decline in the coffee trade in the early eighteenth century saw the relaxation of
Ottoman control over the Yemen and the 'Abdali Sultan of Lahej with support from the
tribes ofYafi' took control over Aden in 1730. This did not result in a return to
prosperity as the areas controlled by the 'Abdali and the Yafi' were poor and the port
continued its decline until European interest in the Middle East was revived during the
Napoleonic Wars7.
The Capture ofAden
The occupation ofEgypt by the French in 1798 was a clear threat to British interests
and the authorities in both London and India realised steps had to be taken to secure the
5
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route to India and the East. Ships were sent to the Red Sea to command the Bab el
Mandeb, but the chosen site of Perim (a small island in the mouth of the Red Sea) was
barren and had no water, so the force tried to use Mokha as their base. However, anti-
British feelings there meant a relocation to Aden where the Sultan was either willing to
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accept or unable to oppose the stationing ofBritish troops in September 1799 . The
troops returned to India in 1800, and British forces drove out the French from Egypt in
1801, but the incident forced British authorities to re-examine the Western approaches
to India. Other factors were the growth in 'piracy' by ships based in the Persian Gulf
which was seriously affecting British trade between India and Europe and there was
also a renewed trade in coffee with Mokha involving British ships. In order to reassert
their dominance in the region and protect the increasing trade with the Peninsula,
British ships began charting the waters in the Red Sea in the early nineteenth century.
However, at this stage there was no attempt to establish a colony in the region, only to
protect British trade and shipping.
The situation changed again in the 1830s with Muhammed Ali's Egyptian forces
appearing to undermine the Ottoman Empire, including the Empire's provinces in the
Arabian Peninsula. This increased the threat to British trade in the Middle East as it
meant there was a danger of increased regional instability. Opinion in London was
split over Muhammed Ali as he replaced some ineffectual regimes in the Peninsula
which benefited British commercial concerns, as did his establishment of coaling
depots once interest grew in the use of steamships9. However, British foreign policy
strategy in the Middle East at the time centred on bolstering the Ottoman Empire
against Russia (which threatened British interests in India) and the actions of
Muhammed Ali were putting this strategy in danger. Moreover, there was the simple
fact that Egyptian presence in the Red Sea was a threat to British commercial
dominance in the area and the establishment of another power in South Arabia was in
itself a potential threat to India. For these reasons, increasingly forceful warnings were
sent to Muhammed Ali in the 1830s to leave Aden alone and not pass the Bab el
Mandeb, the southern entrance to the Red Sea.




However, by 1838 these warnings had changed in content so that the British were
claiming Aden for themselves and no longer warning others off10. The decision to take
Aden was much debated in both London and India by the British authorities, and at first
they negotiated with Sultan Muhsin Fadl al 'Abdali, the ruler of Aden and Lahej. The
reasons for wanting Aden were not solely to warn offMuhammed Ali, in fact probably
more important was the desire for a coaling depot on the sea route to India as
steamships were taking over from sail at the time. Many in the Government argued
that, if it was only as a coaling station that the British wanted Aden, then this could be
obtained without the expense of a military occupation. However, the man in charge of
the negotiations with Sultan Muhsin, Commander Stafford Bettesworth Haines of the
Indian Navy, wanted to take Aden and believed it could be converted into a major
international port again. Haines had been involved in the charting of the Red Sea and,
according to Gavin, there were accusations that he helped scupper the negotiations to
lease the island of Socotra as an alternative to Aden because he believed the latter had
better prospects11. Occupation was supported by the Governor of Bombay, Sir Robert
Grant, and there were strategic arguments from London supporting this option12. Lord
Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, also supported the case for occupation as he
wanted to warn offMuhammed Ali and protect the route to India13. However, there
was also strong opposition, including from the East India Company which had control
ofBritish interests in Aden at the time and wanted to reach agreement with the local
ruler rather than occupy the port. This was presumably out of fear that military action
would jeopardise the Company's commercial interests in the region.
Ultimately, the decision was taken out of the hands of both London and Bombay by the
actions of Haines who was sent back to Aden in September 1838 to negotiate again
with the Sultan. Negotiation failed once more, partly over terms, partly over mistrust
between Haines and Sultan Muhsin, and for two months there was minor conflict
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between the British ship and the 'Abdalis. Finally, Grant's successor as Governor of
Bombay ignored the Governor-General of India and sent more troops to Haines with the
intention of taking Aden forcibly14. The result was that after a brief naval
bombardment, British troops landed in Aden and hoisted the Union Jack, with the loss
of only sixteen killed and wounded. The seizure of Aden had been forced upon London
and India by Haines' actions and the decision ofBombay to support him, and the
British government had to accept the fait accompli. Ironically, within two years of the
occupation, Muhammed Ali had been forced out of the Arabian Peninsula and the other
Ottoman territories he had conquered by British actions in the Mediterranean, and one
of the reasons for taking Aden had been rendered obsolete.
Haines' Aden
Whilst the British Government in both London and India had to accept the reality of
events, there was no attempt to turn Aden into the major commercial centre that Haines
believed it could be. The fact that Haines, only a Naval Commander, remained in
charge of Aden as Political Resident for fifteen years reflected the fact that the port was
not viewed as important by his superiors. Had the port been viewed as anything more
than a coaling station by the authorities in London and the Government of India in
Bombay which had jurisdiction over the new colony, then a higher-ranked and better
connected official would have been in charge15. According to Gavin the question of
Aden's status among the decision-makers was a controversial one. Therefore, Haines
was in reality a compromise candidate between those who wanted to develop Aden and
those who wanted to keep it as a coaling depot and nothing else16.
Haines, therefore, got no support in his ambitious plans, especially as he managed to
alienate most of the British military commanders during his period in charge17. The
Political Resident was able to outwit most of his opponents within the British military,
14 Gavin - op. cit., p. 36
15
Lackner, Helen - P.D.R. Yemen (Ithaca Press, London, 1985), p. 8
16 Gavin - op. cit., p. 39
17 Lackner - op. cit., p. 8; Gavin - op. cit., pp. 39-43
12
but he inspired little respect in his methods for doing so and it is unlikely he would
have lasted so long ifAden had not been of such little importance to his superiors in
Bombay. One advantage that Haines did have, however, was his ability to play "the
• *18
tribal rivalry games according to much the same rules as the Yemeni leaders" . He
was also able to claim with some truth that "he alone understood the politics ofAden
and the hinterland and that his methods were successful"19. Despite this, Aden was
subjected to attacks from the neighbouring 'Abdali tribe which organised a coalition
against the British. Three frontal assaults between 1839 and 1840 failed to dislodge the
British from Aden, however, as did an attempted blockade of the port during the 1840s,
although supplies did run short at times and the garrison suffered from scurvy20.
Whilst Haines did understand local politics better than any other British official, his
personal relations with Sultan Muhsin were poor. There was deep mistrust between the
two, especially as the Sultan believed that Haines was supporting his sons and internal
enemies in Lahej against his rule. This mistrust was one of the main causes for the
assaults on Aden and the blockade that followed the British conquest. Haines was able
to make peace with the other neighbouring tribes, the 'Aqrabis and the Fadhlis, but
never with Sultan Muhsin. It was not until the latter's death in 1847 that relations
91
between Aden and Lahej improved . Haines was also capable ofmisreading the
situation, allying the British in Aden with the Imam of Sana against SharifHussain of
Abu 'Arish in the Tihama (the coastal strip ofYemen on the Red Sea). This move
backfired in 1844 when the Imam then allied himselfwith the Sharif against the British,
although their alliance did not last long enough to attack Aden22.
Ultimately, Haines was recalled to Bombay in 1854 and jailed for financial
9T
malpractices . During his period in charge, Haines had dominated the colony, but
failed to develop it into the major trading centre he had aimed for. His constant conflict
with other British officials and poor relations with certain hinterland rulers (in
18 Lackner - op. cit., p. 8
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particular Sultan Muhsin) had meant little was achieved in terms of administrative,
economic, or social progress in Aden. After his departure, attempts were made to bring
Aden and its administration into line with other British dependencies.
The Suez Canal and Economic Growth
The appointment ofHaines' successor was significant because Colonel James Outram
had important political connections, the lack ofwhich had limited Haines' attempts to
establish Aden as a major trading centre. Outram had such influence in the East India
Company that the Governor of Bombay had to be careful how he treated the new
Political Resident24. This not only showed a change of attitude by the Government of
India, but also tied Aden more closely into the East India Company. Another
significant factor was making Aden a free port in 1853, charging no duties for the
import and export of goods, which attracted the larger merchant ships visiting the Red
25 • •Sea . From 1854 onwards, therefore, there was a period of growth in the Aden
economy as Outram used his contacts and also recruited staff who had their own
connections to higher places, such as R. L. Playfair who 'had the ear of John Murray,
Ambassador to Persia and later Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign
26 • •Office . However, this growth only affected Aden's trade with India and beyond, there
was no attempt to improve links with the hinterland and make the colony into the
regional trading centre that Haines had envisaged.
Moreover, Aden's role as a trading centre was not intentional Government of India
policy as it had decreed in 1854 that "the military importance ofAden is to be
considered paramount to its commercial improvement, and should be the first object in
. 27 ,i .view" . This view ofAden as a military station first and commercial centre second
was predominant among the policy-makers in the Government of India until control of
South Arabia passed to the Colonial Office in 1937. Whilst trade did increase from
24 Gavin - op. cit., p. 91
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between 5 and 8 million rupees in the early 1850s to between 22 and 33 million rupees
by the early 1870s this was not due to measures enacted by either Bombay or London,
more through the activities of the Aden authorities28. Similarly, the occupation of
Perim island in 1856 and purchase of Little Aden peninsula in 1869 were done to
forestall French expansion into the Red Sea rather than to improve and develop the
colony. The strategic importance ofAden was the unquestioned reason for the British
presence. The 'Fortress Aden' policy dominated British thinking towards the port, with
the Colony being used as a punishment station due to its poor conditions of service.
The Abyssinian expedition in 1867-68 when British troops were sent from Aden into
Abyssinia to secure the release of the British consul there underlined the view of the
Colony as a military base and staging post for ships.
Whilst the military and strategic value ofAden was the raison d'etre for British policy
there, the shipping trade and coal bunkering industry were also important. The location
of the Colony on the world's major shipping lanes and its natural harbour meant there
was an ever-increasing number of ships stopping at Aden. The opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869 further increased the value of the port and Colony in both strategic and
commercial terms, although again the primary use ofAden was envisaged in military
terms. This policy of 'Fortress Aden' meant the town's defences were built up and
Aden came to be seen as the first line of defence for British interests in the Suez Canal.
The boost to the local economy from the opening of the Canal meant that Aden
replaced Berbera (on the Somali coast) as the major regional trading centre (which had
been Haines' ambition). However, it was still viewed by British policy-makers as a
military post and its primary role was to seal the Red Sea should the Suez Canal fall
into enemy hands. Even then its value was of "very doubtful importance" according to
Lord Northcote in 190329 and was only the second line of defence for the British
position in the Middle East (the first being naval command in the Mediterranean).
Moreover, the increase in commerce meant that Aden became increasingly difficult to
defend as the town spread, despite substantial improvements in the seaward defences.




The economy ofAden did continue to grow as merchants settled it as a major trading
centre (for cotton goods, coal, grain, coffee, and hides and skins). The port's ability to
emerge from a commercial war with the Perim Company (based on the island of Perim
in the mouth of the Red Sea) over coal bunkering in the 1890s showed the strength of
its commerce. However, this was largely due to the colony's strategic location and
natural harbours. This was especially true after the inner harbour was dredged in 1895
to allow the larger and faster steamships to take on coal there rather than the rougher
outer harbour30. Nevertheless, the 'Fortress Aden' concept was the dominant view in
both London and Bombay and took priority over any commercial value. Therefore, the
growth in the economy can be viewed as almost accidental since the primary role of
Aden was strategic and military rather than commercial, as can be seen with British
attitudes towards the hinterland.
Move into the Hinterland
Ottoman Rule in the Yemen
Whilst the defences ofAden were being strengthened and its economy benefited from
the opening of the Suez Canal and the military presence, little was done to improve
British awareness of the surrounding hinterland, let alone develop relations. Under
Bombay orders, the British authorities in Aden were prohibited from expanding their
influence into the Sultanates, Amirates and Sheikhdoms of South Arabia. Events did
force a re-think of this policy by the end of the nineteenth century since the British
position in Aden was being threatened by Ottoman expansion in Yemen and the claim
of the Sublime Porte in Constantinople to suzerainty over the region.
The Ottomans had controlled the Yemen from the early sixteenth through to the early
eighteenth centuries, but then the Empire had begun to decline and lose its grip over
30 ibid., p. 184
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certain territories. However, when the Imam of Sana (Haines' erstwhile ally, see
above) faced deadlock with Sharif Hussain of the Tihama in the 1840s, he invited the
Ottomans back to Yemen in order to bolster his regime. Hie Ottoman troops seized the
Tihama (the Sharif s territory) in 1848, and an agreement was reached with the Imam
whereby he would acknowledge Ottoman sovereignty and could rule his own territory
it
with a garrison ofOttoman troops . However, the presence of these troops caused riots
in Sana, the garrison was forced to withdraw back to the coast, the Imam was
assassinated and there followed twenty years of chaos and disorder with a powerless
Imamate. The opening of the Suez Canal allowed easier access for Constantinople to
send reinforcements to the Yemen and under Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha reoccupy Sana and
the northern highlands (1872)32.
Initially, the Ottoman presence in South Arabia was of no great concern to the British in
Aden. In fact the twenty years of unrest that followed the riots of 1849 caused an
economic depression in the Yemen, which was a boost to the Aden economy as there
was stability, unlike further north in the port ofMokha. However, the growth of the
pan-Islam movement within the Empire itself and the weakening hold on the Balkan
territories saw the Ottomans attempt to extend their control and move south to impose
their suzerainty over the whole of South Arabia. Arabia was still a powerful political
and religious symbol within the Islamic world, and was a potential focus for Islamic
unity under the Ottoman Sultan. Therefore, the presence of Britain in the comer of the
peninsula where the Prophet had sent his son-in-law Ali to preach the word of Islam
was not welcome to many Muslims. The result was a drive to control the whole of
South Arabia once Ottoman troops had recovered most of the Yemen in 1872, and
pressure was put upon the rulers of the hinterland around Aden to acknowledge
Ottoman sovereignty.
The threat to neighbouring rulers was noted in Aden, but due to the reluctance of
Bombay to expand British territory or influence, little could be done. The minimal
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importance of South Arabia meant that unless Aden itselfwas threatened, then there
were to be no attempts to extend British influence beyond the Colony. The formation
of a cavalry troop in 1868 at least enabled the authorities in Aden to attempt to map the
hinterland and expand their horizons beyond the bordering 'Abdali, Fadhli and 'Arabia
tribes. However, there was limited contact with the surrounding area and it was only
the threat ofOttoman expansion that forced the British into action. The first conflict of
interest had occurred in 1867 when Ottoman ships had sailed to the Hadhramaut to
support one side in a dispute, a move which greatly annoyed the British as they had
political relations with the other side34. However, negotiations in Constantinople saw
the withdrawal of the ships and an agreement to abstain from interference in the
Hadhramaut, but it was clear that an active policy in South Arabia was being pursued
by the Ottomans.
This policy was again shown in the early 1870s when pressure was brought to bear on
the southern Yemeni tribes by the Ottomans. Some of the rulers of these tribes
recognised Ottoman sovereignty (the Subaihi according to Lackner, and the Haushabi
according to Bidwell, quite probably both) and the 'Abdali Sultan of Lahej was
commanded to acknowledge the claim of the Sultan-Caliph to suzerainty over South
Arabia. This meant that the Ottomans were on the borders ofAden, and the
Government of India was forced to take action to extend influence into the hinterland to
secure the British position. Therefore, a list of nine tribes was drawn up by the British,
whose independence the Ottoman Empire should respect. The list consisted of the
tribes inhabiting the area surrounding Aden: the 'Abdali, Fadhli, 'Aulaqi, Yafi'i,
Haushabi, 'Amiri, 'Alawi, 'Arabia, and Subaihi (see Map 2, p. 18)35. This was only a
political delineation rather than a British claim to territory. Moreover, whilst these
tribes would later make up most of the territory which became the Western Aden
Protectorate it was not an attempt to create a Protectorate as the Government of India
were still loath to extend British influence beyond Aden.
34 Lackner - op. cit., p 10; Gavin - op. cit., pp. 164-5
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The May 1873 notification to Constantinople was not enough, however, as Ottoman
troops were sent towards Lahej and enlisted rivals of the Sultan as their allies. To
counter this the Indian Government acceded to the Political Resident's (Schneider)
request to send British troops to protect the 'Abdali Sultan. There was no fighting
between the two forces, but a conflict between the two Empires over South Arabia was
a distinct possibility. Indeed, the Duke ofArgyll (Secretary of State for India)
threatened to use the Indian Army to oust the Ottomans, a prospect which greatly
alarmed the Foreign Office who still regarded the Sublime Porte as a friendly
government. However, a threat of force sent to Constantinople forced the Ottoman
Empire to reconsider their actions since a war with Britain would add considerable
expense to an already costly venture in South Arabia. Moreover, defeat would have had
wider repercussions for Ottoman rule in the Yemen by shattering their air of
invincibility, and so the expansionist party in both Constantinople and London was
overruled, and Ottoman troops withdrew from Lahej and Haushabi country in
December 1873 . This withdrawal allowed Britain to consolidate the rule of the Sultan
of Lahej, and the series of incidents with the Ottoman Empire in this period did mean
that a re-think ofpolicy was necessary in order to strengthen the British position in
South Arabia.
The Protectorate Treaties and Demarcation ofthe Frontier
The Ottoman claim to sovereignty over the whole of South Arabia was not ended when
their troops withdrew from Lahej in 1873. The British, therefore, decided to
consolidate their interests in the region and in the late 1880s signed a series of
protectorate treaties with various tribes in South West Arabia. This was also partly out
of a change ofpolicy in the British Government from a mercantile concern to a more
colonialist and expansionist attitude, as shown by the Congress ofBerlin in 1885 and
the 'scramble for Africa' among the European powers in the late nineteenth century.
This rush for territory after the British intervention in Egypt in 1882 prompted fears




France and Germany) would encroach on British interests in the Red Sea and East
Africa. This in turn saw the Government of India seek to secure the coast of South
Arabia through treaties with the local rulers, starting with the Sultan of Qishn and
Socotra in 18 8637. However, there was no immediate attempt to secure protectorate
treaties with the 'nine tribes' listed in 1873, mainly because the occupation ofEgypt
had offended the Sublime Porte, and Britain did not want to threaten or further offend
the Ottoman Empire unduly in South Arabia.
Events in the hinterland, however, forced a change in this policy and protectorate
treaties were signed with inland tribes and rulers. The traditional society in South
Arabia was disrupted by the introduction of a new commodity, the trade in arms which
saw the arrival of the Le Gras, Remington, and Martini-Henry rifles to the region38.
The arrival of these new weapons from the 1880s onwards enabled the landless class to
assert their independence from the local ruler, and weakened local powerful families.
Moreover, the range and accuracy of the new rifles increased the ability to kill and
maim, which in turn increased the number of blood feuds and vendettas among families
and tribes, so further dividing society. One result of this was that the local rulers had to
increase their rates for protecting goods in transit as landless tribesmen attacked
caravans crossing the hinterland. Another was that many of the smaller chiefdoms,
feeling pressure from the Ottomans to the north, and from Lahej in the south, were
being squeezed and losing control of their territory. Many turned to the British for
protection and support for their rule. Some others might have also turned to the
Ottomans, but the latter was supporting many opponents of the local shaikh or amir and
so often seen as helping to undermine existing society. Moreover, in the early 1890s,
the Ottomans were having to deal with renewed rebellion in the Yemen from a revived
Imamate which was overrunning many of their positions in the north.
For these reasons, the weaker rulers in the hinterland began asking the British for






Shaikh and Lower Yafi'i Sultan in July 1895 and the Haushabi Sultan in August39. All
three rulers had been under pressure to accept Ottoman sovereignty, but instead turned
to the British for protection and financial aid. The recent deterioration in Anglo-
Ottoman relations justified these advances into the hinterland from the British point of
view, but the treaties did not halt the changes taking place in South Arabia. Moreover,
the tribal disputes were drawing the two international powers into confrontations,
although there was only one instance of armed conflict before World War One, at al
Darayjah in 1901. The incident had roots in the rivalry between the Sultan of Lahej and
the Shaikh ofMawiya in the Yemen, the latter building a fort on the main trade route
between Lahej and the Yemeni highlands at al Darayjah on the Haushabi border.
Initially the Shaikh had to withdraw under British pressure when the Ottomans denied
all knowledge of the fort, but then Ottoman favour was regained and the fort was re-
occupied. Whereas previously British policy would have involved attempts to resolve
the dispute through diplomacy in Constantinople, circumstances and personnel had
changed within British circles. The military at Aden were against pandering to the
Ottoman authorities once more, whilst the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, favoured a
more aggressive policy, and had little respect for the Ottomans. Furthermore, the
Foreign Office were no longer so sensitive to Ottoman susceptibilities as British
priorities were changing in international affairs away from the Middle East towards
Central and Eastern Asia. Therefore, the news of the reoccupation of al Darayjah was
not well received and in July 1901 a force ofBritish troops from Aden moved against
the fort. After a brief cannonade, the Shaikh's forces fled, leaving the Ottomans out¬
gunned, who then also withdrew leaving the British troops to raze the fort40.
The al Darayjah incident had important repercussions as it showed the British were in
earnest about protecting Aden and its immediate hinterland and unwilling to permit the
Ottomans to surround the Colony. After a period of tension, agreement was reached
between the Sublime Porte and the British to set up a boundary commission to draw a
line between the two spheres of influence. However, it proved very difficult to agree on






frontier, the 'Aden movable column' was formed and sent north. Furthermore, two
British cruisers were sent to Aden, and the Sublime Porte was warned that Britain
would not allow Ottoman reinforcements to land to aid the troops dealing with the
Imam's rebellion in northern Yemen41. The result of these measures was to not only
force the Sultan to back down and withdraw his troops from the Dali' area, but also to
swing the balance in the hinterland in favour of the British. Those local rulers that had
been either delaying their decision or even actually hostile to the British responded to
invitations from Aden to negotiate. The result was that, despite London's reluctance, in
the year from May 1903 a series ofprotectorate agreements was reached with most of
the rulers within the limits of British claims in South Arabia (the 'Amiri, Upper Yafi'i,
Upper 'Aulaqi and Beihan districts42). These treaties did not endow the British with
any real authority in the hinterland, but they were meaningful as they formally extended
British influence beyond Aden. As regards the boundary commission, differences
continued, but the work was concluded after the Ottoman Commissioner signed a
proces-verbal in April 1905 settling most of the outstanding differences. In fact,
relations between the British in Aden and the Ottomans in the north substantially
improved over the next decade, the authorities in Aden even allowing the passage of
Ottoman mail through Lahej during the Italian blockade of the Yemen (1911)43.
The Protectorate Treaties signed with the hinterland rulers were basically forced upon
London by the Government of India and Aden, but the British Government would not
accept any further incursions. The Aden authorities planned to extend trade with the
hinterland and even proposed a railway scheme into the area. However, London vetoed
these plans and in October 1906 ordered the withdrawal of British troops from the
hinterland, forcing Aden back into the policy of inactivity that had been the norm
before the al Darayjah incident44. The more active policy pursued by Aden had been
strongly supported by Lord Curzon in India, but the change of government in London in
1906 had brought the Liberals to power, who were opposed to expansionist policies, in
particular Lord Morley, the new Secretary of State for India. Therefore, British policy
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in South Arabia returned to non-intervention in the hinterland and consolidation of the
defensive position in Aden.
World War One
During the years up to World War One the Ottomans were too busy dealing with the
Imam in Yemen to intervene in Aden's hinterland. In fact, the Imam was more of a
threat to British influence as his forces drove the Ottomans out ofmuch of the Yemeni
highlands and were on the borders of British-protected territories at times. However,
conflict with the Imam would not occur until after the Ottoman surrender in the Middle
East in October 1918. The only potential threats from the Imam were the letters sent in
1912 to the Qutaybi and 'Alawi shaikhs, the Haushabi and Lower Yafi'i Sultans and the
Upper Yafi'i chiefs, but these were seeking only a general acceptance of the Imam's
authority. This was nothing more than he had received from the 1911 agreement with
the Ottomans, acceptance of his religious suzerainty and payment of the Islamic tithe45.
As regards Aden itself, the port's business continued to grow and the garrison was
expanded, but it was still not a primary concern of the British compared to the more
important colonies of India and the Middle East.
Once the First World War broke out, little in fact changed in South Arabia. The main
concern of both Britain and the Ottoman Empire was further north in Egypt or the
Persian Gulf, and that was where the majority of fighting between the two powers took
place. Reinforcements were sent to Aden to counter the already large Ottoman army in
the Yemen, but the main British weapons in the Protectorate continued to be money,
arms and a promise of independence from Ottoman rule. The British made attempts to
bring the Imam under their influence through the Sultan of Lahej and the Sharif of
Mecca as a rebellion behind Ottoman lines could have caused them severe difficulties.
However, the Imam was afraid the British wanted to extend their influence beyond
Aden and the Protectorate, and his rule had been recognised in northern and eastern
Yemen by the Ottomans so British attempts failed. Therefore, the British turned to
45 ibid., p. 242
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Sayyid 'Idris in the Tihama to undermine the Ottoman cause, signing an alliance in
April 191546. This alliance tied the two sides together politically and militarily, a fact
which would have consequences in Anglo-Imamate relations after World War One.
The arms and money 'Idris received were used to tie down Ottoman troops that might
otherwise have been turned against the British elsewhere in the Middle East. However,
'Idris was a rival of the Imam to control of the tribes in the Yemen, and the latter would
hold this against the British after 1918.
In Aden itself, the British took up a largely defensive stance and made no attempt to
shore up the Protectorate against an Ottoman attack. Therefore, when Ottoman troops
crossed the border at the end of June 1915 and moved on Lahej the authorities in Aden
were in no real position to respond. The 'Aden Movable Column' was quickly formed
from the Aden garrison and sent to Lahej where the 'Abdali forces had been easily
defeated. However, the forced march north in hot conditions took its toll on the troops,
the Subaihi camel drivers deserted with most of the stores, the advance force sent in
requisitioned cars got stuck in the sand, and only 250 men and a ten-pounder battery
actually reached Lahej47. There were some skirmishes with the Ottoman troops, but the
focus had by then changed from defending Lahej to enabling an orderly withdrawal, but
even that was not achieved as large amounts of equipment were left behind. The
Ottomans continued their advance whilst the British drew up defensive lines at
Khormaksar and prepared for a final stand. However, Aden command's fears were
exaggerated as the Ottoman troops stopped at Shaikh 'Uthman on the outskirts ofAden
proper. Given the fiasco at Lahej, it was not surprising that the Resident was dismissed,
his command transferring to General Younghusband who drove the Ottomans five
miles clear ofAden, but no further. Allegedly the General was only concerned that
Aden golf course was out of range of the Ottoman artillery and had no interest in
occupying Lahej as it would then have to be garrisoned. The rest of the war was spent







From Fortress Aden to Forward Policy
The Imam ofYemen and the Treaty ofSana
World War One left Britain in control ofmuch of the Middle East and the Empire was
expanded to include mandates in Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. However, there was
no expansion in South Arabia and British and Ottoman troops were still in the same
position as they had been since 1915. Under the armistice, the Ottomans had to
withdraw from the Yemen, and their position was quickly filled by the Imam who
aimed to unify the country under his rule. This left the British and the Imam as the two
regional powers in South Arabia. Neither side trusted the other, and there was to be
almost constant conflict until the Imamate was overthrown in 1962. The British in
Aden felt that the Imam had not done enough against the Ottomans and had ambitions
to control the Protectorate, whilst the Imam resented the British preference for 'Idris in
the Tihama. The departing Ottoman troops in the Protectorate were replaced by those
of the Imam in Dhala, Upper Yafi'i and Haushabi, whilst to speed up the Ottoman
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withdrawal the British occupied Hodeidah on the Red Sea coast in December 1918 .
British policy regarding the importance of the hinterland at the time was as limited as it
had been ever since Aden was first taken. The debate over whether to abandon the
Protectorate, negotiate with the Imam or consolidate the British position outside Aden
continued through the 1920s, but for the most part the Imam's actions forced the British
to act. At first non-intervention continued to dominate under the Government of India.
The policy was to keep the local rulers divided and split so as not to challenge the
British position:
"What we want is not a united Arabia but a weak and disunited Arabia split into
little principalities as far as possible under our suzerainty - but incapable of co¬
ordinated action against us, forming a buffer against the powers in the West"49.




This meant no more territory was to be annexed, but to reconcile the Imam and 'Idris
and count them among British satellites. However, there were several problems with
this policy, not least that the Imam and 'Idris were irreconcilable, and that the Imam
desired control over all historical 'al-Yemen', including the Protectorate. British and
Imamic policies in South Arabia were therefore also irreconcilable and the latter's
actions meant that non-intervention was not really a possibility unless the Protectorate
Treaties were to be renounced.
Another factor was that the Imam's claim to sovereignty over all of the Yemen was not
universally welcomed by its inhabitants. The Imam was a Zeidi Shi'ite Muslim
whereas the majority of the population of the Protectorate, and also of the Tihama, were
Shafi'i Sunni and did not want a Zeidi overlord any more than many of them had
wanted an Ottoman overlord. The Imam, in fact, used tribes mainly from the Zeidi
north of Islam in his conquest of the Yemen, and treated the expansion as a jihad:
"The tribesman who enrolled under the Imam's standard and came from north
of San'a to the lowlands of the Tihamah, to Ibb, to Ta'izz, and al-Bayda' was
not referred to as a soldier but as a warrior in the cause of the God"50.
The 'Idris on the other hand was a Shafi'i, which was another reason for the
irreconcilable differences, although the fact that both had designs on dominating the
Yemen was probably more telling. The 'Idris died in 1923 and his 16-year old son was
driven out of Hodeidah (which had been vacated by the British in 1920 and left to the
'Idris) in 1925, leaving the Imam with no major rival in the Yemen51. However, the
Imam's control over the tribes was not complete, and during the 1920s he acted as more
of an arbitrator than a ruler, but in the early 1930s he imposed his full authority on
them, keeping up to 4,000 hostages to ensure his control52.
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The Imam, however, was largely isolated from the outside world, and knew little about
international politics and the real power of the British. Since he had assumed the
Imamate in 1904, Imam Yahya had seen the British only in South Arabian terms.
Limited to Aden, the British had been defeated by the Ottomans at Lahej, and the Imam
had successfully taken much territory that they allegedly protected after World War
One. For these reasons, Yahya did not see the British as formidable opponents. This
would mean that it would take a lot for the authorities in Aden to convince the Imam
that they would not accept his claim to the Protectorate, and that his troops should
withdraw from Amiri, Qutaybi, 'Alawi, Shaibi, Audhali, Upper Yafi'i, and Subaihi
lands, some ofwhich were within 40 miles ofAden . Negotiation was attempted and
in 1926 Sir Gilbert Clayton (who had successfully negotiated with Ibn Saud and King
Feisal) went to San'a to discuss the Protectorate with the Imam54. The Imam was
willing to allow Britain to retain Aden, promised not to send troops into other parts of
the Protectorate, and agreed to maintain the status quo in those territories where Aden's
interests needed to be safeguarded (in particular Lahej), but he would not withdraw his
troop from those areas already occupied. This underlines that the Imam felt he was
negotiating with an equal, certainly not making concessions to a superior power, and
the breakdown of the talks left Yahya maintaining his claim to the Protectorate. Clearly
the British could not remove the Imam's troops from southern Yemen without force,
and unfortunately for Yahya, due to his isolation, he did not know much about the RAF
and air proscription.
The refusal of the Imam to withdraw from nominally British-protected territories meant
that the Government of India had to countenance force to keep their promises to the
Protectorate rulers. However, this was at a time when the Middle East was a low
priority for Britain given its concerns with Europe, which saw the region starved of
defence resources in the inter-war period55. The estimated cost of forcing the Imam's
troops out of the Protectorate was £1 million which was a considerable expenditure for
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what was a prospective minimal return56. Fortunately for the Government of India, the
Air Ministry volunteered to take over responsibility for the Defence ofAden. The
advantage of air power had been shown by the use of the RAF to protect British
interests in Afghanistan, Russia, the North-West Frontier, Somaliland and Iraq, all at
much less cost than land action would have created. Therefore, Aden became an Air
Command in 1927 and when the Imam's troops invaded Subaihi territory again in 1927,
an ultimatum that they would be bombed forced their withdrawal57. The Imam had now
been warned that further raids would lead to air attacks against his forces, and so when
his troops kidnapped two Protectorate chiefs in February 1928, Ta'izz and other sites in
the Yemen were bombed58. This shook Yemeni morale greatly, and large parts of the
Protectorate were evacuated as the Imam revised his opinion about British power.
However, there was no attempt at negotiations immediately, in fact there were
continued raids across the border, although these were usually ended by the threat of
bombing.
The Imam, though, was also in dispute with Ibn Saud (King of the Hijaz and Najd, then
King of Saudi Arabia from its creation in 1932) and when Yahya tried to enforce his
claim to territory in the north he met with resistance. The resulting conflict meant that
the Imam had to come to terms with the British to the south as he did not have the
resources to resist pressure coming from both directions. Six weeks of discussion lead
to the Treaty of Sana (February 1934) by which the Imam evacuated Audhali territory
and released the hostages from Protectorate tribes, in return for which the British
saluted the Imam as King of the Yemen and dropped the claim to al-Bayda on the
frontier. However, the most important clause in terms ofAnglo-Imam relations was
Article IE which was highly ambiguous and became the source ofmuch controversy. In
English the clause read as "The settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the
Yemen is deferred ...", whereas in Arabic it could be read as "The settlement of the
question of the Southern Yemeni area .. ."59. The ambiguity lay in the Arabic word
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hudud which could be read as either a definite border - which is how the British saw it -
or an area of land - which was how the Imam read it. In other words, the authorities in
Aden saw this as postponing the question of the exact border between the Yemen and
the Protectorate, whereas the Imam saw the Treaty as deferring the issue of the
Protectorate as a whole. The negotiations did lead to friendlier relations between the
Imam and Aden, but once attempts to develop the Protectorate were finally taken by the
British they were viewed by Yahya as infringing the Treaty of Sana, which would cause
great problems after World War Two.
The India Office andStagnation
As noted above, the intended policy of the Government of India towards South Arabia
was non-intervention, although this was difficult in practice given the ambitions of the
Imam to rule over the Protectorate. However, even the British responses towards the
Imam were to be as limited as possible to avoid extending British territory and
responsibilities in the area. Therefore for the twenty years after World War One, little
was done to enhance the development ofAden or extend British influence in the
hinterland.
Part of the problem was the inter-departmental differences that had plagued British
policy-making as regards South Arabia for almost a century, largely due to reluctance to
bear the costs of running Aden. India Office and Foreign Office tactics to deal with the
Ottoman Empire had frequently been very different, in particular at the turn of the
century over the al Darayjah incident when the Government of India won, but more
often than not the more cautious Foreign Secretary would prevail. During World War
One the India Office, Foreign Office and Service Ministries had all been involved in the
running ofAden, and after 1918 the Colonial Office became involved as it took over
the running of the Protectorate. This division of responsibility between India Office
and Colonial Office would cost Aden dear as it missed out on the constitutional
advances occurring in the other colonies and imperial interests60. Increasingly the view
60 Gavin - op. cit., p. 255
30
was taken in London that Aden was an Arab town and so should be taken from Indian
Office jurisdiction, but the rivalry between India Office and Colonial Office was such
that the former was loathe to relinquish control.
Eventually the Colonial Office did take control of the running of South Arabia, but not
until 1937. During the 1920s, the India Office continued to run Aden from Bombay
and developments were minimal. Relations with the hinterland were still kept to a
minimum, despite the need to counter Imamic intrusion. The arrival of the RAF helped
in this, since air proscription meant there was no need to build roads and develop
communications with the Protectorate as there was no need for land action. Moreover,
to protect the RAF station (and help with the local police when required) the Aden
Protectorate Levies (APL) were created in 192861. The APL consisted largely of local
Arabs with British officers, but there was a strong Indian influence, such as the
uniform, language used, and the number of Indians enrolled, which was resented by the
Arab rank and file. However, a large number of the soldiers were taken from
Protectorate tribes which did increase contact between the authorities in Aden and the
tribes, although not to the extent that development of the hinterland took place, nor was
there still much political or economic integration.
The Government of India was not concerned about extending British influence into the
hinterland, however. The chief concerns of the officials in Bombay were with events in
India, not South Arabia, especially not the expansionist and interventionist policies of
the Colonial Office. The Government of India:
"regarded it (Aden) merely as a military outpost. A fortress on the sea route
from Europe to India, with the Protectorate as a kind of glacis or vacuum
surrounding it, and keeping unwanted neighbours ... at a distance"62.
The large Indian community in Aden (numbering over 7,000 by 1931) was rich and
powerful enough to make its views heard in Bombay, and it regarded the transfer of the
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colony to the Colonial Office as harmful to their interests63. This in turn saw the
Government of India pressure London, which meant that whenever Aden was discussed
in Government the agreement of several departments was required (the Foreign Office
and the Service Ministries were also involved), which in turn paralysed policy. The
result was that officials in Aden had a lack of funds and felt neglected, and relations
between Aden and Bombay turned sour. The resulting administrative uncertainty
paralysed development as London tried to turn control ofAden to the Colonial Office
whilst Bombay resisted.
The Colonial Office andAdvisory Treaties
Once the Government of India lost control ofAden, however, things started to change
radically. The appointment of Sir Bernard Reilly as Resident in 1930 saw the start of a
more expansionist 'forward policy'. Reilly, like many ofhis predecessors, wanted to
free Aden from the grip of Bombay and, unlike his predecessors, he succeeded. In
1932, Aden was removed from under the jurisdiction of the Bombay Legislative
Assembly and it was transferred to the authority of the Viceroy of India64. It was not
until 1937 that the Colonial Office took over the administration ofAden, but even
before that Reilly was able to re-orientate policy towards the hinterland as Bombay had
become divorced from events in South Arabia. Gradually the 'Fortress Aden' concept
was abandoned, and schemes to tie Aden more closely with the hinterland came into
being. Aden's medical services were extended into the Protectorate, the education
service was also opened up more, and the Aden Police, which had been an Indian unit,
went through a process ofArabisation. These changes did not have an immediate
effect, but they showed a change in attitude by the British.
Economically, Aden continued to prosper, again surviving competition with Perim for
coal bunkering. In fact Aden survived the world-wide depression in 1929-30 whilst
Perim collapsed, largely due to the construction of an oil-bunkering depot (established
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in 1920) which helped ensure Aden's continuing prosperity as oil-fired ships took over
from coal-fired ones65. However, the Protectorate was still seeing little of this
increasing prosperity, especially after the Imam closed the road between Aden and the
Yemen in 1932 which resulted in a slump in the landward trade. Moreover, the
increasingly industrial Aden meant that the proportion of trade linking it with the
decidedly non-industrial hinterland was diminishing.
The British in Aden, though, were attempting to improve links between colony and
Protectorate. Once the Colonial Office had taken over Aden, a forward policy was
followed in the Protectorate to try to bring it closer economically, administratively, and
politically to both Aden and the British. In order to achieve these aims, a series of
Advisory Treaties were signed with various hinterland rulers from 1937 until 1957, the
first being with the Qu'ayti Sultan66. These treaties went further than the earlier
protectorate ones by stating the ruler would "take British advice on matters not relating
to religion"67. In theory the Advisory Treaties would allow the reform of the hinterland
societies to bring them closer to Aden. However, the funds available to the rulers were
generally very small, and what little they received was generally spent on keeping their
tribes content by supplying arms and ammunition.
British influence expanded as did their knowledge about South Arabia through the
Political Officers who were sent to different rulers as their advisers. Initially the
numbers of Political Officers were few, although they were able to help re-organise
tribal forces and introduce a certain amount of stability to the Protectorate. This was
especially true ofHarold Ingrams in the Eastern Aden Protectorate (EAP) who
convinced the many tribes of the Hadhramaut to sign thousands of truces in 1937,
known as 'Ingrams Peace', and ended the conflicts that had threatened the
disintegration ofHadhrami society . The influence of the ruler, though, frequently
suffered as the imposition ofBritish advice often undermined the traditional tribal
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structure by choosing one side against another (with the Imam generally choosing the
other side) and so extending feuds which might have otherwise died down. Moreover,
what development that was introduced to the Protectorate generally had a negative
effect. The extension of 'roads' (many were little more than tracks, Tarmaced roads
were not established until the 1950s, and even then they did not extend far into the
Protectorate) and introduction of motorised transport in the 1930s would later destroy
the traditional livelihood of the camel owners and caravan leaders. Many tribesmen
relied on charging customs dues on transport through their territory, another system that
the British were determined to put an end to. There were attempts to soften these
blows, such as limiting the types of goods that lorries could transport, but these were
generally ineffective:
"the fees for the use of roads were designed not only to give revenue but also, in
conjunction with minimum fares, to protect the beduin camel traffic. In fact
goods were not allowed to be carried by road unless they were perishable, too
heavy for camels, or urgent, in all ofwhich cases the freight charged had to be
higher than that which would be charged for camel transport"69.
Furthermore, after World War Two some tribal groups so resented these invasions of
their independence by roads and lorries that they became 'dissidents'. Sir Kennedy
Trevaskis describes meeting the Khalilis, a group of rebel tribesmen, in the 1950s and
asking them for an explanation for their actions. They explained that:
"It was the road which Mcintosh had made through their country in 1951, to
link the Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdom with Aden. This was their country and within
it they alone had a right to propose or dispose. By making a road through it
Mcintosh had been as much an aggressor as if he had invaded their
encampments and stolen their goats. They had been robbed of their right to levy
tolls and protection money off travellers across their land and with the
appearance ofmotor traffic on the road they had also been robbed of their
former income as cameliers"70.
The extension ofBritish interests in South Arabia was to cost the livelihood ofmany
tribesmen, who would later rebel against these intrusions by the Government in Aden.
69
Ingrams, Harold - Arabia and the Isles (John Murray, London, 1966), p. 298
70
Trevaskis, Kennedy - Shades ofAmber (Hutchinson, London, 1968), p. 85
34
These developments were advantageous for trade and commerce in Aden and made it
easier to move freight, and also troops, around the Protectorate. However, there was
little attempt to replace the loss of income and livelihood of those who lived there. The
funds for development of the Protectorate were mainly used by the rulers to keep their
tribes happy with gifts of arms and ammunition rather than create other forms of
employment and income. The one major exception to this was the introduction of
cotton to the Abyan region (straddling the Fadhli and Lower Yafi'i Sultanates) in 1940,
and, with the establishment of the Abyan Development Board in 1947, by 1954 there
were 45,000 acres irrigated71. The result was prosperity in the area and a settled
community emerged, but Abyan was the exception rather than the rule as the British
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attempted to create self-supporting chiefdoms . Moreover, one of the main reasons
that cotton was introduced to Abyan was as insurance in case other sources were cut off
as a result of the war.
During World War Two, Aden reverted to its status as a military base whilst, as in the
First World War, the main fighting in the Middle East took place further north. The
garrison was reinforced from India and the APL's manpower was increased to 600,
although it did not have a very active role, the only attacks on Aden were a few Italian
bombing raids and the main function of the colony was as a marshaling port for
■ji
convoys crossing the Indian Ocean . However, the war did effect Aden in that the
increased garrison raised concerns about food supplies, which led to the creation of the
'Khanfar Development Board', the predecessor of the Abyan Cotton Board, in order to
develop agriculture. Moreover, a drought swept South Arabia in 1943 and 1944 and
this also gave momentum to the development of agriculture, and Political Officers were
sent into the most fertile areas of the Protectorate in order to cultivate land. This was a
continuation of the forward policy of the late 1930s, and saw increased British
influence in the Protectorate. Furthermore, troops were sent in to end feuding which
was limiting economic activity in Beihan, order was imposed and an administration
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established. This became the fore-runner of other administrations in the Protectorate
which saw a further erosion of the traditional tribal structure and the extension of
British control from March 1944 when the idea was approved by the Colonial Office74.
However, the problem with these new administrations was that they depended almost
entirely on British funds for survival, and so had to accept Whitehall's orders for using
the money. Whilst there were benefits for South Arabia, such as the building of schools
and medical centres, the reality was that any attempt to create a self-sufficient
Protectorate was unlikely to succeed given the limited amount of good agricultural land
and water available.
Conclusion
By the end ofWorld War Two, the forward policy ofReilly and the Colonial Office
was beginning to take shape through the Advisory Treaties. The first hundred years of
British rule in Aden under the Government of India had seen the Colony be valued only
for its strategic location and position on the world's shipping lanes. There had been
little attempt to extend British influence beyond Aden, other than to provide a defensive
barrier in the hinterland from the threat from the Ottomans and the Imam of Yemen.
Under the Colonial Office, this policy was to change to a more expansionist one which
sought to extend British influence in South West Arabia, albeit with the emphasis still
on creating a protective barrier for Aden. However, this policy was also to create new
problems for the British as it involved the Aden authorities more than ever before in the
affairs of the Protectorate. The developments that were introduced by the Political
Officers would later help to erode the authority of the rulers (although boost the wealth
of a limited circle of followers), remove the income ofmany tribesmen, and destroy the
traditional society of the hinterland. These developments created a ruling class that
were almost entirely dependent on British munificence, and a large group of
discontented tribesmen that would later take up arms and be a useful weapon for the
Imam in his campaign against the Protectorate and the British in Aden.
74 Gavin - op. cit., p. 312-3
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Chapter Two: The Middle East after World War Two
Introduction
Despite the Allied victory in World War Two, the British economy, and nation as a
whole, was drained of its resources and power. Nevertheless, the British Empire
remained intact and many within Whitehall believed that this position should be
maintained. Possibly surprisingly, even under Attlee's Labour Government (1945-
1951), the decisions to withdraw from empire were minimal. In fact, the major change
to the British Empire, Indian independence in 1947, had been decided in the 1930s.
However, the ability of any British government, either Labour or Conservative, to play
a world role was no longer as great as it had been. The decline of the former world
'superpowers' ofBritain and France was not inevitable, but was increasingly likely after
the immense effort and difficulties both countries underwent between 1939 and 1945.
Their earlier global dominance was further challenged by the rise of two new powers,
both opposed to British and French colonialism, which were themselves beginning to
dominate the world stage: the United States and the Soviet Union. The start of the
Cold War between the two superpowers saw the globe bisected into two spheres of
influence, with Britain increasingly unable to compete. However, the decline from
international power to regional influence was not rapid, and the decision to hold onto
such colonies as Aden until the late 1960s showed that those in power did not see
Britain as the second-rate player it was becoming. Whilst this could be regarded as a
'rearguard action' in the face ofmore powerful competition, it can also be seen as
determination to remain a global force. It should also be noted that, whilst Britain was
unable to compete directly with either of the superpowers, they were a useful ally for
the Americans who had little influence in the Middle East in the period immediately
following 1945.
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Decline of the British Empire and the Cold War
British Overseas Policy after 1945
The only power that was in a position to challenge Britain in the Middle East following
World War Two was the Soviet Union which had troops in northern Iran and was
pressuring Turkey for access through the Bosphorus. In the Arab world, however,
Britain still appeared to reign supreme and unchallenged with her massive military
bases in Palestine and the Canal Zone, a situation which was to change drastically in the
following decade. To a large extent, British foreign, defence and colonial policies in
the Middle East in the twenty years following 1945 were aimed at preserving this
paramount position in the region. This task, however, was increasingly difficult to
achieve given the opposition ofArab Nationalism, the weakness of the British
economic situation and mounting domestic pressure for demobilisation.
The Labour Government of Clement Attlee which came to power in 1945 was divided
between those who wanted to maintain the empire, such as Foreign Secretary Ernest
Bevin, and those who wanted overseas commitments cut, the 'Little Englanders' such
as the Prime Minister. Whilst Bevin and Attlee agreed on many issues and formed a
formidable partnership in policy-making, there were differences over the extent to
which Britain would be able to maintain a world role. Bevin sought to preserve Britain
as a great power with the Middle East as the principal pillar of the British position in
the world. Attlee, however, was more sceptical of Britain's military and economic
ability to remain a great power in the Middle East and he was willing to recognise that
British power had diminished and that a withdrawal from empire was potentially
necessary. The Foreign Secretary believed, though, that by transforming the unequal
colonial relationship with the Arabs into a more equal partnership, with Britain and the
Middle Eastern states working together for mutual advantage, then the military burden
would be reduced1. Unfortunately the lack ofBritish resources and the fact that the
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Government's allies in the region were the unpopular old reactionary rulers limited this
policy of cooperation. Instead, the British position continued to be maintained through
direct rule in Palestine (to 1947), Sudan and Aden, and indirectly (through local allies)
in the Gulf, Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt.
Bevin had the support of the Chiefs of Staff, an important voice in policy-making, who
feared a British withdrawal from the Middle East would allow the Soviets to threaten
Africa and the oil supplies in the Gulf2. However, the loss ofPalestine in 1948, and
then of the Canal Zone in 1954 severely damaged British aspirations to play the role of
the great power in the Middle East. The policy ofAttlee, with the advantage of
hindsight, was more realistic since to have cut losses and withdrawn after World War
Two would have saved a lot of expense and effort. Bevin's attempts to consolidate
Britain's position in the Middle East failed in the face of regional instability, Arab
nationalism, and resentment of the British military and economic presence.
Nevertheless, despite the problems in Egypt and Palestine (until the creation of the state
of Israel in 1948) and the eviction of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company following the
Nationalist coup in 1951, British policymakers still believed that the UK could play the
role ofworld power in the region, a beliefmaintained up to and beyond the humiliation
of Suez in 1956.
Part of the reason for the continuation of the belief in Britain as a world power, at least
as far as the Middle East was concerned, was that very little had changed in the region
following six years of a Labour Government. Whilst the Palestine mandate had been
relinquished and the military bases at Cairo and Alexandria evacuated, there were still
military installations in the Canal Zone, Sudan, Libya, Cyprus, Jordan, Iraq, Aden and
Bahrain. During the 1950s, however, this situation changed quite drastically as the
Conservative Governments ofChurchill, Eden and Macmillan had to learn to deal with
the new revolutionary Arab regimes that replaced the old 'politics ofnotables'3.
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Elsewhere in the Empire, the move towards independence was accepted by the British,
and the Conservatives, in particular under Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister from
1956 and Iain Macleod as Colonial Secretary, were willing to instigate de-colonisation
in Africa. Macmillan's 'wind of change' speech in South Africa in February 1960
announced Britain's support for African independence urging the European settlers to
accept that "this growth of national consciousness is a political fact"4. However, the
Middle and Far East, under both Labour and Conservative Governments were viewed
as the two areas where Britain could still play a world role, and so any growth of
national consciousness was generally either ignored or resisted.
Britain's determination to remain in a position of influence 'East of Suez' (the term for
the regions surrounding the Indian Ocean to the north, west and east, primarily the
Middle and Far East) dominated foreign and defence policy in the late 1950s and 1960s.
The original reason behind the British presence in these regions was primarily to defend
the Indian Empire as well as protect the trade routes between India and Britain.
However, the granting of independence to India and Pakistan in August 1947 removed
the 'Jewel of the Crown' and should have consequently reduced the value of colonies
such as Aden in the minds of overseas policymakers. This, though, was not the case. A
combination of factors saw the continued presence ofBritish troops and overseas civil
servants in Aden, Singapore, Bahrain and elsewhere for another twenty years (more in
certain cases). As regards the Middle East the region's value was primarily as the
world's leading supplier of oil, and British troops in Egypt (until 1954), Cyprus (until
1960) and Aden (to 1967) were seen as vital to protecting the increasingly valuable
commodity. Another factor was the desire to keep the USSR out of the region, as well
as provide a buffer zone against Soviet attempts to gain access to the rich mineral
deposits in Africa. Finally, the British military and political presence in the Middle and
Far East was a useful support for American foreign policy in the east of Suez region,
and enabled Washington to concentrate its resources elsewhere. These factors all
served to justify the continued British presence east of Suez, despite the ever-increasing
cost, financially and politically, to successive Governments.
4
Lapping, Brian - End ofEmpire (Granada, London, 1985), pp. 13-4
40
The main problem, however, was that there was rarely any defined aims, rather policy
seemed to be dictated by reacting to events. Given the economically, physically and
mentally exhausted state ofBritain following the Second World War, a reappraisal of
overseas policy should have taken place. Instead, the view in both Government and
among the population at large was of the country as a world power, a belief that was not
properly challenged until the Suez crisis. Whilst Attlee wanted to instigate cuts
overseas after World War Two, the Chiefs of Staff, with Bevin's support, refused to
countenance cutting troop numbers in the Middle East5. Even when the defence chiefs
were forced to evacuate the Canal Zone base in 1954, there was no re-examination of
British defence and foreign policy or any attempt to cut commitments. Moreover, at the
same time as successive Governments in the 1950s were reinforcing that Britain would
not cut its overseas commitments (namely the continued presence of troops in the east
of Suez region), the actual manpower of the army had been reduced by 45,000 men by
19566. The nuclear deterrent was the priority of the Defence White Papers of the mid-
1950s, whereas the overseas defence role was treated as a side issue, and the poor
mobility of the British forces during the Suez crisis was one result of this failing.
Even the humiliating climbdown over the Suez Crisis failed to dent the view ofBritain
as a world power, despite being forced to withdraw troops from Egypt because of
American pressure . The British response to Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal
had been slow and poorly organised. The inability of British troops to move quickly
into the area to support Government policy should have sent clear warnings to the
defence chiefs that tactical changes were necessary if Britain were to remain a power
capable of efficient military action. The 1957 White Paper, though, maintained the
traditional view ofBritain as the dominant power in the Middle and Far East, referring
to the obligations to defend Aden, the Persian Gulf territories, the protectorates in
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south-east Asia and the external defence ofMalaya . However, both the Prime
Minister, Harold Macmillan, and the Defence Secretary, Duncan Sandys, still saw
tactical nuclear weapons as the answer to the need to cut costs whilst maintaining a
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world role, and so army manpower was further reduced to 375,000 by 19629. This
blindness to the need for tactically mobile forces that were able to be flown into a
trouble spot at short notice was surprising given the failure at Suez. However, the
inability of air power to quell the troubles in Oman in July 1957 did see the
modification of British tactical thinking as regards defence of overseas interests10. The
Oman operation also strengthened the argument for better airlift capability, the need for
acclimatisation, and for rapid action to avoid political repercussions.
The one lesson, however, that took a long time to be learned was that the actual British
presence overseas was a serious source of grievance to many of the indigenous peoples
of the colonies, mandates and protectorates that were still present on the edges of the
Indian Ocean right up to the end of the 1960s. The fact was that the east of Suez policy
as a whole was never truly challenged in Parliament. The Services themselves were too
busy either defending their own interests or carrying out operations so that long-term
decisions about overseas commitments were never taken until Healey was forced to
implement further cuts to his defence budget in the 1966 White Paper. Had there been
the necessary reappraisal of the British presence in the Middle and Far East following
the Second World War, then the various Government departments could have
implemented long-term policies to deal with the necessary cuts in expenditure. As it
was, the commitment to the world role that infected both Conservative and Labour
leaders meant that Britain stayed in many parts of the empire longer than they were
wanted.
American Involvement in the Middle East
American foreign policy immediately following World War Two was dominated by the
same concern that would drive successive Presidents and their policy advisers after
1945, namely the containment of the Soviet Union and communism. After the end of
the War, the Soviet Union and the USA would go from being allies to enemies, albeit
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from a distance and using their respective client states to fight their ideological war, the
Cold War. Truman (President to 1952) therefore, like his successors, saw the biggest
threat to American interests coming from Moscow, and the attempts to counter that
threat would be the raison d'etre ofWashington foreign policy from 1945 to the 1990s.
In that respect they shared a concern with the British. However there was also a general
disapproval ofEuropean colonialism and imperialism which at times saw the two allies
in disagreement over their respective policies in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the
dominant position ofBritain in the Middle East in 1945 meant that the US needed to
rely on them in order to defend Western interests. Therefore, whilst there were
differences of opinion, the two powers usually presented a united front to the perceived
threat from the Soviet Union.
Under Truman the Middle East as a region was treated as a low priority, the only major
problem being the question of the Palestine mandate. However, Washington's policy at
this time was more affected by local events, in particular the Israeli victory in the
conflicts of 1948-1949, rather than actually driven by a definite aim or strategy, in other
words it was reactive rather than proactive. This lack of coherence was shown by the
inconsistency of Truman's attitude towards the region, such as approving the State
Department document which advocated giving the Negev desert to the Arabs and then
signing a letter to Chaim Weizmann (the first President of Israel) extolling the utility of
the Negev for Israel11. The only other attention given to the region was the issuing of
the Truman doctrine in 1947 granting aid to Greece and Turkey to help them resist
Soviet pressure since Britain was no longer able to defend these states from outside
19 •
intervention . The fear was that without foreign aid both Turkey and Greece would
come under Soviet control, and then the other Middle East states would follow suit.
However, it was probably only because Britain was incapable of financially and
militarily supporting Greece and Turkey that the US became involved, otherwise the
two states would probably have been left to British concern, as the Arab world was.
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The low priority given to the Middle East would change under Truman's successor,
President Eisenhower (1952-1960), largely because the dominating foreign policy issue
remained Soviet containment. The increased attention given to the region was due to
American apprehension at intensified Soviet activities in the Arab world following the
death of Stalin in March 1953°. The Soviets began to cultivate relations with
previously ignored governments in Africa and Asia, including 'reactionary' regimes, in
order to counter the expansion ofWestern influence. However, Eisenhower's policies
failed in their attempts to forestall the Soviet Union establishing themselves in the Arab
world. Moreover, relations between the Arab states and the West actually deteriorated
rather than improved, largely thanks to the actions ofAmerica, Britain and France. The
Tripartite Declaration by the US, Britain and France in May 1950 had established the
three countries' opposition to the use of force by any power in the Middle East to
achieve their aims14. However, this policy was unpopular with both Israel and the Arab
states. Both sides viewed the Declaration as discriminating and were frustrated in their
desire for military expansion. This was especially true after France supplied Israel with
arms in 1954 and 1955, an act which was justifiably regarded as upsetting the regional
military balance, and helped force Nasser to seek military supplies from the Soviets via
the Czech arms deal15.
Eisenhower's strategy to limit Soviet expansion centred on regional alliances, such as
having Turkey and Greece join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in
195216. The attempt to create a similar organisation in the Middle East would fail
however, largely thanks to America getting cold feet and withdrawing its support. The
Baghdad Pact was an alliance between Turkey, Iraq, Britain, Pakistan and Iran, reached
1 7
through a series of treaties in 1954 and 1955 . One of the main weaknesses of the Pact
was the lack ofArab signatories, with the pro-West government of Iraq being the sole
adherent from the Arab world. This in itselfwas enough to limit the efficacy of the
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Pact, especially as Nasser's Egypt sought to prevent any other Arab states joining .
The lack ofArab signatories meant that American and European influence in the region
was limited to those states which were already aligned to the West. Furthermore, the
refusal ofAmerica to be a signatory meant that the Pact had little military strength, a
weakness which rendered the Baghdad Pact ineffective. The US drew back from the
Baghdad Pact in 1955 because it was unpopular in the Arab world. This meant, though,
that the regional defence Pact was both weak and unpopular rather than just unpopular,
and so even more incapable of containing Soviet expansion.
Both Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, underestimated the
intensity of feelings on both sides of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Their attempts to
manoeuvre between the interests of both sides, as well as those ofBritain and France,
saw all four groups alienated. The Israelis needed American support to maintain their
military position, but American unease at arming one protagonist over another meant
the Israelis had to look elsewhere, principally France. The Arabs were similarly
disappointed by their inability to secure arms from Washington. In return, the non-
aligned position ofNasser which saw Egypt stay aloof from the Baghdad Pact
displeased Washington who saw non-alignment to the Western cause as alignment to
Moscow. Finally, American opposition to the Franco-British-Israeli position over Suez
in 1956, which was designed to contain the Soviet Union, failed. The Americans were
viewed in the same light as the European colonialist powers by the Arab world, and
relations between Washington and Britain and France cooled considerably.
The fractional nature ofArab politics, with the almost constant rivalry between the
regional states, was a factor in hampering American policy as close relations with one
state impaired relations with another, especially as the US was growing increasingly
close to Israel. Initially, relations between Nasser's Egypt and Washington were good,
but this relationship would deteriorate as both sides increasingly viewed the other with
suspicion. Eisenhower and Dulles's preference for the conservative monarchies of the
region helped to damage America's standing in the Middle East since the new Arab
nationalist states felt isolated. This view, in combination with the Tripartite
18
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Declaration, probably helped push Nasser towards the Soviet Union (via
Czechoslovakia) in his quest for arms for Egypt in 1955. The Eisenhower Doctrine of
1957 further entrenched the belief among the Arab Nationalist states that American
policy was part ofWestern imperialism, despite the President's aim that it would be a
unilateral statement ofpolicy to support Arab independence. The problem was that the
Doctrine gave Eisenhower the right to use American forces, if requested, to support an
independent state against international communism, which was simply viewed as
imperialism in a different form. The only two occasions on which it was used were
Jordan in January 1958 when 'international communism' was a remote threat and
America supported British intervention, and Lebanon in July 1958 when US troops
were airlifted into the country to support President Chamoun. Fortunately in Lebanon,
Chamoun saw sense and stepped aside as President allowing the crisis to pass,
otherwise a far more serious conflict could have occurred19. Overall, however,
Eisenhower's policy towards the Middle East was largely a failure given that the only
group pleased were the oil companies since policy centered on the conservative, oil-
producing Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia.
Under President Kennedy, though, there was another shift in American policy as the US
attempted to appease the Arab Nationalists, in particular Nasser. Admittedly, Kennedy
benefited from a largely peaceful period of events in the region, the only problematic
issue being the Yemeni coup and ensuing Republican-Royalist civil war. However, the
Kennedy administration also took a less bipolar view of the world than Eisenhower had,
which meant that a more generous policy was taken towards many of the non-aligned
nations, such as increased and depoliticised aid. This saw the level of aid to Egypt
surpass $200 million with the US supplying 50% of the country's wheat and Kennedy
informing Nasser beforehand ofAmerican decisions which could affect the UAR20.
The improved relations between the two Presidents survived Nasser's verbal attacks on
Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 1962, and the sale ofUS Hawk Missiles to Israel in
September 1962, but the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen was to prove a far more
19 Cleveland - op. cit., pp. 316-7
20 Nadelmann, Ethan - 'Setting the Stage: American Policy toward the Middle East, 1961-66',
International Journal ofMiddle East Studies, Vol. 14 (1982), pp. 435-457 - Nadelmann got his statistics
from Copeland, Miles - The Game ofNations (College Notes, New York, 1969), p. 268
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difficult issue21. In fact, the recognition of the Republican regime in Yemen, despite
British opposition, and the continued aid to Egypt actually had given the Americans
little leverage over Nasser. This in turn, especially under Kennedy's successor
Johnson, saw American-Egyptian relations reach a low point, especially as the various
American sponsored attempted peace deals between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over the
Yemen failed to achieve the end of the civil war. Kennedy's policy towards the Middle
East had seen a new attitude among American policymakers towards Egypt, but
ultimately failed to achieve any more real success than Eisenhower's bipolar view had,
the only exception being the temporarily better relationship with Nasser.
American relations with Egypt deteriorated under Johnson, who was viewed as pro-
Zionist by the Arab Nationalists given his opposition to Eisenhower's threat of
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sanctions against Israel in 1957 . There was increasing hostility towards America by
Nasser in the mid-1960s as frustration with the Yemeni conflict increased on all sides.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union reassessed its approach to the Middle East, renewing
overtures towards Egypt. The divergence ofUS and UAR interests was highlighted by
the visits ofKhruschev to Cairo and Levi Eshkol (Israeli Prime Minister) to
Washington in 1964. However, with the onset of the Vietnam War, America became
increasingly disinterested in Egypt as other concerns took over. This was especially
true as the Soviets became increasingly unwilling to challenge the international status
quo at the time. The lessening danger of Soviet expansion in the region, therefore, saw
the Middle East's priority rating among American policymakers decrease until the Six
Day War of 1967. The ineffectiveness ofNasser's troops in both Yemen and against
Israel in 1967 underlined Egypt's status as a subsidiary concern since it was
increasingly unable to disrupt American interests. This was especially true following
the withdrawal ofUAR troops from Yemen in 1967, thereby removing a threat to
American oil interests in Saudi Arabia.
American policy towards the Middle East in the twenty years following World War




the world, the need to contain Soviet expansion. The subsidiary concern of protecting
oil supplies was important, but largely left to the British from their military bases until
the mid-1960s. In fact, successive American Presidents viewed the world in bipolar
terms, a 'them and us' view which frequently alienated non-aligned states, such as
Egypt. The only President to achieve any kind ofpositive relationship with the Arab
Nationalists was Kennedy, but even he failed to gain any kind of powerful leverage
over Nasser who was able to receive aid and threaten American oil interests by invading
Yemen and attacking Saudi Arabia. Therefore American policy in the Middle East
before the Six DayWar failed to achieve any lasting benefit in the struggle against
'international communism'. However, the Soviet leadership similarly failed to fully
establish themselves in a region noted for its rivalries and fractious politics.
The Soviet Union
Whilst the Soviet Union did, unlike the Americans, have a presence in the Middle East
following World War Two, like their erstwhile allies they were not at first overly
concerned with the Arab world. The failure to win over Turkey and Greece following
the Truman Doctrine and the withdrawal from northern Iran in 1946 were the only
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attempts to win influence in the Middle East as a region until the mid-1950s . These
failures in the 'northern tier' countries (the states bordering the Soviet Union to the
south and the Middle East to the north) were not of undue concern given Stalin's
concentration on Eastern Europe. However, following Stalin's death, a more proactive
policy to leapfrog the northern tier and win a foothold in the Arab world took place,
starting with the Czech arms deal with Nasser in 195524.
There was considerable frustration among certain Arab states, in particular Nasser's
Egypt, with the strings attached to American aid under Eisenhower. The Tripartite
Declaration restricted arms purchases, and the Western powers' support for Israel, saw
first Egypt, and then Syria, Iraq and others turn to the Soviet Union for military and
23 Cleveland - op. cit., p. 260
24 Mansfield - A History of the Middle East (Viking, London, 1991), p. 253
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economic aid. This was not due to any overt sympathy for communism, but rather the
Soviets were seen as a useful counter-balance to the Americans. Thus under
Khruschev's more expansionist foreign policy, the non-aligned Arab states were able to
play off the Soviets against the Americans since both were willing to aid a country
perceived as a potential ally in their international proxy war. However, following the
crushing defeat of the Arab countries against Israel in 1967, the freedom of the Arab
states to dictate their terms was eroded and most became dependent upon one or other
of the two superpowers.
The Soviet clients were mainly the 'revolutionary' Arab states such as Syria, Iraq and,
to a lesser extent, Egypt. However, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets military
capacity could not match that of the USA, and so Moscow was unable to support its
clients with direct intervention, as shown during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and
when Israel threatened Damascus during the Six Day War. Therefore, Khruschev had
to rely on careful political expansion, avoiding direct confrontations with the West and
seeking to exploit regional instabilities. The Middle East was a prime candidate for
Soviet expansion in the 1950s and 1960s given the possibilities of the 'Arab Cold War'
(see below) and the frequently poor relations between the West and the 'revolutionary'
Arab states. The prime candidate for Soviet aid was Nasser, and Egypt was duly
courted with military and economic support in the mid-1960s as UAR-American
relations deteriorated over the Yemeni civil war. This in turn became near-dependence
ofEgypt (and Syria and Iraq) on the Soviets following the Six Day War when the
UAR's army needed drastic rebuilding. The Americans in turn tended to support Israel
and the conservative Arab monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Jordan). Whilst there were
exceptions to this situation, in particular Sadat's abrogation of the Soviet treaty in 1976,
the two superpowers tended to carve up the Middle East into two camps following the
June War25.
However, before the Six Day War in June 1967 the Soviets were never a major factor in
Middle Eastern politics, other than as a perceived threat to Western interests.
Admittedly, the Czech arms deal had introduced the Soviet Union into the regional
25
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politics of the time, but until Brezhnev built up the Soviet military into a force capable
of challenging the Americans in the 1970s, the Soviets could not get directly involved
in the region. However, the perceived threat was important for dictating both British
and American policy towards the region. The British base in Aden was viewed as vital
for the defence ofWestern interests in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf from the
expansion of 'international communism', despite American apprehension at European
colonialism. Moreover, Soviet aid was a useful tool for the Arab nationalists to play off
against the Americans in order to receive further support. Therefore, whilst there was
no real direct role played by the Soviet leadership in the Middle East before the late
1960s, to British and American policymakers the threat of such a role was enough to
affect their own actions.
The Arab Cold War
The rise ofGamel Abd al-Nasser and the Suez Crisis
The Free Officers Revolt of 1952 in Egypt was a major upheaval in the Middle East and
served as the model for the series of revolutions and coups that affected most other
states in the Arab world over the next ten years. The nominal leader was General
Naguib, but he was merely a figurehead for the group of officers who took control of
the country26. The most important of these officers was Colonel Gamel Abd al-Nasser
who would become President ofEgypt from 1954 until his death in 1970, as well as the
dominant figure in Arab Nationalism throughout the region. Nasser, through his desire
to break Egypt free from its British-dominated monarchy, embodied the hopes ofmany
Arabs throughout the region, and with his success in achieving the British withdrawal
from the Canal Zone through the 1954 treaty was seen to be successful. However, his
greatest success was in resisting Britain and France during the Suez crisis in 1956, a
victory which Nasser would frequently find hard to live up to.
26 Cleveland - op. cit., p. 289
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The Suez conflict arose from the conflicting ambitions of rising Arab Nationalism and
fading European imperialism. The Anglo-American attempt to create a regional
defence pact to contain the Soviets, the Baghdad Pact, was rejected by Nasser, and his
vociferous denunciation ensured that the only Arab state which joined with Britain,
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Turkey and Pakistan was Iraq, for which it was condemned by Arab Nationalists .
Nasser's non-alignment was seen as a snub to Britain, and the refusal ofmost Arab
states to join the Pact frightened off the Americans who were put off by the
unpopularity of the organisation, which then further weakened the Baghdad Pact. A
further cause ofAnglo-Egyptian conflict was in the need for arms to build up the
Egyptian army which saw Nasser turn to the Soviet Union via the Czech arms deal in
September 1955, a move which angered both Britain and the US as it gave the Soviets
9R
their first foothold in the Middle East . This resentment was further exacerbated by
Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 1956 following the withdrawal of
World Bank funds (under American pressure) for the building of the Aswan dam. To
Anthony Eden (British Prime Minister 1955-57) the nationalisation was seen as theft,
despite Nasser's offer of compensation29. The British Government were further
annoyed by Egypt's ability to run the Canal smoothly (with the help ofGreek
engineers) despite the withdrawal of British and French engineers. In order to punish
Nasser, the British and French (who were angered by Egypt's support for the Algerian
Nationalists, the FLN) colluded with Israel to invade Egypt . Once Israel invaded
Egypt, then British and French troops were also to invade Egypt on the pretext of
separating the two sides and impose 'peace'. However, the slow British build-up meant
that the plan did not happen until October/November 1956, at which point international
outrage, in particular on the part of both the USSR and America, whose reaction the
British had underestimated, forced the withdrawal of British and French troops from
Egypt. The result was, despite military defeat, a political victory for Nasser and Egypt,
whilst the end of Britain as a great power was confirmed by their need to keep the peace
27 Hourani - op. cit., p. 367
28 Cleveland - op. cit., p. 292
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with the US who threatened the devaluation of sterling to keep Eden in line31. The
American stance greatly angered the British Government, but they had little option
other than submitting to Washington's demands given the dependence of Britain on
American financial support. Moreover, to rub salt into the British wound, Nasser was
left as the outstanding hero of Arab Nationalists throughout the Middle East as he had
stood up to two former imperial powers and not only survived but won a significant
victory.
The impact of Suez was widespread, giving credibility to Nasser and his regime,
providing an example to other Nationalist groups, and established the Egyptian
President as a 'bogey figure' to successive British Governments. Moreover, Egypt-
Soviet relations improved, with the USSR financing the Aswan dam project and
granting military and technical aid, although Nasser's persecution of communist groups
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in both Egypt and Syria later saw a cooling of relations for a few years . Nasser had
also established himself as a figure the Americans saw as beneficial to support given his
regional influence and value to the Soviets. Therefore, both superpowers vied to be the
main benefactor of the prominent regional power, and so Egypt was able to play off the
two sides against each other until after the Six Day War in 1967. However, Nasser's
victory and position at the head of Arab Nationalism following Suez was a difficult act
to follow. The Egyptian leader remained open to criticism from other Arab Nationalists
if he was not 'radical' enough, as well as in constant need of re-establishing his own
prestige and Arab Nationalist credentials in the face of accusations ofbeing an Egyptian
Nationalist rather than a pan-Arab Nationalist.
The Arab Cold War
Broadly speaking in the Middle East there were two forms of Arab state, the nationalist
'revolutionary' republics, and the 'conservative' monarchies, terms which are very
general, but also contained a certain amount of truth. The two sides were in constant
31
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rivalry, but rarely, as with the USSR and USA, in direct conflict, the only occasion of
war being the Yemeni civil war which was fought through proxies (see below), just as
the international superpowers fought their ideological conflict through regional clients.
The revolutionary states were primarily Egypt, Syria and Iraq (after the 1958
revolution), three countries which spent as much time verbally attacking each other as
they did carrying out their ideological campaign against the monarchies of Saudi Arabia
and Jordan.
The dominant position ofEgypt in the Middle East in the 1950s, especially after Suez,
enabled it to lead an independent foreign policy, a position which was weakened in the
1960s as inter-Arab rivalry weakened the bargaining power of the Arab clients vis-a-vis
their superpower suppliers. At the height of his powers, however, Nasser was able to
unify Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) and play off the
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superpowers to his advantage due to his regional ascendancy . The non-aligned
position ofNasser and the UAR, was shown by the refusal to join the Baghdad Pact and
the cool reception that the Eisenhower Doctrine received in the Middle East where it
was perceived as yet another form ofWestern imperialism34. However, Egypt was only
able to maintain this position whilst it held the position of regional superpower,
dominating the Middle East and so therefore a useful ally for both the Soviet Union and
America to have as a client in their own Cold War. Therefore when Syria seceded from
the UAR in September 1961, not only was Nasser's prestige damaged, but it gave
ammunition and a potential ally to his rivals, in particular Iraq and Saudi Arabia35. The
breakdown of the UAR was welcome news to both the Soviets and Americans as it
further polarised Arab politics and weakened the strong centre that had been Egypt,
enabling the easier penetration of the Arab political system by the superpowers and
restricting the independence of an Arab foreign policy.
Nasser's own reaction to Syria's secession was to attack the conservative Arab
monarchies, breaking off diplomatic relations with Jordan, denouncing the Saudi
33 Cleveland - op. cit., p. 295
34 Mansfield - op. cit., pp. 260-1
35 Hourani - op. cit., p. 411
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regime and blaming the UAR split on a reactionary plot . The blow to his prestige was
significant, and Egypt was left largely isolated in the Arab world since the other major
'revolutionary' regime, that ofQassem in Iraq, was a rival rather than an ally. To
maintain his position at the head ofArab Nationalism, Nasser had to restore his
prestige, an aim which saw Egypt become embroiled in the Yemeni civil war, and also
take the lead in opposing Israel. This latter stance was to hit Egypt heaviest as the total
defeat of the Egyptian army in the Sinai in June 1967 forced Nasser to rely almost
totally on the Soviet Union for aid to rebuild the army37. Moreover, the humiliating
loss ofEgyptian territory on top of the demolition of the army forced Nasser to come to
terms with Saudi Arabia and accept aid from his erstwhile rival in return from
withdrawing from the Yemen in order to help Egypt recover from the Six Day War38.
The Arab Cold War was initially a regional conflict with the backing of the
international superpowers, but after the Arab defeat in 1967, the Soviets and Americans
came to dominate the Middle East, restricting freedom of action among the Arab states.
However, at least for a period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the regional
powers had a certain amount of freedom ofpolicy, even being able to play off the
Americans and the Soviets against each other. Unfortunately for the Arab Nationalists,
they were unable to present a united front, and their own rivalry helped to further
weaken an Arab political system already weakened by the 'revolutionary' against
'conservative' conflict. This latter rivalry was for the most part a war ofwords and
diplomacy, a cold war between the two regional superpowers ofEgypt and Saudi
Arabia, although on one notable occasion it turned into an actual military conflict
following the officers coup in Yemen.
The Yemeni Civil War: 'Nasser's Vietnam'
The anti-Imamate coup by a group ofArmy officers on 27 September 1962 lead to the
formation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and posed an immediate threat to the
36 Mansfield - op. cit., p. 265
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British position in Aden and south-west Arabia39. This combination ofRepublican
regime and potential to threaten the British provided an excellent opportunity for
Nasser to restore his Arab Nationalist credentials. This became especially true when
resistance to the new regime among certain of the Yemeni tribes was organised by the
Imam (who had been thought killed in the coup) with the support of Saudi Arabia40.
The result was a protracted civil war between Republicans backed by the UAR and
Royalists backed by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and, covertly, Britain, a conflict which
continued past the Six Day War and the withdrawal of Egyptian troops until 1969.
Nasser's commitment to other Arab revolutionary movements meant that when the
YAR President Abdullah al-Sallal called for aid in the conflict with the Royalist
opposition to the coup, Nasser could not ignore the plea even if he had wanted to41.
The initial Egyptian expeditionary force which was sent to Yemen days after the coup
was not enough however, and the number ofEgyptian troops in the country grew to
40,000 by the end of 1963, and there was no reduction in numbers until Nasser agreed
to withdrawal in November 196742. The major problems facing the Egyptian troops
was unfamiliarity with the country and the lack of a transport infrastructure, forcing the
UAR Army to build their own roads. Moreover, whilst the UAR troops had superior
technology and weapons, they were fighting in mountainous terrain against tribal troops
who knew the geography of the country and whilst they avoided pitched battle were
able to keep the Egyptians at bay. Ironically, what the UAR troops underwent in the
Yemen against British-backed Royalists was remarkably similar to what their British
counterparts were facing to the south against Egyptian-backed Nationalists, albeit on a
far larger scale. Eventually, the Egyptians were forced to admit defeat in their attempt
to control the entire country and so attempted to dominate the Yemen from the triangle
formed by the three major towns of San'a, Ta'iz and Hodeidah. However, even this
39 Balfour-Paul - op. cit., p. 78
40 Cleveland - op. cit., p. 296
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was not particularly successful as the Royalists were still able to set ambushes and
attack the Egyptian/Republican forces from their mountain bases.
The Royalists' primary backer was Saudi Arabia which supplied gold and weapons,
whilst Jordan also acted as financial backers for a time, until the threat of reprisals by
Nasser forced King Hussein to back down. Moreover, there was also more covert aid
from the British-backed Federation of South Arabia which channeled arms, ammunition
and money to the Royalists from the south. There was also much-denied aid from the
British themselves, primarily arms, but also a certain number of 'ex-SAS' men who
went north to train the Royalists in guerrilla warfare and became involved in the
fighting themselves. Whilst there is little direct evidence to prove British involvement
in the Yemeni civil war, there was almost certainly considerable indirect and covert
support for the Royalists43. This policy made sense from a British point of view, as the
harder the Royalists made life for the Egyptians in the Yemen, then Nasser would be
less able to undermine British rule in the Federation of South Arabia. However,
because of fears of international condemnation, there was no direct outside military
intervention to support the Royalist cause who were frequently on the verge of defeat,
but survived with Saudi aid and superior knowledge of the terrain they were fighting in.
There were attempts at peace between the two sides, with Nasser and King Feisal of
Saudi Arabia meeting to negotiate a settlement at Khamr in May 1965 and then Jidda in
August 1965. However, Nasser was unwilling to withdraw his troops and see a
Republican regime defeated, despite the increasing unpopularity of the Egyptian
presence among many Yemenis who saw the UAR troops as a form of colonial force.
Moreover, there was little agreement between the Republicans and Royalists at first,
especially over the return of the Imamic Hamid ad-Din family to some form ofpower.
A 'third force' did exist among Republicans willing to compromise with moderate
Royalists, but the Egyptian stranglehold on the YAR meant that such a move never
came about.
43 Various PRO documents refer to the need for covert aid, including a minute from the Foreign Secretary
Butler to the Prime Minister Douglas-Home (DEFE 13/417) and a Memo by the Ministry of Defence
(DEFE 11/425/2624) - covert retaliatory actions were in fact carried out according to conversations with
former overseas civil servants
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Ultimately, the Yemeni civil war was a proxy war fought by Egypt and Saudi Arabia
using their respective clients, the Republicans and Royalists, in much the same way as
the Soviets and Americans used their clients to fight their ideological battles.
Moreover, there was no clear victor on either side, just as with many of the conflicts of
the Cold War, the most important impact probably being the presence of a third of
Egypt's army, its most experienced and battle-ready troops, in the Yemen during the
Six Day War. The civil war would probably have been ended far sooner had it not been
for the foreign presence as Nasser and, to a lesser extent, Feisal saw advantages out of
prolonging their support. In the end none of the parties made any significant gains out
of the conflict, the only exceptions being the Americans and Soviets who profited from
their clients increased reliance on the superpowers for aid.
Conclusion
The Middle East in the twenty years following the end ofWorld War Two was one of
the most significant regions in the world as regards the start of the Cold War, the end of
European imperialism, the rise ofArab Nationalism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
international relations. The decline of Britain as a world power, whilst resisted for so
long, was confirmed by Suez, although the British presence in Aden until 1967 was an
attempt to deny this reality. This was a period of transition, however, from the old
European colonial powers who dominated the Middle East between the wars, to the
Cold War which saw the region dominated by the Soviet and American superpowers.
In between those two periods there was a brief period ofArab independence from
foreign domination with the rise ofNasser and Egypt's ability to follow its non-aligned
foreign policy. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, however, that independence was
lost, and in the same year the end of the only British colony in the Middle East was
confirmed as the shambolic withdrawal from South Arabia saw the establishment of the
first, and so far only, Marxist government in the Middle East.
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Chapter Three: The Move Towards Federation, 1945-1959
Introduction
After World War Two, Britain remained the paramount power in the Middle East.
However, the next ten years saw this position greatly undermined as the decline of
Great Britain as a superpower in economic and political terms saw a gradual withdrawal
from empire. Despite this, in Aden, the opposite process was occurring as the Advisory
Treaties signed with the Sultans, Amirs and Naibs of South Arabia saw an increased
British presence from the mid-1940s onwards. In fact, the more territories world-wide
that the British granted independence to, the greater the importance ofAden and the
Protectorate. The reluctance of successive Governments in London, both Conservative
and Labour, to relinquish their perceived world role, meant that Aden was turned into
one of the world's busiest ports and, by the early 1960s, one ofBritain's two main
overseas military bases. The rapid development and increased importance of Aden and,
to a lesser extent, the two Protectorates in the two decades after 1945 was in sharp
contrast to the previous century of relative neglect.
British Policy in Aden
Aden's Increasing Value
The granting of independence to the Empire of India in August 1947 should have
questioned the necessity for a continued British interest in Aden and South Arabia since
the colony's location on the sea route to the 'jewel in the crown' had been the prime
reason for maintaining a colonial presence there. However, despite the loss of India,
and the belief ofPrime Minister Attlee in the need to cut overseas commitments, there
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was no move to withdraw from all British interests in the region. In fact, British policy¬
makers continued to see a need for a military presence in the Middle East for twenty
years, even as independence was being granted to one country after another during the
1950s and early 1960s. Economically, Aden was also a potentially valuable asset given
its location on the trade routes between Europe and the Far East and Australasia, as well
as its proximity to the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Another advantage was
the lack ofpolitical development in Aden which meant that British control was more
complete there than in any other territory in the Middle East. Moreover, the Colony had
a politically underdeveloped population which meant that British institutions were safer
than in other colonies with more politically active populations agitating for
independence. Therefore, the value ofAden increased to British policy-makers and
defence chiefs who were reluctant to relinquish their overseas role, but were left with
fewer and fewer possible sites for the bases they viewed as necessary to maintain this
role1.
Moreover, economically, Aden was also of increasing value, and no longer solely
because of the port and its prime location on the world's sea lanes. The port and
shipping did remain the dominant economic interests of the Colony, so much so that by
1964 Aden had the fourth largest bunkering port in the world after London, Liverpool
2 • •and New York . However, this reliance on shipping was dangerous as the port was
dependent on Red Sea shipping, and so on the political situation in the Suez Canal, and
the economy ofAden suffered in 1956 and 1967 when the Canal was closed due to
conflict. The effect of the Suez crisis in 1956 was that the business of the port dropped
by about 20%, and the new Governor, Sir William Luce, commented that,
"The whole prosperity of this place depends so heavily on the port that even a
short interruption ofCanal traffic is bound to run us into serious economic
difficulties"3.
1 For British defence policy in this period see Chapter 2
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The monthly shipping average at this time fell from 454 vessels a month to 277 in
November 1956 and 93 in February 1957, and then from 450 to 140 vessels after the
Six DayWar in June 1967, highlighting the over-dependency of the port on the Suez
Canal4. However, the port, whilst being the main source of income, was not the only
source of economic prosperity for Aden after the construction of the oil refinery.
The BP oil refinery at Little Aden (Bureika) was opened in July 1954, initially as a
replacement for Abadan in Iran (which had been nationalised in 1951) and had a staff of
over 2,000 workers5. The refinery imported crude oil, mainly from Kuwait, and then
exported processed oil to East and South Africa and the Red Sea ports, as well as
supplying local shipping companies. The result was that the refinery provided 10% of
the GDP, 20% of industrial employment and 75% of export earnings for the Aden
economy6. There were other smaller industries, such as soft drinks factories, ship¬
building and repairing, and construction, but the only other major source of
employment and economic activity was the military base. This was particularly true
once Aden became the headquarters for British Middle East Command and
accommodation had to be constructed for the increased numbers of servicemen and
their families stationed there in the 1960s. However, one thing true of all these
economic activities was their reliance on external conditions outside the control of the
local population, and the economy would suffer greatly once the base was withdrawn
and the Suez Canal was closed in 1967.
Therefore, there was an economic interest in maintaining the British presence, but the
overriding concern of policy-makers was the strategic value ofAden and the duties and
obligations ofHer Majesty's Government. A memorandum by the Colonial Office for
the Chiefs of StaffCommittee in 1955 sets out British interests and obligations in Aden
Colony and Protectorate at that time with the aim of establishing future policy for South
Arabia7. There were no obligations to retain control of the Colony, the only exceptions
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being the British, Indian, Pakistani and Jewish communities which had built up
considerable commercial interests in Aden and the British Petroleum Company which
had invested large sums ofmoney in building the refinery. The Arab majority ofAden
did not count as a "commercial interest" and so were not worth concerning Her
Majesty's Government about. As regards British interests, firstly, strategically Aden
was not counted as "essential" but was of value as the Overseas Defence Committee
commented that:
"Aden is an important naval and air base for the protection of our lines of
communication - both sea and air - and for the offensive operations in the Red
Sea, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. It will also serve as an air staging post"8.
In fact, a Joint Planning Staff report criticises the Colonial Office for this view, stating
"this seriously under-rates the case" since Aden's value was increasing as a staging post
and repair and fuelling base9. Secondly, diplomatically, again Aden was not viewed as
essential, but still of value since the removal of British influence would damage British
prestige in the Middle East. However, because the Colony and Protectorates were the
only areas in the Arab Middle East still under the control of a colonial power, then "the
voluntary removal of this anomaly would no doubt be welcome to the Arab League and
to the anti-colonial Powers generally"10. Thirdly, economically Aden's importance had
increased with the construction of the oil refinery, and would increase further if oil were
discovered in the Protectorates, leading to the conclusion that:
"Taking these three considerations [strategic, diplomatic and economic]
together it is evident that H.M.G. have a strong interest in the maintenance of
control of Aden Colony for an indefinite future period; and policy towards the
Protectorates can reasonably be considered in the light of this permanent British
interest"11.
The value ofAden was therefore established by the mid-1950s as increasing, albeit not
essential. This meant that any move towards independence on the part of the Adenis
would not be viewed with enthusiasm by the British who were becoming more and
8 ibid.
"PRO CO 1015/1212/31 & /33 - Joint Planning StaffReport, 5 Oct. 1955
10 PRO CO 1015/1212/30 - op. cit.
11 ibid., for policy in the Protectorates, see below
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more intent on maintaining their grip on Aden, as shown by the visit of Lord Lloyd in
1956.
Lord Lloyd's Statement
The visit of the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in May 1956, Lord Lloyd,
was designed to bolster the confidence of the civil service and European business
community in Aden who had been disturbed at the recent wave of strikes (see below).
The Governor, Sir Tom Hickinbotham, and Lord Lloyd both believed that a statement
by the latter to the Aden Legislative Council was desirable as it would strengthen the
moderates and convince the nationalists that independence was not a viable option at
the time. Hickinbotham had telegrammed the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Alan
Lennox-Boyd) proposing a statement to the effect that the British were not leaving, that
there was no question of a further constitutional advance, independence "was an absurd
idea", and that the only reasonable goal was some degree of internal self-government
which was dependent on the political responsibility of the people and their leaders, "a
19
quality which is sadly lacking in both at present" .
Fortunately, the final statement was not so crudely worded as Hickinbotham's proposal,
but it was still sufficiently strongly worded to dispel any doubts about future British
intentions. On 19 May 1956, the members of the Aden Legislative Council were told
by Lord Lloyd that,
"The degree of constitutional development, and the pace at which it can be
realised, must depend on the sense of responsibility which is displayed by the
people of the Colony and their leaders. There is no reason why you cannot
1 T
expect to achieve further constitutional development in due course" .
12 PRO CO 1015/1202/1 - Hickinbotham to Colonial Office, 28 Apr. 1956, also Records ofYemen 1798-
1960: Volume 12, 1955-1957, p. 127
13 PRO CO 1015/1202/17 - Outward Telegramfrom Commonwealth Relations Office, 18 May 1956
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However, after offering this small promise of future advance, any hope of an
independent government is quashed:
"I should like you to understand that for the foreseeable future it would not be
reasonable or sensible or, indeed, in the interests of the Colony's inhabitants, for
them to aspire to any aim beyond that of a considerable degree of internal self-
government. Therefore whilst I have indicated the type of constitutional
advance to which the people in this colony may legitimately wish to aspire, Her
Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that the importance of Aden both
strategically and economically within the Commonwealth is such that they
cannot foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their
responsibilities for the colony. I feel that this assurance will be welcome to you
and to the vast majority of the Colony."14.
This statement, contrary to Lord Lloyd's opinion, was not welcome to the moderates in
the Colony who were disappointed that self-government was distant. The nationalists,
on the other hand, were satisfied to see the moderates' ambitions suffer a setback and
were still determined to achieve independence despite the statement. In fact, the
announcement was a political miscalculation which did little to help the British
position. 'The News Chronicle' newspaper compared the statement to the Hopkinson
declaration that Cyprus could never have full independence and commented that "the
Government does not seem to have learned from its bitter experience in Cyprus that it
must seek allies rather than keep dependants"15. The British had complete control of
the Colony and Lord Lloyd's statement reflected their desire to maintain this, but they
should have realised after their experiences elsewhere in the Middle East that they
needed the support of the moderate politicians. Announcing that there was no
immediate possibility of constitutional advance was not a wise move as it strengthened
the resolve of the opposition and undermined the moderates who the British were
supposed to be supporting.
14 ibid.
15 PRO CO 1015/1202/24 - Extractfrom 'The News Chronicle ',21 May 1956
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Constitutional Development
There had been constitutional advance in Aden and the population was represented by
politicians, but progress had been limited and at the time of Lord Lloyd's statement still
well short of internal self-government. The Legislative Council had been established
by the Aden Colony (Amendment) Order in Council (1944) and consisted of sixteen
members (4 ex officio, 4 official and 8 unofficial) all nominated by the Governor until
195516. All legislation was subject to the Governor's veto, and the move towards self-
government and greater local participation in the administration was slow, even
compared to other colonies. Beginnings were made, however, and a new constitution
was introduced in July 1955 allowing for elections for four seats on the Legislative
Council, but the qualification was that electors had to be either British subjects or
1 7
resident in Aden for two out of the three preceding years . This qualification ruled out
the migrant Yemeni and Protectorate labour force which supported the trade unions and
meant that of the population of 138,155 in the 1955 census, only 10,820 were eligible to
1 o t
vote . However, it meant that at least there was some form of elected local
representation in the administration, although the electoral qualifications ensured that
the moderates who supported the British presence won all four seats. The elections also
provided the first evidence of a more radical opposition to the British presence in the
shape of the United National Front who organised a boycott of them (see below).
There were further constitutional developments towards the end of the 1950s, devolving
more responsibility to the local population. The Governor's Annual Report for 1958,
'Aden: Review ofAffairs in the Colony' commented that "Not only has a colonial
Government survived despite the unsympathetic climate ofworld opinion but it has to a
surprising extent remained in effective control" 19. The report attributed the strength of
the British position to the weakness of the opposition and constitutional development.
A Municipal Council was formed in March 1958 of 14 elected and six nominated
16
Liebesny, Herbert J. - Amendment and Legal Development in Arabia: Aden Colony and Protectorate,
The Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, no. 4, Autumn 1955, pp. 385-96
17 Records ofYemen: Volume 12, 1955-1957, pp. 93-4
18 ibid., pp. 95-8
19 PRO CO 1015/1835/14 - Aden: Review ofAffairs in the Colony, Governor ofAden to Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 13 March 1959
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members, and in these elections "the more extreme nationalists" headed the polls in the
three municipal constituencies. However, "the more moderate politicians of the older
generation ... were able to outmanoeuvre the extremists on important issues" and "the
90 • • •
three extremists" resigned after six months . A new Colony Constitution came into
effect at the beginning of 1959 with elections on January 4th and the new Legislative
Council opened on the 26th with 12 elected members and only 5 ex officio and 6
nominated. Again, a nationalist boycott was implemented and "was partly successful"
• • • 21 • •
according to the 'Review ofAffairs' . In fact, only 27% of the electorate participated
in the elections which suggests that the boycott was somewhat more than "partly
99
successful" . However, of the twelve elected, eleven were affiliated to the Aden
Association, the moderate grouping that the British were keen to work with, which
suggests that the boycott also worked in favour of the colonial power, in the short-term
at least. However, the boycott should also have been a sufficient warning to the British
in Aden that there was a serious body of opposition in existence that threatened their
position and interests. Despite this, the Governor still claimed that:
"Sufficient constitutional progress has been conceded to enable the moderates to
involve themselves with the Government of Aden without being regarded as
unpatriotic by the general public; and a substantial body of local opinion for the
9-5
first time has an active interest in the Government of the Colony" .
This claim was dubious since the moderates had been elected by only a quarter of the
electorate, and this was an electorate which excluded the large numbers ofProtectorate
and Yemeni workers resident in Aden. Therefore, whilst the British were able to claim
that progress was being introduced to Aden, it was still a long way short ofmeeting the
demands of the opposition. Furthermore, the constitutional developments that had been
introduced did not threaten to dilute colonial rule and threaten the increasing value of
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The Rebellion in the Protectorate
British Interests in the Hinterland and the 'ForwardPolicy'
The transfer of Aden to the Colonial Office in 1937 had seen the start of a new, more
active policy in the Protectorate surrounding the Colony. As noted in Chapter One, this
'forward policy' saw the introduction ofmotorised transport into the various
shaikhdoms, amirates and sultanates of South Arabia, as well as the building of some
roads, and new agricultural policies to increase productivity. These developments were
seen as advances by the British policy-makers, and by those rulers and tribes who
profited from them. However, there were also many that suffered from the loss of their
traditional income. This latter group became actively opposed to the forward policy in
the 1950s, taking up armed resistance and creating unrest in the Protectorate. This,
though, was at the same time as the British were re-evaluating their role in the
Protectorate, and its benefit to their position in Aden. The Colonial Office, therefore,
were more interested in maintaining order in the hinterland than previously, which in
turn meant an increased involvement to pacify the rebellious tribes.
The value ofAden was established in the Colonial Office Memorandum of September
1955 (see above), and this same document also evaluated the value and importance of
the Protectorate to British interests and the British position in the Middle East24. This
document pointed out that:
"There is a clear obligation on H.M.G. to maintain and uphold its treaties with
the protected states for as long as they themselves wish to remain in that
association with H.M.G. it would not be possible unilaterally to abrogate these
treaties, although it may be possible in time to evolve a different kind of
relationship."25.
The British Government also had a "general kind of obligation to assist and develop
these small and weak states" towards a stronger economic and social condition "by
24 PRO CO 1015/1212/30 - op. cit.
25 ibid.
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means of tactical advice and financial aid", the extent of this to be determined by
"H.M.G.'s abiding policy"26. Therefore, even before British interests were taken into
account, the Advisory Treaties had bestowed a legal and a moral obligation upon the
colonial power to remain in South Arabia to defend and aid the rulers of the
Protectorate.
In fact, these obligations were more binding than any interests in the Protectorate on its
own. In the first place, from a strategic point of view,
"the protected states can simply be regarded, as they have historically been
regarded, as a glacis for the protection of the Colony and the essential interest
might equally well be achieved either by having friendly independent states on
the borders of the Colony, or by having protected states in the same relationship
to H.M.G. as at present, whether or not closer association or federation were
achieved."27.
The memorandum also pointed out, however, that if the neighbouring states were the
hostile Yemeni and/or Saudi Arabian Kingdoms which had swallowed up the states,
then the Colony would be threatened. Secondly, diplomatically, if self-government
were granted to the protected states, then "a powerful propaganda weapon" would be
removed from "the Arab League and other anti-colonial powers", but again there was
the danger of the states "being swallowed up" by the Yemen and/or Saudi Arabia.
Finally, the only possible economic benefit from the Protectorate would have been if oil
was discovered, otherwise "H.M.G. has no economic or financial interest in the
Protectorates if they are considered by themselves in complete isolation from the
?o t
Colony" . In fact, according to the Colonial Office, "a considerable sum annually in
grant in aid" was being paid to the Protectorate rather than any benefit received,
although only £1.4 million was spent on development between 1946 and 1960
according to Halliday29. The economic relationship between Aden and the Protectorate
was significant as Aden was the only port of importance in South West Arabia, but
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Overall, therefore:
"The conclusion to be drawn from these three considerations [strategic,
diplomatic and economic] taken together is that on the whole the obligations of
H.M.G. in the Protectorates are of greater weight than H.M.G.'s interests,
except to the important extent that continued influence in the Protectorates is
necessary for the military and economic security of the Colony. If it were
possible to discount the protection of our interests in the Colony, a policy of
disengagement from the Protectorates might be considered, but even then only
on condition that they were not thereby delivered up to the Yemen or Saudi
Arabia"30.
This showed that, whilst Aden was becoming of increasing value to British interests,
the Protectorate remained only of interest as a barrier to defend the Colony. However,
there had been threats to the Protectorate's role as a defensive barrier before, and the
Imam ofYemen continued to lay claim to sovereignty over the area in the 1950s, which
meant that, like all defensive shields, the hinterland needed strengthening at times. To
achieve this, the 'forward' policy had been introduce by the Colonial Office, but this
had further endangered the British position in South West Arabia by interfering with the
traditional social structures and economy, thereby creating disaffected tribal groupings
who were in a position to create serious difficulties for British interests.
To the colonial officials working in the Protectorate, however, the problem was not
British interference, but lack of funds or Yemeni subversion or the ineffectiveness of
the rulers themselves (or a combination of these factors). Sir Tom Hickinbotham
(Governor ofAden) wrote to J.E. Marnham of the Colonial Office in 1954 declaring his
support for an active policy in the hinterland:
"The Treasury would like to know where we are going in the Protectorate. I
would say that we shall be going through a door marked 'Exit' unless we can
apply a forward and vigorous policy of development in the Protectorate"31.
30 PRO CO 1015/1212/30 - op. cit.
jl PRO CO 1015/1211/4 - Letter from Hickinbotham to J.E. Marnham, 7 Aug. 1954
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Moreover, he believed that if the British did not "give" the Arabs in the Protectorate
progress then they would accept it from Egypt or another Arab state. This may have
been true, but if progress involved loss of income for the tribes, then it was hardly
surprising that there was opposition to British involvement. According to Sir Kennedy
Trevaskis, who served in Aden and the Protectorate for thirteen years, the problem was
not so much the lack of funds supplied by the British Government, although he does
criticise this, but the misrule of certain rulers, and the interference of the Imam in the
hinterland. In response to a friend asking exactly what the state governments did,
Trevaskis replied that, "They tax the weak, buy off the strong and keep what is left over
for themselves", which he admitted was an exaggeration, but "not so very far from the
truth" . The "rub" of the problem was not too much British interference in Trevaskis'
opinion, but not enough:
"Everywhere the need for reform stared one in the face. We needed to improve
the competence and quality of the state governments by the textbook procedures
of inspection, supervision and instruction and we needed honest-to-goodness
district officers familiar with them. But this was not a colony, we were advisers
and had no district officers"33.
Whilst making the Protectorate into a colony might possibly have meant more
development and improved education, health and social conditions, it would also have
laid Britain open to accusations it was busy trying to deny, namely imperialism and
colonialism. Furthermore, it was unlikely that the Treasury would have agreed to the
increased expenditure necessary for the conversion. Finally, there was no guarantee
that it would have removed the grievances that existed among the discontented
tribesmen in the Protectorate.
The Troubles
In the minds ofmany of the British civilian and military officials in Aden and the
Protectorate, the outbreak of resistance they faced in various parts of the hinterland was
32 Trevaskis - op. cit., p. 31
33 ibid., p. 31
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largely due to Yemeni interference and subversion, inciting disaffected tribes to revolt
against their rulers:
"The Governor of Aden and the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, consider
that the primary requirements for the improvement of the internal security of the
Aden Protectorate is the effective curbing of Yemeni interference and that an
examination should be made ofmeans of inducing a change in that country's
policy"34.
The Colonial Office supported this view, but the Foreign Office was disturbed at
reports suggesting the intelligence system in the Colony was inadequate and the
Security Forces were not being used effectively, pointing out that "we must look very
closely at our own arrangements before we assume that the trouble is primarily due to
■jc
the Yemen" . The inadequacy of the Security Forces and intelligence system was an
opinion endorsed by the Colonial Office and the Governor, and highlighted by the
Chiefs of Staffwho pointed out the low morale among the Aden Protectorate Levies.
However, in their same report, the Chiefs of Staff stressed the problem was not solely a
military one:
"We further conclude that settled conditions cannot be restored in the
Protectorate by military means alone. We would therefore stress the urgency for
taking the necessary non-military measures for giving the tribesmen of the
Protectorate a vested interest in living peaceably and for inducing the Yemeni
i/-
(sic) to cease their subversive activities" .
This conclusion is important as it highlighted that there were different reasons for the
troubles in the Protectorate in the 1950s. The factors involved were political (Yemeni
interference), military (the weaknesses of the Protectorate Security Forces), and socio¬
economic (the effect of the 'forward policy'). It is the latter which was probably the
prime factor in instigating the rebellion.
34 PRO DEFE 11/309/125A - Security in the Aden Protectorate - Long Term Measures, Memorandum by
the Chiefs of Staff, 5 Aug. 1955
j5 PRO DEFE 11/309/121A - Letter Foreign Secretary to Secretary ofState for Defence, 29 July 1955
36 PRO DEFE 11/309/125A - op. cit.
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Kennedy Trevaskis, no sympathiser of the Yemeni Imam, did not believe that the
dissident tribes were fighting for the cause ofYemeni unity:
"if the Imam was feeding, paying and arming the rebels, not a single shot had
been fired by any of them for union with the Yemen. The old Shafi'i prejudices
against Zeidi rule were still unshaken. At one time [Qadi Muhammed Abdulla]
Asshami (the Imam's special adviser on the Protectorate) had tried to persuade
his clients to sign declarations of allegiance to the Imam, but he had failed and
he no longer even made a pretence that they were fighting under Yemeni
banners. They were fighting, he would say, for freedom. Freedom from what? I
would ask. 'Freedom from your colonialism', would be the invariable reply"37.
He also admitted that there was no consensus among the British working in the region:
the Aden Secretariat believed the 'rebellion' was a symptom of bad and unpopular
government whilst the Political Officers were of the opinion that the cause was penury
and tribal opportunism. Trevaskis believed that underlying all the problems was
discontent, although not with the state governments, since the two most oligarchic and
unreformed were in Audhali and Beihan, the only two states which had resisted
'Yemeni subversion' successfully. Instead, Trevaskis came to the opinion that the
'Advisory Treaties' had weakened the Dolas by "well-intentioned interference"38. This
in turn had weakened the bonds between tribesmen and their leaders, and the tribal
leaders and their rulers, since the Sultans and Amirs could not maintain the balance
between rival tribes if the Imam was funding and supplying one tribe whilst the other
received nothing because the British refused to disburse arms. Trevaskis defined the
problem as 'tribalism', the tribes being divided by suspicion and blood, so much so that
democratic institutions would not work as one side would not sit on a body that
included their rivals.
This view is an accurate look at traditional society in South West Arabia in the 1950s,
but it also admits the mistakes that were made by the British in their rush to introduce
Western democracy to a tribal structure. The introduction of roads, motorised transport
and British Advisers had destabilised the structure of society and left some tribal groups
without any form of income. This had created a number of dispossessed tribesmen who
37 Trevaskis - op. cit. p. 79
38 ibid., p. 88
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were resentful at the loss of their livelihood and rebelled against their rulers who were
supposed to protect them. These 'rebels' according to the British were being supplied
and supported by the Imam, and there is no doubt that arms did cross the border - Qadi
Asshami admitted as much to Trevaskis (see above). However, as Trevaskis also
admitted, the Imam had no more control over these groups than the British did:
"The Imam had no difficulty in manufacturing revolts, but, as we had seen, he
had so far been unable to claim a single rebel as a subject. As a patron of
revolts he had been acceptable, but not as a master" .
Anglo-Yemeni relations had steadily worsened since the Imam Ahmad had come to the
throne after his father's assassination in 1948. Sir Tom Hickinbotham blamed Ahmad
for the worsening situation in the Protectorate, claiming the Imam feared the forward
policy as the advanced well-being of the Protectorate would make it more difficult to
impose his will in the area at a future date, and also that his own subjects would react to
the contrast in conditions between Yemen and the Protectorate40. For these reasons,
frontier raids were conducted, assassins hired and formal protests made to the British
diplomatic representative at Taiz claiming that the forward policy was a breach of the
status quo established by the 1934 Treaty. The Exchange ofNotes between the United
Kingdom and Yemen in 1951 failed to settle any differences as the Imam still claimed
sovereignty over the Protectorate and the British still felt there was Yemeni support for
the rebel tribes. A statement from the Yemeni Charge d'Affaires in Washington (13
August 1954) gave the Imam's point of view:
"The Yemeni Government considers the Advisory Treaties as well as the
proposed Federation scheme a serious violation of the Treaty of Sanaa of 1934
which provided in Article m for the strict maintenance of status quo on the
southern and western extremities of the Yemen"41.
Moreover, the Protectorate Treaties were likened to slavery which was forced on
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incapable of agreement over the question of Imamic sovereignty in the Protectorate and
British policy.
Whilst it is true that there was Imamic support for the dissidents in the Protectorate, this
was not the sole reason for the situation. Trevaskis admitted that the Advisory Treaties
and British 'forward policy' in the Protectorate had to take some responsibility because
of the effect they had had on the traditional tribal structure. The two main dissident
groups carrying out attacks in the Protectorate in the 1950s were the Ahl Abu Bakr bin
Farid and Muhammad Aidrus, and both felt they had suffered from reforms to the tribal
system. The former were a notable family and felt they had been excluded from
powerful positions in the Upper 'Aulaqi Sheikhdom and revolted against the state's
leaders, largely due to Trevaskis's interference:
"It (the family's disaffection) arose out ofmy (Trevaskis) insistence ... that
some of them should be removed from the Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdom's 'civil
list' and that others should be deprived of sinecures. The Sheikh's sons, who
were administering the state, protested that they were 'important'. I dismissed
their protests and delivered a textbook lecture about their need to cultivate a
proper sense of responsibility. I won the argument, but, unwittingly, provoked a
tribal revolt"42.
Trevaskis later realised the damage he had caused in his "clumsy pursuit of better
government", but this did little to appease the Ahl Abu Bakr bin Farid who remained in
opposition to the British and the Protectorate rulers until the end of colonial ruler in
1967. However, the Ahl Abu Bakr's peak was in the 1950s when, with tribesmen from
Dathina and Abyan they attacked the new agricultural projects in the Protectorate43.
These projects were the same targets for Muhammad Aidrus, Naib ofLower Yafi'i,
who recruited dissident tribesmen from Dali, Fadhli, and Lower Yafi'i to his cause. He
demanded greater participation of local entrepreneurs in the Abyan Cotton Board, the
landowners and peasants who worked in the co-operative project should receive a larger
share of the profits, and British control of the project should be reduced. These claims
might have been a reflection of his personal desire for greater wealth, but they also
42 Trevaskis - op. cit., p. 86
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showed the growing ambition ofmen like the Naib, who believed they were being
deprived by the forward policy and wanted a greater say in the running of the
Protectorate.
Whatever the reasons behind Muhammad Aidrus's revolt, he proved to be a major
problem for both the British and the rulers of the Protectorate. From his base in al-
Qarah (in the mountains close to the border with the Yemen), he attacked convoys and
military and economic installations in the Protectorate. Probably his most embarrassing
success from the British point of view was when he managed to take the contents of the
Lower Yafi'i state treasury, the Tribal Guards and almost every official in the
administration with him back to his stronghold44. Aidrus was also very popular with
the people ofLower Yafi'i, which meant that the British had to move carefully so as not
to set off an even more widespread rebellion in the Protectorate. Muhammad Aidrus,
like the Ahl Abu Bakr bin Farid, remained an active opponent of the British and their
policy in the Protectorate right up to 1967. He also remained influential and was
invited to join the National Liberation Front when it was formed in 1963, although he
declined. In fact, as Kostiner has pointed out these were not only tribal revolts, the
activities of both groups were important for the political organisations as well,:
"Both Ibn al-'Aydarus' uprising and the ... Ahl Abu Bakr revolt contributed to
the emergence of an opposition which cut across the boundaries of the
previously rigid stratification; notables, administrators, teachers and
landowners, in co-operation with tribesmen, against the leading establishment in
the Protectorate"45.
These two groups of dissidents were the most notable, largely for their success, but they
were not the only opposition to Britain and the Protectorate rulers. Other groups, such
as the Rabizi tribe and the Dammanis were also causing the security forces great
problems, in some cases the Government Guards were effectively prisoners under siege
in their forts. However, it has to be stressed that there was no overall command of the
dissidents, rather it was several separate, and quite distinct, tribal groups that rebelled
44 Trevaskis - op. cit., p. 124, also Records ofYemen, 1798-1960: Volume 13, 1957-1958, pp. 329-30,
Luce's telegram to Secretary of State for Colonies stated that Aidrus left Abyan with over £10,000, over
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45 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 28
74
against either their local ruler or the British or a combination of the two. Despite this,
the rebellion in the Protectorate took its toll on both the security forces and the forward
policy as a whole, and it became increasingly clear that a change of direction was
needed from the British if they were to contain the dissidents and help their allies and
dependants, the various Sultans, Amirs and Naibs of the Protectorate states.
The British Response
One of the reasons for the efficacy of the Protectorate dissidents was the poor
performance of the security forces, the APL and the Government Guards. Moreover,
this got worse as the 'rebels' gained in confidence and achieved successes which
highlighted the need for reform of these forces. There were actually three different
forces in the Protectorate, the APL, the Government Guards and the Tribal Guards,
each with different roles and areas of responsibility. The Tribal Guards were for
internal security within each state and were the rulers' own security force. The
Government Guards were for manning key position on the frontier and for dealing with
breaches of security the Tribal Guards could not handle. Finally, the APL were
responsible for patrols in the hinterland and to give military backing where necessary to
the Government Guards46. However, by the mid-1950s, none of the three were
particularly efficient at maintaining security within the Protectorate, and there were
serious problems with low morale.
The Foreign Office, as shown above, believed that the inadequacy of the intelligence
system and security forces were potentially part of the problem in the Protectorate and
that the British should not be so quick to blame the Yemen for all the troubles. The
ambush of an APL convoy in Wadi Hatib in 1954 by the Rabizi tribe resulted in huge
casualties for the Levies and an already low morale plummeted further47. This incident
highlighted that the Foreign Office view certainly had some truth to it, especially after
46 PRO CO 1015/1302/10 - Strength and Deployment ofAden Protectorate Levies and Government
Guards, 1 Feb. 1957
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the garrison at Robat had to be evacuated in July 1955 in the face of further Rabizi
attacks, as well as mass desertions in both the APL and the Government Guards48. The
need for reform was clear, and so Sir Lawrence Sinclair, Commander British Forces,
decided to withdraw all Levies to Aden for training and re-fitting and left the
Government Guards in forts with landing strips to be supplied by air transport as there
was to be no road movement by troops49.
Initially disengagement was treated with dismay by the rulers, and jubilation by the
dissidents. There were more determined attacks on Government Guard forts, and
unfamiliarity with the new system meant communications between the forts and APL
headquarters were poor. However, order was gradually restored as the dissident tribes
grew tired of attacking uncapturable forts, and there were no convoys to ambush. The
resultant lack of success against the British and the security forces saw the cessation of
Yemeni supplies to the 'rebel' tribes. The APL was also successfully reformed under
the War Office and by the late 1950s was efficiently imposing more peaceful conditions
in the Protectorate in tandem with the RAF. This is not to say that all trouble ended,
but conditions did improve and the British slowly regained the initiative in the
Protectorate, albeit only for a few years until the NLF appeared on the scene. Even so,
it was not until late 1960 that Muhammad Aidrus was bombed out ofhis stronghold
and his political supporters detained50. Furthermore, the Imam continued to supply
large quantities of rifles and ammunition to dissident tribes51. Luce believed that by
January 1957 the Imam had been taught "a sufficiently firm lesson" which had
stabilised the frontier over the previous six months since the latest bout of disturbances
had erupted . However, the danger of political subversion was still very real, and the
Governor believed that:
48 Trevaskis - op. cit., p. 71
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"Our best, and indeed only, hope of retaining the allegiance and co-operation of
such Rulers in the face of external pressures lies in the development of their
S3
States and the giving of tangible proofof the value of the British connection" .
Thus, Luce was repeating the warnings of the Chiefs of Staff in their 1955 report on
security in the Protectorate, that settled conditions could not be restored by military
means alone. It is difficult to establish the extent to which these warnings were actually
heeded, especially with Treasury opposition to increased expenditure. Military means
had restored a large degree of stability to the Protectorate in the short-term, but there
had still been a lot of damage caused by the rebellion and the British response. Any
progress that had been achieved in the early 1950s was ruined by the events of the mid-
1950s with trade at a standstill, the states' revenues had dwindled, and control had been
lost over large parts of the country54. Moreover, the events of the mid-1950s had ruined
British credibility in the eyes ofmany; their initial inability to contain the situation had
shown that British control over the Protectorate was far from absolute. Disengagement
had worked in the short term, but a long-term solution was required to ensure a repeat
of the Protectorate rebellion did not occur, and some British officials believed the
answer lay in creating a Federation in the hinterland.
The Creation of the Federation
Hickinbotham's Proposal
The Federation of the Arab Amirates of the South was inaugurated on 11 February 1959
but was actually first suggested in 1952 by the then Governor ofAden, Tom
Hickinbotham, to the Colonial Office55. The gap of seven years was due to a
combination of reluctance on the part of the rulers to relinquish any of their powers, and
cold feet by the British who, with the exception ofHickinbotham, did not want to
53 ibid.
54 Trevaskis - op. cit., pp. 77-8
55 PRO CO 1015/1212/30 - op. cit.
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pressurise the rulers into the project. The Federal scheme ultimately found favour with
both the rulers and the British, but was opposed by certain groups within the
Protectorate and also by the Imam who saw it as yet another transgression of the 1934
Treaty of Sana.
Hickinbotham initially proposed to the rulers in January 1954 two federations, one in
the Eastern Aden Protectorate (EAP), the other in the Western Aden Protectorate
(WAP) which was less well developed administratively. The Governor would have
been head of both organisations, with a Council of Rulers, Executive and Legislative
Councils of nominated members (elected members at a later date) in both federations,
which would only have been responsible for customs, communications, education and
public health56. The rulers accepted this scheme in principle and progress was made
but the hostile reaction from Yemen and Egypt (and the accompanying propaganda)
cn
scared the rulers who started hesitating over the proposals . British Government
officials were also uncertain about the benefits of a federation:
"Mr Gorell-Barnes (Colonial Office) replied that, in his personal opinion, the
federation scheme did not look like coming to anything. The Rulers concerned
had been affected by anti-federation propaganda from Cairo and elsewhere, and
CO
were showing reluctance to enter into the scheme" .
According to Hickinbotham, pressure should have been exerted on the weaker rulers to
coerce them into accepting federation, but instead the Colonial Office pulled back to
avoid the allegations of force and left it to the rulers to initiate the scheme59. However,
this does not give the full story, and there were other factors involved, not least the
rivalry that existed among certain rulers, and the fact that policy-makers in London
were unsure of the best direction to take in Aden and the Protectorate until regional
policy had been determined.
56 Hickinbotham - op. cit., pp. 165-6
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The main differences in British policy-making over the idea of federation was between
the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office. The Colonial Office memorandum to the
Chiefs of Staff on the British Government's long range policy assessed the value of
both the Colony and the Protectorate to British interests and concluded that Aden had
strategic value whilst the Protectorate's main value was as a defensive barrier60. The
question that had to be asked was, was federation the best way ofmaintaining British
interests in Aden and ensuring the Colony was protected by the hinterland? The
Colonial Office memorandum pointed out that there were sufficient doubts about
federation to withhold pressure on the rulers to agree to a union, although the prospect
of oil being discovered might change the circumstances. The Colonial Office believed
that the states should be induced to sign a precautionary agreement - to divide the spoils
if oil were discovered - which in itselfwas a closer form of association both between
the states, and between all the states together and the British Government than had
previously existed. In addition, there was the Government's stated aim regarding all
dependent territories, that they should be brought "to responsible self-government if
and as soon as that can be safely achieved, having regard to the economic and social
condition of each territory"61. It was not realistic to assume that the states could
achieve this independent of each other, and so policy should be in favour of gradual
achievement ofFederation, bringing the rulers voluntarily into association with each
other. However, the memorandum also stated that "it is not also necessary to assume
that any time must come when those federated Protectorates would need in turn to be
fO • •
federated with the Colony" . This highlighted that not only did British interests come
first, but that in reality the policy-makers in London were unsure how to best defend
them. Moreover, the memorandum was also an example ofBritish uncertainty about
relinquishing any control over the Colony, an issue which would be much debated until
the final decision to withdraw was taken in 1966.
The Foreign Office at the time were more certain ofhow to best defend British
interests, and this preferably did not involve federation. Harold Macmillan, then
60 PRO CO 1015/1212/30 - op. cit.
61 ibid.
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Foreign Secretary, wrote to Alan Lennox Boyd (Colonial Secretary) expressing his
doubts about federation and the aim of eventual independence for Aden and the
Protectorate, since "it is surely an essential interest to hold on to it (i.e. Aden) as long as
we possibly can and not to encourage any development which will speed up a demand
/ri
for independence" . Moreover, not only should the British Government not encourage
federation, but in fact the exact opposite should be British policy, the rulers should be
left "in a state of simple rivalry and separateness" so that they could be played off
against each other and remain dependent on Britain64. The Joint Planning Staffwere
also dubious about federation since, according to them, discussions would prolong the
requirement for additional British forces in Aden65. However, it could have been just as
easily argued that this was necessary anyway, given the unsettled state of affairs in the
Protectorate at the time. Lennox Boyd responded to these doubts with the argument
that the barrage of criticism the rulers were facing from the opposition meant they
might succumb individually to Yemeni or Saudi influence unless they were united66. It
was this argument that ultimately won the day, and the Governor was authorised to
open discussions with the rulers again, although the 'softly, softly' approach was to be
continued67.
The Rulers were therefore sent a communication on 31st March 1956 informing them
that, after a review of policy,
"It is therefore the view ofHer Majesty's Government that it would be in your
best interests to seek some form of closer association between yourselves for
mutual assistance and support, in order to strengthen your internal economy and
social organisation with a view to your further economic and political
development"68.
The communication's language was, presumably intentionally, vague, allowing the
Rulers to negotiate among themselves, and reassuring them of continued protection
63 PRO CO 1015/1212/35 - Macmillan to Lennox Boyd, 14 Oct. 1955
64 ibid.
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from the British Government. The Rulers replied, with an equally vague
communication, that they believed "that the development and progress of our countries
in the future depends on close association and co-operation between them", and
promised that they would have discussions to consider this and reach "a more
acceptable organisation" 69.
Hickinbotham was disappointed at the lack of pressure the British Government was
willing to exert on the Rulers, and criticised British policy in a long letter to the
70
Colonial Secretary . He believed that to control political development, improve the
economy, advance education "of the right type", and weld together the component
states of the Protectorate with as little disturbance as possible, the Federation plan was
the best solution. The decision in 1954 not to interfere in the internal politics of the
Protectorate was taken to avoid arousing the opposition of "the less understanding and
71
more backward of the rulers" . The federation plan at that time was capable of
adjustment and could have been made more palatable to the rulers if necessary, indeed
negotiations continued through 1954 even whilst the rebellion in the hinterland was at
its heaviest. However, the British decision to avoid pressuring the rulers into federation
was a serious setback which Hickinbotham criticised:
"More is the pity that no pressure was brought to bear for if it had been the
whole affair would have been concluded successfully within a few weeks and
77
we should certainly be much better off than in fact we are" .
The rulers also protested at the decision since it meant they were suffering from Yemeni
propaganda attacks for no good reason, but Hickinbotham, "ever obedient", followed
orders. In fact, the Governor's criticisms here were watered down by Lord Lloyd before
he circulated the despatch so that the criticism was much milder73. The present policy
of giving the rulers mild encouragement to form a federation by themselves also comes
in for criticism from Hickinbotham, however, as he did not believe that any of the rulers
69 PRO CO 1015/1131/3 - Appendix II to Despatch No. 875 of19th June 1956
70 PRO CO 1015/1131/3 - Despatchfrom Governor to Lennox Boyd, 19 June 1956
71 ibid.
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were capable of introducing a workable scheme for even partial federation. The only
exception to this was the Sultan of Lahej who "unfortunately ... has very nationalistic
and advanced ideas" and his "anti-British policy must be condemned and that
roundly"74. Hickinbotham was of the opinion that it was up to the British to give the
lead, and so considered setting up a small committee of rulers under his chairmanship
to consider how best to make federation a reality, an idea that Lloyd opposed as he did
not want the initiative to come from a representative ofHer Majesty's Government75.
Luce's Policy
Hickinbotham's criticisms and proposals ultimately came to nothing as he was replaced
as Governor ofAden by Sir William Luce in September 1956. The new Governor had
his own ideas about future policy in Aden and the Protectorate, and he was not of the
opinion that federation suited the best interests of the British Government. Therefore,
in December 1956 he informed the Colonial Office that he was stopping the federation
and oil agreements:
"they were in the best interests of the people of the Protectorate ... But, as I see
it, the requirements ofHer Majesty's Government's policy for the Colony must
come first and insofar as there is disharmony between them and administrative
consideration in the Protectorate, the latter must give way"76.
Luce expanded on his views on the British Government's policy in a letter to the
Colonial Secretary. He based his conclusions "on the assumption that British policy is
primarily concerned with our interests in Aden Colony ... and that the importance of
the Protectorate to Her majesty's Government lies chiefly in its relationship to the
77 •
Colony" . In Aden itself, the problem was to keep the politically conscious class
happy with political and constitutional developments, but not go so far as to prejudice
the British Government's policy - in other words "play for time by performing a tight-
74 PRO CO 1015/1131/3 - op. cit.
75 PRO CO 1015/1131/6 - Lloyd to Hickinbotham, July 1956
76 PRO CO 1015/1132/7 - Letterfrom Luce to Sir John Macpherson (Colonial Office), 11 Dec. 1956
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rope act"78. As regards the Protectorate, Luce did not believe that Federation was a
policy which would avoid conflicting with British needs and interests. Firstly, there
had been no real support for the scheme from among the Rulers, in fact the plan had run
into difficulties due to "the feuds, jealousies and suspicions which are typical ofmost
Arabs" (a disparaging view common among many of the Government's representatives
70
in South Arabia), let alone been eagerly accepted . More importantly, according to the
Governor, federation would result in an early call for the abolition of the protectorate
and advisory treaties which would limit British actions:
"the demand for independence of the Protectorate which I believe would follow
federation would greatly stimulate nationalist feeling in the Colony and the
desire to join Colony and Protectorate together in one independent State. The
difficulties of retaining control of the Colony would thereby be greatly
increased."80
For these reasons, Luce opposed the implementation of the federation proposal,
although he admitted that, since the idea was in circulation, the British Government
could not kill it off openly without encouraging the Yemen to champion the idea and
win over "the more progressively minded Protectorate Arabs". He suggested instead
that Britain should not say or do anything to either promote or kill off the scheme.
Moreover, the oil agreements, which would be the surest way making a federation
reality, should also be abandoned. Luce's alternative was to convince the States of the
advantage of the British connection through a policy of economic and social
development of the Protectorate. He warned that this would require "considerably
greater funds" than had previously been expended, but,
"IfHer Majesty's Government are not prepared to pay for the retention of their
influence, they will in my opinion assuredly lose it and with its loss their policy
for Aden Colony will be gravely jeopardised"81.
The Governor believed that, whilst economic and social development might well






risk already existed and a policy of encouraging progress might reconcile the moderate
elements to the British connection.
Luce's proposals were not seriously considered by the British Government for another
year when future policy in the Colony and Protectorate were again being discussed. A
Colonial Office memorandum for the Cabinet Committee on the Middle East suggested
three possible policy options for the Protectorate: present policy; federation; Luce's
89
proposal . The policy being followed at the time involved fending off Yemeni or
Saudi aggression and subversion whilst maintaining minimum control with minimum
development, but this was negative and did little to satisfy the aspirations of the more
educated classes or bind the rulers and their subjects to the British connection. British
Ministers were against taking the initiative over federation and the rulers' "traditional
separatism" meant little progress had been made. After the memorandum rejected these
two options it recommended that the Colonial Office supported Luce's proposal
regarding the development of the Protectorate. The suggested increased expenditure of
additional £1.75m. per annum was the problem as it was unlikely to yield an economic
return. Furthermore, the Cabinet had endorsed the view that very careful consideration
• • 0-2
was necessary for any increased commitments in overseas expenditure . However,
since Great Britain needed to retain the Colony, and control over the Protectorate was
important to this, then,
"the proposed additional expenditure in the Protectorate can be compared with
the recent decision to allocate £lm. annually to economic support of the
Baghdad Pact, and the whole proposal should be considered as a series of
measures designed to strengthen the United Kingdom position in southern
84
Arabia and therefore in the Middle East" .
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The proposals met opposition from the Treasury who claimed they needed to
economise85. However, there was support from the Foreign Office since "expenditure
of this kind was necessary ifwe were to maintain our position in Arabia and the Persian
Gulf'86. Ultimately, Ministers agreed to an enhanced programme of development
involving "some expansion in the general scale of our economic aid", but not until
07
1959/60 due to the economic situation in the UK . However, at about this time, the
rulers were changing their minds about federation and beginning to see the benefits of
forming some kind ofunion, a development which involved further revisions of British
policy towards Aden and the Protectorate.
The Rulers Agree to Federation
Early in 1958 the Governor ofAden informed London that some of the Protectorate
rulers were proposing a Federation of their states88. The reason for the change ofmind,
according to Luce, was "their desire to strengthen themselves against the Yemen and to
OQ
offer their people a more secure and prosperous future" . The renewed threat from the
Yemen, in particular the formation of the United Arab States in January 1958 which
allied the Imam with Nasser's Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic, seemed to be the
main reason for the Rulers' renewed interest in federation. According to Trevaskis the
initiative to move towards a federation came from Sharif Hussein ofBeihan, Sultan
Saleh ofAudhali, and Sultan Ahmed of Fadhli, with support from the Upper Aulaqi
Shaikhdom, Dhala and Lower Yafi'i90. However, the initiative took the British by
surprise.
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The Rulers had been alarmed, not only by the closer ties between the Yemen and Egypt,
but also at the renewed outbreak of disturbances in the Protectorate during 1958, which
this time was backed up by Yemeni troops91. However, unlike the troubles of 1954, on
this occasion the APL and the Government Guards were better able to defend the
Protectorate against the dissident tribes, although they had more difficulties against the
better armed Yemeni troops on the frontier. The firm stand by the British, though,
resulted in the rulers having increased confidence in the British Government,
particularly after Luce withdrew recognition of Sultan Ali of Lahej who had been
causing problems for the colonial government (see below). This confidence in the
British, boosted by the reassurance ofDuncan Sandys, and the Labour MP Austen
Albu, that the rulers would not be abandoned helped convince the Protectorate rulers to
ally themselves with the British Government, and also with each other in the face of the
• . • Q? . . .
Yemeni/Egyptian threat . The result was that discussions to form a federation took
place in London in June 1958, and then back in Aden for the last quarter of the year to
Q-3
reach agreement on the form that the Federation would take .
The discussions were long, and at times difficult, and the inauguration ceremony did
not take place until 11th February 1959 when the six states who had first expressed
interest established the Federation of Arab Amirates of the South. The British
Government had agreed on 16th July 1958 to the principle of federation and that there
should be a treaty between the British Government and the Federation. However, the
form of the new Federal constitution proved a difficult problem to overcome, largely
because, in Luce's opinion, "Some of the Rulers are highly temperamental characters
and the shaping of the constitution had to take account of deep-seated suspicions and
jealousies between them"94. In the end the constitution provided for a Council of
Ministers with general executive authority and a rotating chairmanship, and a Federal
Council as the legislative authority with six nominated members from each state. The
plan for a President "proved impossible owing to mutual distrust and suspicion between
91 ibid, pp. 129-130
92 ibid., p. 133
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some of the Rulers"95. The Treaty between the British Government and the Federation
gave Britain the responsibility for external affairs and the obligation of defence as well
as the right to give advice (which the Federation was obliged to accept). Financial and
technical assistance was to be provided and a Federal Army and Federal National Guard
(to replace the APL and Government Guards respectively) were to be established,
although British forces could also move at will and carry out operations. Despite its
weaknesses, Luce was reasonably hopeful about the future of the Federation, but
warned:
"The future of the Federation and the faith of its members in our good intentions
will depend greatly on the firmness of our support in the face of the Yemen's
provocative and active hostility"96.
This is important because Luce's warning turned out to be fairly prophetic, as the
reluctance of the British Government to fight back against Yemeni subversion and
hostility in the 1960s was one of the main complaints from the Federation and seriously
undermined it as an effective institution. Trevaskis also warned of the weaknesses in
the Federal structure since the only element of stability to base the Federal government
on was the tribes qualified acceptance of their ruling councils' leadership:
"With bullets in their cartridge belts they had the most effective means of
influencing their rulers and, so long as tribalism persists and they have guns in
their hands, they are unlikely to be converted to unintelligible principles of the
07
ballot box and the majority vote"
However, this pessimism did not stop other states from allying themselves to the new
creation, and by 1962, six more states had joined so that almost the entire Western
Aden Protectorate was federated, the main exception being the Colony of Aden, and its
exclusion was to prove a very controversial issue which divided British policy-makers.
Luce stated that he "naturally welcomed" the rulers' approach in 1958, although given
his opposition to federation and his alternative proposals for future policy in South
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
97 Trevaskis - op. cit., p. 145
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Arabia, this was probably diplomacy rather than actual pleasure . However, British
policy since 1956 had been that, if the Protectorate rulers wanted to form a federation,
then they should be encouraged. This meant that there was no real option to supporting
the initiative other than destroying the new confidence the rulers had in the British
Government. According to Trevaskis, though, there were many within British policy¬
making circles who were unhappy about the development. The majority of the
Conservative Party were unhappy about the Federation as it would want to absorb Aden
and move towards independence, the Foreign Office were sensitive to the reaction from
the Yemen and Egypt, the Colonial Office were unsure about the wisdom of federations
after their bad experience with the Central African Federation, and the Treasury were
loathe to increase Government expenditure. However, despite these objections, the
discussions did go ahead, and meant that British policy had to be revised in light of the
new organisation, not just in the Protectorate, but also in the Colony.
Luce's Proposals for Future Policy in Aden
The problem now facing the British was how to best maintain their control over Aden
which had maintained its importance as a military base for overseas policy, in particular
the 'East of Suez' policy which had become the focus of the British Government's
defence and foreign policy (see above, Chapter 2). However, whilst Aden was
increasing in importance, British power had greatly waned in the rest of the Middle
East, especially after the Suez debacle in 1956, and the Government was finding it more
and more difficult to maintain its influence in the face of the growing threat of Arab
nationalism. Luce summarised the most likely future for Aden and the British position
in two letters to Gorell Barnes of the Colonial Office (March 1958) in which he
estimated that the "considerable degree of internal self-government" promised to the
Adenis by Lord Lloyd would be achieved by the beginning of 1963. Moreover, he was
realistically pessimistic about the length of time the British Government could hold
onto the Colony. After the advance had been secured,
98 PRO CO 1015/1835/13 - op. cit.
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"it might be possible to hold the position for a further three or four years, but in
the face of a growing demand for full self-government and self-determination.
To retain control of the Colony after 1967 will in my view involve a head-on
collision with Adeni Arabs, their physical repression and probably a
constitutional breakdown. It is quite possible that such a situation will arise
before 1967 if the local situation is subjected to strong external influences and if
the Colony Arabs see no prospect but an indefinite continuation ofBritish
control"99.
He believed that the British were faced by four "currents" in world affairs: the move
towards independence in the Empire; Arab nationalism; the decline ofBritish power;
and Russian expansionism, all four ofwhich would lead to the termination ofBritish
control in Aden. He asserted that the best way forward for the British Government in
the Middle East was to enlist Arab nationalism against Russian expansionism, but this
was only achievable once the British had pulled out of the region. Any attempt to arrest
the abandonment of British power in the Middle East would fail to win any benefits and
involve a military effort out of all proportion to the issues at stake10 . This view was
fairly radical for a British colonial official at this time, but was also a realistic summary
of regional affairs, and would ultimately prove to contain a large amount of truth.
The follow up to this letter set out Luce's views on how the British Government should
respond to the forces it faced in the Middle East101. The Governor set out three possible
courses of: digging in and defending the British position; a very early withdrawal; or a
gradual disengagement. The first was a continuation of the policy at the time of
retaining indefinite control, which would mean increasing hostile propaganda, the
rejection of federation as it would ultimately mean merging with Aden, and having to
rely more and more heavily on British troops as the loyalty of the Arab forces would
come under pressure. Moreover, as the security situation deteriorated, so would the
strategic and economic value ofAden, and in the end Britain would either be defeated
or have to withdraw, which in both cases would harm British interests. An early
withdrawal would cut expenditure, but also involve breaking treaties and a loss of
prestige which would again damage British interests in the Persian Gulf. Therefore,
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Luce favoured a gradual disengagement over ten years, building up a successor state
which would be capable of determining its own future status. It is possibly because of
this realisation that Luce changed his mind about federation and came to view it
favourably as the basis for a potential successor state. As regards the effects on British
interests, the Governor was of the opinion that securing Gulf oil supplies should depend
on diplomacy and adapting to conditions rather than on military action. Moreover,
Aden was only important in shipping terms in relation to the Suez Canal, as a trading
centre its importance had decreased, and the refinery and bunkering services could
either be still available or alternatives could be found within ten years. Therefore,
"the relinquishment of control of Aden Colony within the next decade would
not have such an effect on British strategic and economic interests as to make it
preferable to retain control indefinitely in spite of all the difficulties and dangers
• • 109
inherent in such a policy" .
Again, these views were radical for the time, and, as Glen Balfour-Paul has pointed out,
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probably too radical for London to accept . Luce, however, was convinced that it
would do Britain more harm than good to retain indefinite control and as the move
towards the Federation began to take shape, the Governor expanded on his proposals
with a possible timetable. This involved "a simple association ofColony and
Protectorate" which would not affect the status of the Colony, followed by a "firm
constitutional arrangement" for a merger with protectorate status, and then the move
towards complete independence104. The third phase, Luce reckoned, would be reached
in ten years at the latest since the pace of disengagement was being forced by the
developments towards creating a federation in Somaliland, and also the Iraqi coup was
a new factor to be taken into account. The British Government at the time were
preparing to make an announcement on the future of the Somaliland Protectorate,
supporting independence and union with Somalia, a move which could have been
compared unfavourably with the lack of constitutional progress in South Arabia. The
situation in Iraq was also of concern as the pro-West government of King Faysal II and
102 ibid.
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Nuri al-Sa'id was overthrown in a military coup in July 1958, ending British influence
in the eastern Arab world. Admittedly, this third phase would cast doubt on Britain
retaining independent defence rights in Aden, but it would be hoped that the move
towards independence would have generated enough goodwill to ensure some form of
defence treaty. In the Governor's opinion, the only alternative to actually coming to
terms with Arab Governments to preserve the remaining British interests in the Middle
East was "the suppression by increasingly forceful methods of a rapidly growing
demand for self-determination stimulated by the Somaliland statement" (which would
announce Britain's support for independence for the Somaliland Protectorate)105. Luce
was afraid that the imminent announcement of constitutional advance in Somaliland
would lead to similar demands from Adeni Arabs, but his long-term view was not
shared by others in London.
The Chiefs of Staff saw the retention ofAden as vital if the British Government were
going to maintain their policy of the time106. Moreover, whilst the first stage of Luce's
proposals would not affect British defence rights, stage two might cause problems for
operations in the Persian Gulf, and the third stage was not welcome to military chiefs,
since,
"once full independence had been granted the United Kingdom could not rely on
using Aden as a base for the support ofher interests elsewhere in the Arabian
Peninsula or in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area and would have to make
1 07
other arrangements" .
Therefore, if Luce's proposals were to be accepted, the Chiefs of Staff warned, then "an
alternative strategy for supporting military operations in the Persian Gulf area will have
108
to be evolved" . The defence staffwere not the only ones with doubts about Luce's
policy since Julian Amery (then with the Treasury, later at the Air Office) warned
Gorell Barnes that Aden and the Federation should be kept apart since "overseas bases
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are only secure when they are under British sovereignty"109. One possible alternative
raised by Amery and later by Duncan Sandys was to carve out sovereign base areas in
Aden so as to retain British control over vital parts of the Colony, an idea which was
closely looked at by defence chiefs and the Colonial Office in the early 1960s (see
below, Chapter 4).
Even Luce's superiors were against encouraging a merger between the Colony and the
Federation, preferring to maintain control over Aden for as long as the possibility of
using force to defend British interests in the Gulfwas necessary. The Colonial
Secretary told Luce,
"I and my colleagues see great difficulty in approving now a line ofpolicy
which would have the effect on the use ofAden base which, you have readily
admitted, your proposals sooner or later would have. We do not underrate the
difficulties and dangers of the alternative policy ofmaintaining Colonial status
ofAden Colony indefinitely, and if necessary by force, but do not feel we would
be justified in rejecting it definitely before the Chiefs of Staff have completed
their study"110.
This was the end of Luce's proposals, although he continued to argue in favour of them
and did have the support of others, as the Chiefs of Staff declared that:
"ifHer Majesty's Government wishes to retain the ability to intervene quickly in
the Persian Gulf area, there is no short term alternative to the retention ofAden
as a base; and that a long term alternative would be very expensive to
provide"111.
Ultimately, however, Luce was proved right in his predictions as British rule in Aden
only lasted until the end of 1967, the Colony and the Federation did merge, and events
in the 1960s proved very costly to both Her Majesty's Government and its allies. It
could be argued that those opposed to Luce's pragmatism believed that the British and
Federal forces could deal with the opposition, and in 1958 that may well have been true,
109 Records ofYemen, 1798-1960: Volume 14, 1958-1960, pp. 543-5, Minute lfom Julian Amery to
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but the opposition was to grow in strength and numbers, and even in the 1950s had
already caused the British authorities a fair amount of difficulty.
The Early Nationalist Groups
The Aden Association
British control in Aden was, in comparison to control of the other interests in the
Middle East, relatively secure until the 1950s. Unlike Iraq, Egypt, or Palestine there
was no real political opposition to colonial rule from the indigenous population and
there was no effective nationalist organisation until after World War Two. The phrase
which best summed up the state ofAdeni opinion about the British was "respectful
hostility" at the time of the Suez crisis since, whilst there were strikes in support of
t i# ... 119
Nasser, there was very little open denunciation of 'imperialism' and 'colonialism' .
However, things were changing as ideas and ideology spread into Aden and, in the
1960s and probably with lesser impact, into the tribal-based society of the Protectorate.
This was enabled through transistor radios which brought Cairo's 'Voice of the Arabs'
to the Colony and later on to the hinterland. The spread of a nationalist ideology was
enhanced by the return of students and/or migrant workers from abroad where they had
been introduced to the ideas of Arab Nationalism and Nasserism. The attitude to such
ideologies was different in the Protectorate than it was in the Colony which had a large
mercantile community and so was not attracted to the idea of Yemeni nationalism or the
more parochial tribal values, but rather towards an urban, professional form ofpolitical
organisation.
The first such organisation was the Aden Association (AA) which was established in
1950 and formed the main moderate nationalist party in the Colony in the 1950s, and
was generally willing to work with the British to achieve their aim of 'Aden for the
lnPROCO 1015/1132/1 - Letterfrom Luce to Lord Lloyd, 21 Nov. 1956
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Adenis'. The leaders of the AA were from the established merchant and notable
families ofAden like the Luqmans, the Bayoomis and the Maqawis who had earlier
established the Arab Reform Club in 1930 and the Arab Literary Club in the 1930s113.
However, these clubs were criticised for being too close to the British and so the Aden
Association was formed in an attempt by the leaders to distance themselves from the
British, which was difficult to achieve given that the majority of its members were from
the mercantile community whose fortunes were tied to those of the British. The
Association advocated eventual independence for Aden within the Commonwealth, and
was successful in legitimate Colony politics during the 1950s, dominating the elections
to the Legislative Council in 1955 (winning three of the four seats, and the fourth being
aligned to them) and 1959 (winning eleven of the twelve seats). Importantly, the same
families also controlled the Colony newspapers, which were used to support their
demand for a share in Adeni politics and shaping the future. However, the AA was
weakened by its willingness to work with the British, which caused the Association to
be denounced by the emerging radical nationalists and their popular call for full
independence. There were also internal conflicts, which lead to the Association's split
in 1960, nominally over the issue ofmerging with the Federation, but also because of a
clash ofpersonalities between Hassan Ali Bayumi and Muhammad Ali Luqman (the
President of the AA) who set up their own parties following the split (see below,
Chapter 4).
Until 1960, though, the AA was the main legitimate nationalist organisation, and as
such, probably deserved more support from the British since it was the organisation
most likely to co-operate with future policy. The Association's desire for a greater
participation in the running ofAden was dashed by the visit ofLord Lloyd whose
statement in May 1956 promising nothing more than "a considerable degree of self-
government" was a disappointment to the Association which "had hoped for early
internal self-Government but now accepts 1958 as the earliest date for any radical
change and is planning accordingly"114. According to Hickinbotham, the AA blamed
113
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the activities of the more radical Nationalists like the South Arabian League and the
United National Front for the lack of constitutional advance115. However, the
reluctance of the British Government to relinquish control over the military base was
the more realistic reason. Lord Lloyd, despite his statement against political progress,
believed that the British should build up the Association into a stable party with popular
support as the best way to defend the British Government's interests, but nothing came
of this proposal116.
The Aden Association was important as it was the first proper political organisation in
the Colony, and its members continued to play prominent roles in the legitimate politics
ofAden. However, its support rarely went beyond the wealthy mercantile community,
and it is likely that if the elections of 1955 and 1959 had been based on wider electoral
franchises, then they would not have had won by the considerable margins that they did.
Moreover, the AA's willingness to work within the British political structure in Aden
meant that it was an easy target for more radical groups who could accuse members of
the Association of being 'imperial stooges'. This gave these latter groups the
opportunity to attract the wider support of the lower classes and those attracted by Arab
nationalism and the achievements ofNasser.
The South Arabian League
Before World War Two, the main challenge that the British had had to face in the
hinterland was from dissident tribesmen, either because of a feud which drew in
British/Ottoman (until 1918)/Yemeni involvement on one side or the other, or because
of discontent with the effects of the 'forward policy'. However, this began to change in
the late 1940s and 1950s as political ideas from outside South Arabia began to infiltrate
the Protectorate and movements emerged which were not necessarily based on tribal
groupings, but on ideology or issues. The League of the Sons of the South, which
became the South Arabian League (SAL) was the main organisation of this kind in the
115 PRO CO 1015/1202/19 - Telegram Hickinbotham to Secretary ofState for Colonies, 25 May 1956
116 Records ofYemen, 1798-1960: Volume 12, 1955-1957, pp. 148-9, Extract from Report by Lord
Lloyd on his visit to Aden
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Western Aden Protectorate, and dominated political life in the hinterland during the
1950s.
The League was established in 1950 by Muhammad Ali al-Jifri and Shaikhan al-Habshi
who remained the two leading figures of the SAL until 1967. The aims of the League
were total independence from Britain and the unification ofAden and the Protectorate.
The organisation was the most powerful political voice in the hinterland until the
emergence of the NLF and FLOSY after 1963. Its main support, like al-Jifri, came
from Lahej which was both a benefit and a hindrance as, on the one hand, the state was
the strongest and most developed in the WAP, but on the other, this aroused the rivalry
of other states and tribes. There were few members from outside Lahej in the SAL, the
notable exception being al-Habshi who was a Hadhrami, and the League had little
influence outside of Lahej and Abyan. As with the Aden Association, the SAL's
leaders were from society's notables and elite, albeit from the Protectorate rather than
the Colony. This meant that, again like the AA, it was distanced from the lower
classes, which hindered the League's attempts to win over the support of the migrant
workers in Aden, despite large numbers of them coming from the Protectorate.
However, the SAL did have more radical aims than the AA, especially the call for
absolute and immediate independence from Britain, and it followed a pro-Nasser line as
he was seen to be successful against colonialism.
Despite its call for Yemeni unity, the SAL opposed the move towards federation in
1954, but this was more to do with the personal ambitions of al-Jifri and the Sultan of
Lahej than opposition to the concept as a whole. Sultan Ali abd al-Karim of Lahej had
replaced his brother in 1952 after the latter, according to Hickinbotham, shot two ofhis
• m t 117
relatives whilst under the influence of excessive alcohol . The new Sultan was
initially seen as a progressive and promising ruler by the British, but soon became too
progressive for their liking. The reason for this was the Sultan's sympathy for the SAL,
whose President, al-Jifri, was also Legal Adviser to al-Karim and Speaker of the Lahej
117 Hickinbotham - op. cit.
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Legal Assembly118. The League opposed Hickinbotham's federation proposal not only
because of the British involvement, but also because it wanted the new institution to be
based around Lahej's leadership, something which the other rulers did not favour.
The British too were not keen on the idea of a Lahej-centred federation given the
strength of the SAL there and their increasing suspicion of the organisation, especially
as Muhammad Aidrus was a supporter. Moreover, the activities of al-Jifri and al-
Habshi in Aden lead to their expulsion from the Colony in August 1956 as the British
began to regard the League as an increasingly dangerous organisation119. The SAL
President first went to Cairo, then based himself in Lahej, but from there he had little
effect on politics in Aden, which in turn gave the League little influence in the Colony:
"The weakness of the leadership in the South Arabian League has also been
shown up; Jifri seems to have stood head and shoulders above his other
political colleagues, who appear for the moment to be at a loss to know what to
do next"120.
Despite this, the SAL was still viewed as "the strongest and most influential political
organisation in southern Arabia", which was probably true in the Protectorate, but much
less so in the Colony where the AA and the trades unions had far more support121. In
fact, the British continued to over-estimate the strength and influence of the SAL right
up to 1967, by which time it was a Saudi-backed body with little sway in the
Protectorate, and effectively none in the Colony. However, in the 1950s, when it had
the support ofNasser and the UAR, and was helping to co-ordinate the activities of the
dissident groups in the hinterland, the League did have the ability to cause both the
British and the rulers some problems.
The turning point for the SAL was in 1958 when Luce ordered the arrest of al-Jifri and
his two brothers (Abdulla and Alawi) from their base in Lahej. The three, according to
118 Records ofYemen, 1798-1960: Volume 12, 1955-1957, pp. 150-152, Intelligence Summary,
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Luce, were in almost complete control of the Lahej administration and were conducting
an anti-British campaign whilst the Sultan was intending to announce Lahej's
199
attachment to the United Arab States (the union ofEgypt, Syria and the Yemen) .
The attempted arrest in April 1958 failed, however, as both Muhammad and his brother
Alawi escaped, although Abdullah was caught, whilst the Sultan of Lahej defected to
1 90
Cairo in June with half of his army . The new Sultan, Fadhl bin Ali, was, from a
British perspective, to be "a great improvement on his predecessor" and later took Lahej
into the Federation124. The SAL was thereby left leaderless in both Aden and the
Protectorate. This was a serious blow to the League and marked its decline as a force in
South Arabian politics:
"The exclusion of its leader deprived the party of its former dynamism. The
exiles in Cairo are unable to provide the day-to-day leadership and like most
emigres are becoming increasingly difficult to work with as they lose touch with
nf
their supporters in Aden" .
The South Arabian League was not only the first political organisation in the Aden
Protectorate, it was also the most influential one during the 1950s, and even continued,
albeit mistakenly, to be viewed by the British as a force right up to 1967. The League
was able, although only to a limited extent, to attract support from across tribal and
state barriers, the first organisation to achieve this in the Protectorate. However, it was
hampered by being a Lahej-based organisation which lost it support from other states.
Once its President, Muhammad Ali al-Jifri, was in exile in Cairo, the League lost its
ability to exert influence on politics in both Aden and the Protectorate.
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The Trades Unions, the UNF and the ATUC
The economic and industrial growth of Aden in the years following World War Two
lead to social and demographic shifts in the structure of the Colony. The increasing
demand for labour as the port business grew in size and then the construction of the BP
oil refinery meant the numbers of Yemeni and Protectorate migrants to the Colony grew
to fill the demand. This in turn gave an impetus to demands for improved working and
living conditions as the migrant labour force began to settle in Aden, whereas
previously the workers had returned to their homes after a certain period of
employment. The resulting rise in immigration, as a permanent work force replaced
seasonal labour, would not only mean a change in labour conditions, but also have a
direct impact on Adeni politics and British policy.
Trade unions had been legalised by the British in Aden in 1942, but none were actually
formed until the European employees formed the Aden Port Pilots in 1952 . From the
following year, however, the number ofArab unions rapidly increased, the first two
being the Forces Civilian Employees Association and then the Aden Airways
employees followed suit, and by August 1956 there were twenty-five trades unions in
127 • • • • •Aden . As the unions grew in strength and numbers, their ability to express their
discontent with working conditions increased as well. The unions were not strictly craft
unions as there was very little Arab skilled labour, instead they were based around
specific companies or plants, but they were not puppet unions of the employers, as the
events of 1956 were to prove.
By 1956 the trades unions were becoming involved in the politics of the Colony as well
as workers' rights. The elections of 1955 were opposed by various groups, including
some of the unions, sections of the SAL, and also members of the Free Yemeni
Movement, an anti-Imam organisation whose leaders were in exile in Aden. Together
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they formed the United National Front (UNF) to boycott the elections and demanded an
unconditional right to vote and stand for election for every Aden-born Arab over 21 and
every Aden-bom non-Arab whose predecessors had been resident in the Colony "for a
• 19R
long time" or who had themselves been a resident for five years . The UNF was
short-lived as an effective organisation, but some of its members continued to play an
important role in the political opposition to British ruler in Aden as leaders of the Aden
Trades Unions Congress (ATUC).
The ATUC was established in March 1956, and had very close links to the UNF, as can
be seen by comparing the membership of the two organisations. Muhammad Salim Ali
Abdu, Sayyid Zain Sadiq, Abdullah al Asnag, Husain Salim Bawazir and Ali Uthman
Muhammad were leaders in both organisations, and there were 60 other committee
I
members of the ATUC that were known supporters of the UNF . The Congress was
formed after a series of 33 strikes in March 1956 which involved 7,000 men and nearly
130,000 working days lost, followed by two more waves of strikes in June-July and
1^0 . # #
then August to December . The British TUC was involved in establishing the ATUC,
and contacts were maintained between the two organisations, but gradually the
influence of the more political International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICTU) and
the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU) could be seen as strikes
were used for political issues as well as labour issues. However, the initial industrial
action was largely related to working conditions, as the Commission of Inquiry set up
by the British reported. The Commission included a member of a local trade union,
two members of the Legislative Council and a British former trade unionist and
confirmed that there was a good deal of genuine grievances and a lack ofmachinery to
deal with these grievances and let the workers discuss them with their employers131.
The grievances centred on the hours and conditions of employment, the desire for
benefits like housing and medical care, lack of compensation and national insurance,
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and the muqaddam system of labour contractors132. In response to this the Colonial
government set up conciliation machinery and Luce warned the employers to avoid any
actions which might exacerbate the situation such as staff cuts. Industrial relations did
1 Tl
improve during 1957, partly as a result of these measures .
It was hoped by the authorities that the ATUC would develop along the lines of the
British trades unions, but gradually the Congress moved away from the Western model.
The leadership of the unions came from the middle class, educated, 'white-collar'
workers who were increasingly aware of events outside Aden, in particular Arab
nationalism and Nasser. There was a general strike in October 1956 in support of the
UAR over Suez, and in 1958 a new period of industrial unrest occurred. The leaders of
the ATUC, in particular the Secretary-General Abdullah al Asnag, were using industrial
action for political ends and provided the leadership for the boycott of the 1959
elections, which was remarkably successful since only 27% of the electorate actually
voted134.
The trade union movement began to be regarded as dangerous by the colonial
authorities as it gained in influence. The first instance of this was the highly effective
one-day general strike of 25th April which was followed by "violent and repeated
i or
attacks on the Government ofAden" by the newspaper 'Al AmeP (The Worker) .
The arrest and imprisonment of the journalist and printer of one article lead to a general
strike and riots in October 1958, and Luce became increasingly worried about the
direction the ATUC was taking:
"Despite the absence of Communist influence in Aden it seems almost certain
that the appeal of Arab nationalism must in the long run outweigh the attractions
of friendly relations with the British Trades Union Congress and the anti-
• • • 1
Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions" .
Ij2 A muqaddam would recruit labour on a tribal basis, and then sub-contract them to an employer, but
exploited the system, retaining large percentages ofworkers' pay and providing poor housing
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For these reasons, the Congress was regarded "as the most serious threat to stability and
• • 1 ^7
security in the Colony" .
The success of the election boycott in 1959 gave the ATUC added impetus and, in the
absence of any other opposition political party, it took over the nationalist leadership as
a whole. This was especially true after the SAL faction in the Congress was defeated in
• 1 ^8
1959 leaving al Asnag and his allies in control of the leadership . However, al Asnag
claimed he was also under pressure from Cairo to politicise the unions and wanted help
from the British Government against the employers and over the issue of immigration
ofYemeni workers who formed a large section of the ATUC's support. The Governor,
Luce, told al Asnag that the Government could do nothing about this, but got the
impression from the ATUC leader that he was,
"a good Trade Unionist, and I think he is genuinely anxious to get the A.T.U.C.
away from its present heavy involvement in politics and back to more friendly
relations with the Government. How far he will be able to do this remains to be
seen"139.
To what extent this assessment was accurate is difficult to gauge. It can certainly be
argued that had the British Government given al Asnag more support and tried to reach
a rapprochement between him and the 'legitimate' Colony politicians, then the eventual
situation might well have turned out differently. However, the ATUC leader was seen
as a 'radical' by many within the British establishment who would never have
countenanced working with such a figure. Al Asnag possibly did actually have a
moderating effect on the ATUC as a whole since, during his absence in London in
November 1959 to discuss the control of immigration, the labour situation deteriorated
with a 34-day strike called by the British Petroleum Aden Employees Union140. There
was also a leadership struggle at the same time and personal conflicts were weakening
the movement at times, which were not resolved until 1960 when the ICATU stepped in
to arbitrate.
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The leaders of the trades unions also formed the main nationalist leadership in the late
1950s and early 1960s, until the more extreme NLF was established and started rivaling
the ATUC. However, this also meant that they were open to the accusation of abusing
their power and using industrial action for political ends. At first the unions had
legitimate reasons to strike over the poor working conditions in the Colony and many
employers abused this and were forced to reform their practices. From early 1958
onwards, though, strikes were being used more and more as a political tool to express
discontent over the elections or support for Nasser or to voice demands for
independence. This would later lead the colonial authorities to limit their right to
strike, and this left the Nationalists without a voice for a short period, until the unions
formed their own political party.
Conclusion
The increasing importance of Aden to the British in the 1950s was largely due to the
loss of colonies and mandates elsewhere. Nevertheless, the value ofAden as a military
base to defend British interests in the Middle East and East Africa was increasingly
clear. The tribal unrest in the Protectorate, however, threatened the British presence,
forcing the Government to examine ways to maintain their presence at the least cost.
The result was eventually the establishment of the Federation ofArab Amirates of the
South which it was hoped would provide the foundations on which to build a future
independent state in good relations with the United Kingdom. This hope, though, was
increasingly uncertain given the growing influence of the Arab Nationalist opposition to
colonial rule. Moreover, a new issue was becoming prominent around which the
opposition could rally, the plan to merge the Colony with the Federation.
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Chapter Four; Colony or Protectorate?, 1959-1963
Introduction
The formation of the Federation in 1959 had been conceived by the rulers and the
British as the best way to defend the Protectorate against Yemeni subversion and the
increasing opposition to colonial rule in South Arabia. However, this opposition was
becoming stronger and gaining more support, in particular through the trade unions, at
the same time as Aden was becoming vital to British strategic interests. The danger
was that Aden would go the same way as Palestine and the Canal Zone, previous major
British bases, a possibility Her Majesty's Government were extremely unwilling to
allow whilst the 'east of Suez' policy dominated Whitehall thinking. Therefore,
different policy options were proposed in the early 1960s to ensure continued British
control in Aden, which also involved retaining British influence in the Federation to
maintain a defensive barrier for the Colony. The question was whether to give the
rulers a free reign over Aden to deal with the opposition as they liked, or whether to
retain British sovereignty over the Colony in the face ofworldwide opposition.
Unsurprisingly, opinion was divided in London and Aden over allowing the accession
of the Colony into the Federation, or maintaining sovereignty.
British Defence Policy and its Effect on Aden
Aden as Middle East Headquarters
During the 1950s, British defence policy concentrated on the nuclear deterrent, despite
its ineffectiveness in limited conflicts, as shown by the Suez campaign (see above,
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Chapter 2). However, towards the end of the decade, the British role overseas began to
be re-examined and defence policy as a whole underwent some changes. The focus was
on 'east of Suez', and conventional forces began to be upgraded to strengthen strategic
mobility in order to defend British interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area.
This in turn saw an increased reliance on the base strategy, whereby troops could be
garrisoned in one site and moved quickly to intervene in a trouble spot. The other
factor involved in the base strategy was that it avoided the difficulties of getting over¬
flying rights from a hostile state in a potential emergency situation. The effect on Aden
was significant as the military establishment there grew from a small scale base to one
of the two major overseas British military bases in the world (Singapore being the
other) between 1957 and 1960 when the Colony was made Headquarters ofMiddle East
Command (HQ MEC).
The initial problem with converting Aden into Middle East headquarters was
accommodation for the services. After the Suez Crisis, the number of servicemen in
Aden increased fourfold from 1956 to 1959 which meant there was a serious lack of
accommodation, and that was in poor condition1. The military complained about the
"scandalously inadequate" accommodation . However, the Treasury were unwilling to
allow construction "on the assumption that the security of tenure in Aden may not be
more than five years"3. These uncertainties about the future ofAden meant that the
base was "grossly overcrowded"4 because ofWhitehall's refusal to permit the
construction ofmore accommodation. Moreover, to move troops from Aden to Kenya
or the UK would have been "strategically unacceptable" as the numbers that would
have needed to be relocated to make "a worthwhile contribution to the accommodation
problem" would have endangered the security ofBritish interests5.
Despite these complaints, and the need for redeployment from Kenya, a construction
ban was imposed to save expenditure. By early 1962, however, there were 2,400 Army
1
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personnel to relocate from East Africa6. This was not practicable in Aden and would
n
have involved a construction programme of four-and-a-half years . The military chiefs
were aware of the uncertain security of tenure in Aden and agreed that "it might be
• • R
considered prudent if the building programme was halted in 1965" . Moreover,
Ministers "made the point that an investment of eleven million pounds in building in
Aden which would not be required until 1964 and which might be unusable after 1970
was not compatible with sound financial planning"9. However, despite these
misgivings, the need to accommodate the growing number of servicemen in Aden, and
the belief that the Colony was ofvital importance to British interests, meant that the
construction ban was lifted, although the number of families was to be limited10.
The need to economise meant that there were policy clashes between the Treasury and
the Colonial Office and Ministry ofDefence as the restrictions of the British economy
did not always match the ability to maintain an overseas role. However, successive
British politicians, both Conservative and Labour, sought to pursue the 'east of Suez'
policy even whilst cuts were being made to the defence budgets and the armed forces.
The role of Aden in this policy was firstly as a military base for the defence ofBritish
interests primarily in the Persian Gulf, but also in Muscat and Oman and the Horn of
Africa, as well as an air staging post, naval base and telecommunications11. Defending
British responsibilities and interests from Sudan in the west to Iran in the north and east
required considerable expenditure, however, and this in turn put extra pressure on
British finances. Moreover, there were also questions being asked in London, both by
the politicians and the media. The Daily Telegraph warned:
"Nevertheless it is only reasonable, before sinking great sums in Aden to recall a
few precedents where bases have been vastly improved ... only to be evacuated a
6 PRO DEFE 7/2200/46 - Reportfor CoS Committee Meeting, 10 April 1962
7 PRO DEFE 7/2200/38 - DraftNote to CoS, 27 March 1962
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few months later ... It would be foolish to make the same mistakes about
Aden"12.
During the debate over the 1960 White Paper a number of speakers criticised the lack of
• • 1
facilities and the "slum conditions" the servicemen lived in . In the late 1940s and
1950s, it should be noted, Britain had been pressured into relinquishing control over its
bases in Palestine and the Canal Zone. Moreover, the base in Cyprus had caused severe
friction with the local population which had impaired its efficacy. Finally, at the time
of expanding the Aden base, troops were being evacuated from Kenya as independence
was imminent. Despite this, 'east of Suez' and the enlarging of the Aden base
continued to be British policy in the early 1960s - at the same time as the British
Government's control over the Colony was beginning to look more and more tenuous.
Sovereign Base Areas
The proposals by William Luce to gradually relinquish control over Aden and grant
independence, or else be forced out, were rejected by Whitehall (see above, Chapter 3).
However, the need to grant some form of constitutional advance was admitted,
otherwise there would be no support for British rule from even the moderates in the
Colony. Therefore, a new constitution was introduced in late 1958, and voting took
place in January 1959 to give the Legislative Council an elected majority, albeit on a
very limited franchise. This did alert the Ministry ofDefence to the possibility of
eventual independence and gradual loss of control over the Colony. This process
endangered the security of the base, which was seen as vital to the defence ofBritish
interests overseas. The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, began to examine alternatives to the
status quo, whether it involved moving from Aden, or excising areas of the Colony to
form sovereign base areas (SBAs).






































The first study of a possible military enclave in the Colony was in 1958 when the
Chiefs of Staff examined the suggestion for the Colonial Office15. The constitutional
changes due in 1959 might have permitted the possibility of either a base to sustain
operations in support ofBritish policy in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula (Case A) or an
air staging post with access from the sea (Case B) (see Map 3, p. 108, for the extent of
British military and civilian installations in the Colony). The first possibility would
have required the ability to defend British interests in the region by intervening with
naval, land and air forces in the Protectorate, the Gulf, Muscat and Oman and the Horn
ofAfrica. This necessitated the incorporation of a command and communications
centre, and airfield, air defence, port facilities, accommodation, training facilities and
administrative installations. Moreover, the base would have to be capable of sustained
defence against outside attack, be self supporting in an emergency, have freedom of
access by air and sea, and should cause the least possible resentment to the surrounding
population. To achieve all of this, Case A would have to include the town ofAden and
almost all inhabited parts of the Colony, which the Chiefs of Staff believed was an
unrealistic expectation. Case B would have included the airfield at Khormaksar and a
deep water harbour for supplies. This was much smaller than Case A, but would still
cut off the capital of the Federation from the hinterland and the Federal states
themselves. Moreover, it could not defend itself against outside attack and so would
depend on the goodwill of the surrounding states, and would only be "slightly less
objectionable on political grounds" than Case A, without any of the latter's
compensating advantages. The report concluded,
"that the physical size and the geographical factors which would determine the
location of an enclave in Aden Colony, whether it were sufficient to sustain Her
Majesty's Government's present policy in the Persian Gulf or merely sufficient
for use as a staging post, are such that the retention of such an enclave cannot be
considered politically realistic"16.
15 DEFE 11/229/397 - Possible Military Enclave in Aden Colony, Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff for
the COS Committee, 8 Dec. 1958
16 ibid.
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The military requirements for a major overseas base were significant and the Aden base
incorporated parts of the actual town unlike the self-sufficient base in Cyprus which had
been excised from the independent state. Cutting out the Aden base would have been
politically undesirable and impractical given the need for water supplies and electricity
which were based in the Colony. The Joint Planning Staff outlined the minimum
necessary for a sovereign base to fulfill British responsibilities and defend the British
• • *17
Government's interests in 1959, and the list was extensive . Accommodation alone
was over 8,000 personnel plus families and dependents (Navy 100, Army 3,000, RAF
5,000) whilst there was also the need for fuelling facilities for warships, storage for
supplies, unimpeded access to harbour wharves for the Army as well as deep water
berths and maintenance facilities for the Navy, an airfield with staging facilities,
communications and broadcasting facilities, and so forth. Moreover, the British
Government would have required inviolate rights over accommodation, military
installations, air space and territorial waters, the right to defend military areas without
restriction, the rights to purchase additional sites if necessary, freedom ofmovement for
personnel and vehicles, overflying and staging rights outside military areas, the use of
all public utilities, special legal facilities and the rights to obtain fuel supplies from the
refinery. This list ofminimum requirements and rights was deemed necessary to carry
out British operational commitments in the region, and involved having ultimate
control over the airfield, the port, and large parts of the inhabited areas of the Colony.
Given all these requirements, it was hardly surprising that the Chiefs of Staff pointed
out that to have sovereign base areas would have involved putting almost the entire
Colony under British military control, an unrealistic aim. However, as the base was
still regarded as necessary to British interests, a solution had to be found to maintain
minimum military requirements whilst the Federation and Colony moved towards
constitutional advance and possible merger.
Despite the early opposition of the military to the idea of creating a military enclave in
the Colony, the idea persisted among policy-makers in Whitehall, chief among them
being Duncan Sandys, Minister of Defence then Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The issue was raised again in August 1961, but once again the Joint Planning Staff
17 PRO DEFE 11/229/419 - op. cit.
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came to the conclusion that an enclave in Aden was impracticable as it would cover
half the usable surface of the Colony, create political resentment and prejudice any
future constitutional settlement. Even a single enclave at Khormaksar would cut Aden
1 R
off from the Protectorate and so was politically undesirable . However, it was
recommended that the situation should be reviewed from time to time, and so the idea
was never really dropped until the decision to withdraw was taken in 1964. The
Colonial Office were totally opposed to military enclaves as it was impossible to
physically disentangle the base areas from the rest of the Colony, and the Chiefs of
Staffwere in agreement19. However, the latter had to investigate the alternatives to full
sovereignty over the whole Colony as the proposed merger ofAden with the Federation
• 90
began to become a reality in 1962 .
Impact ofthe Kuwait Operation
The problem affecting British policy-makers was that in order to defend British
interests east of Suez, a large military base at Aden was vital. This had been proved,
according to defence chiefs, by the intervention in Kuwait in 1961, an operation which
was used to justify a continued presence in Aden. In June 1961, an exchange ofnotes
between Great Britain and the amirate ofKuwait abrogating the treaty ofprotection and
declaring Kuwait's independence had provoked a furious response from General
Qassem in Iraq who asserted that the amirate was part of Iraq. Rumours of troop
movements in Iraq and the probable lack of any warning of an attack alarmed the
British, and the Ruler of Kuwait was asked to make a formal request for British
assistance. The Amir did this on 30th June and operation 'Vantage' was implemented
in the first week of July to deploy the forces necessary to counter a full-scale Iraqi
attack. However, the alleged threat to Kuwait never materialised and an Arab Deterrent
Force was established by the Arab League to protect the amirate which meant the
British forces withdrew21. Whilst there was never an actual invasion ofKuwait at that
18 PRO DEFE 11/421/57 - Defence Facilities in Aden and Socotra, Report by JPS, 10 Aug. 1961
19 PRO CO 1015/2389/231-2 - Minute from Morgan to Eastwood, 4 Jan. 1962
20 PRO FO 371/162787/B1051/36 - Retention ofDefence Facilities in Aden, COS Report, 5 July 1962
21
Ashton, Nigel John - Eisenhower, Macmillan and the problem ofNasser: Anglo-American Relations
andArab Nationalism, 1955-59 (Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1996), pp. 220-30
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time, the perceived threat to British interests there, and the operation to defend those
interests, was a major factor supporting those in favour of retaining a base in Aden,
preferably with full sovereignty to grant freedom of action. The operation was viewed
as a success, and allegedly underlined the British Government's ability to play a major
role outside Europe. This, though, was never actually put to the test by a confrontation
with Qassem's forces, which would have had the advantage of a surprise attack given
the lack ofBritish intelligence in southern Iraq.
The Kuwait intervention did underline the need for strategically mobile forces to
support British commitments east of Suez. In the 1962 White Paper the British
Government sought to strengthen the UK's ability to defend their commitments in the
• 99
Indian Ocean region . The Paper declared "its intention to keep British forces
90
stationed in Aden", which required bases by sovereign right even after the merger .
The Kuwait operation had meant drawing on units in Germany, Cyprus, Kenya,
Singapore, and especially the UK, which had weakened the strategic reserve. Despite
this, the strain on defence resources was not used as an excuse to cut commitments.
Instead the base strategy was developed which meant the continued development and
expansion of Aden, even though the increasing likelihood was that tenure of the base
would only last until 1970, at the very latest. However, that Britain needed Kuwait, and
therefore needed Aden was the argument which defined British policy in the early
1960s, and was used to justify the huge expenditure on construction and security of the
base:
"Aden is no ordinary military base. Kuwait is essential to the strength of the
British economy ... Kuwait is, however, impossible, or extremely difficult, to
defend without Aden ... But Aden will be impossible to hold, throughout the
politically difficult period for which we shall require it, without substantially
increased aid"24.
Kuwait and the defence ofBritish interests were therefore used as excuses for the
various examinations of the practicalities of sovereign base areas as "our military
22
Darby, Phillip - op. cit., pp. 223-4
23 PRO CO 1015/2389/322 - Draft Policy Statement, 5 July 1962
24 PRO CO 1015/2395/43 - Reportfrom Governor to Secretary ofState for Colonies, 17 May 1962
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presence in the Middle East depended to such an extent on Aden that sovereignty over
• 9 S
the whole Colony should be retained for as long as possible" . However, since the
merger of Colony and Federation was imminent, this meant that independence would be
increasingly likely to follow shortly and so alternatives had to be examined.
According to the Chiefs of Staff, the main alternatives to SBAs (Course A), which
would have been dependent on the Colony's water supplies and the availability of
Adeni labour and civil facilities and so impractical, were: to concentrate facilities in
Khormaksar and Little Aden/Hiswa areas (Course B); to concentrate facilities just in
Little Aden/Hiswa (Course C); to re-locate to the Protectorate or Socotra (Course D);
or to depend on a defence treaty with an independent Aden (Course E). Course B
would have taken 5-6 years and £40 million to complete, even after which the day-to-
day operation of the base would have remained dependent on Adeni goodwill and the
retention of the only airfield. Course C was also rejected due to length of time (10-12
years) and cost (£75-80 million) as well as dependent on local goodwill for access,
whilst the cost ofCourse D would have been "prohibitive". The remaining option was
to negotiate a defence treaty, but as the Federation would come under increasing
international pressure, it would have become more and more difficult for the British
Government to exercise defence rights. Therefore, the Chiefs of Staff could,
"see no secure way of retaining our defence facilities in Aden short of retaining
full sovereignty over the Colony. Failing this, the best course would be to
negotiate a defence treaty, but there would always be the risk that Adeni co¬
operation would be withdrawn, possibly at a vital time. The alternatives to a
defence treaty would provide no better safeguards and would be extremely
costly"26.
If facilities had to be limited then the chiefs would still wish to retain overflying rights,
signalling facilities, naval fuelling facilities and communications, "but those facilities
alone would not enable us to meet our full commitments in the Middle East"27.
25 PRO FO 371/162787/B1051/36 - op. cit.
26 ibid.
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Despite this report, Duncan Sandys still felt it would be desirable, before the merger, to
separate the essential military bases from the Colony and retain them as SBAs outside
the Federation "as was done in Cyprus"28. The analogy to Cyprus was misleading,
however, as the bases there had not been part of the inhabited areas of the island, rather
they had been separate entities, which was definitely not the case in Aden. Sandys
either did not realise this, or conveniently ignored it and he continued to support the
idea of excluding the base areas. He maintained his position even after he was
informed by the Ministry of Defence that he would need to negotiate the,
"outright exclusion of certain areas. A mere treaty right to withdraw the areas in
question [British military installations and bases] would probably be of very
90
slender value and might even be counter-productive" .
This proposal was opposed by the Governor of Aden, Sir Charles Johnson, since SBAs
would have been attacked by the Arab world, they could only have been achieved at the
cost of full independence for the rest of the Colony, they would have contained half the
usable land area, the oil refinery and airfield (unlike Cyprus) and they would have
• • • 30
ended Adeni goodwill and disrupted the merger plans . This argument was supported
by the Chiefs of Staffwho told Sandys that the base would be useless without Adeni
goodwill, even if independence were to be granted in the four to seven years time that
3 1 • •
the Colonial Secretary envisaged . Colonial Office officials also opposed the ideas of
their Secretary of State since the administration and finance of the SBAs would be so
involved and full of discord that they would destroy any remaining goodwill of the local
• 39
population .
Duncan Sandys did not drop the idea of excluding the base areas from the Colony,
however, and the debate over the issue continued through 1962 and 1963. The Ministry
ofDefence again pointed out that the base could not function efficiently in the face of
28 PRO CO 968/707/12 - Record ofMeeting held in the Lord Chancellor's Office, 2 Aug. 1962
29 PRO CO 968/707/26 - Memo from Minister ofDefence to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 13 Aug.
1962
30 PRO CO 968/707/68 - Johnston to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 2 Oct. 1962
jl PRO DEFE 11/166/330 - Retention ofDefence Facilities in Aden, COS Meeting, 2 Oct. 1962
32 PRO 968/707/re:/70 - Memo from Cumming-Bruce to Armitage-Smith, 5 Oct. 1962
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Adeni ill will and that to carve out even the smallest base areas would arouse violent
opposition:
"we do not think that the loss ofgoodwill which will inevitably follow [the
establishment of SBAs] will be in any way compensated for by the legal rights
[i.e. sovereignty] to which Mr. Sandys attaches such importance. Sovereign
base areas, with all the local inconvenience involved will always provide ready
material for Arab nationalist propaganda"33.
Sandys seemed to believe that if the British Government excised the SBAs before the
merger then somehow this would make the Adenis more used to the base, and therefore
accept the facts of the situation. However, "the converse is at least as likely to be true"
since the probable outburst of opposition to the idea would have jeopardised the whole
merger process34. The "advantages" that Sandys believed would have been accrued
from an early excision did not exist according to the Ministry of Defence since any
attempt to create sovereign base areas would have reduced whatever goodwill remained
in Aden towards the British Government, and possibly created a "very dangerous
internal security situation"35.
There was almost universal opposition to the sovereign base areas plan in both London
and Aden, but this did not solve the problem of granting constitutional advance, whilst
also retaining the necessary facilities to defend British interests east of Suez. As long
as policy-makers refused to countenance a reduction in British commitments, then
Aden was perceived as vital to the British Government's overseas policy. Until that
situation changed, then the problem remained. The idea of carving out sovereign base
areas in the heart of the Colony was finally perceived as impracticable and politically
undesirable, but alternatives had to be found if east of Suez was to continue to be the
defining aim ofBritish policy.
Sandys never fully gave up on the idea of establishing sovereign British territory in
South Arabia, although he did seem to relent on actually doing so in the Colony itself.
33 PRO DEFE 11/166/463 - Retention ofDefence Facilities in Aden, Draft Brief for Minister of Defence
and Chiefs of Staff, 15 Oct. 1962
34 ibid.
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However, this did not mean the end of the British base in Aden, just that certain
adjustments had to be made to retain sovereignty. The idea of relying on a defence
treaty was never fully accepted by the Colonial Secretary, despite the arguments put
forward by the Defence Chiefs and the Governor ofAden and Commander-in-Chief of
Middle East forces who were pragmatic enough to realise that if they could not have
sovereignty, then a treaty was better than nothing. Sandys, however, maintained that
some form of SBA could be created, and he continued to argue for sovereignty rights
rather than treaty rights.
The Merger ofAden and the Federation
Weaknesses ofthe Federation
British policy in South Arabia was always dominated by external influences and
interests. Before 1947 Aden's prime value had been as a port on the sea route to India,
and as a secondary line of defence for the Suez Canal, whilst the Protectorate had never
been more than a defensive 'glacis' for the Colony. This gradually changed as regards
Aden during the 1950s as the base was built up until it became headquarters ofMiddle
East Command, but the hinterland remained of value only as an extra line of defence.
The creation of the Federation of the Arab Amirates of the South in February 1959, tied
the British much more closely to the interests and needs of the traditional rulers of
South Arabia. The Treaty signed with the Federation in 1959 committed Her Majesty's
Government to help the new political body to become politically and economically
independent. Initially, this aided both sets of signatories as the British now had an ally
against the growing movement ofArab Nationalism, and the Federation received
military and financial support in its move to reach statehood. However, ultimately, the
ties proved a weakness to both sides as British actions were limited by international
opinion, and the Federation could not stand on its own without British forces.
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The British position in South Arabia by the end of the 1950s was only still strong in
Luce's opinion, because the opposition was weak, and it was being further undermined
by the introduction of constitutional advances . Luce also believed that further
development was necessary, including the merger of the Colony with the Federation,
and eventual independence (see above, Chapter 3). However, his superiors in London
could not countenance such a "radical" move whilst the base in Aden was still
necessary to defend the British Government's interests in the Gulf. In fact, opinion in
South Arabia did seem to be moving towards a merger ofAden and the Federation, but
the British Government were not in favour of supporting this, even whilst supporting
■3n
the merger of Somalia with the Somaliland Protectorate in 1959 . The Cabinet were
aware of the support for a merger, but the base in Aden came before everything else:
"the Colonial Secretary said that pressure was building up, comparatively slowly
in the Aden Protectorate Federation but more strongly in the Colony, for the
merger of the Colony and the Protectorate and for their ultimate independence.
If the retention of our military base in Aden was essential for our future strategic
purposes ... it would be preferable that the Colony should remain separate from
the Federation"38.
For this reason, no statement was to be made about a possible merger.
The difficulties of a merger were highlighted by the Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd,
• • -2Q
in a letter to Luce in 1959 . Fortunately, the announcement regarding future policy and
federation in Somaliland had produced no adverse reaction in Aden making it possible
to avoid any firm commitment on future policy between the Colony and the
Protectorate. The Federal Ministers and the Colony politicians both hoped ultimately to
achieve some form of closer association, although for different reasons. The Federal
politicians were keen to prevent Aden falling into the hands ofEgypt or Yemen
j6 PRO CO 1015/1835/14 - Aden: Review ofAffairs in the Colony, Governor ofAden to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 28 May 1959
j7 PRO CO 1015/1927/6 - Supplementary Note for Aden, Feb. 1959 - according to this, Adeni politicians
were to be told that "circumstances are entirely different in southern Arabia" as HMG's ties with the
Protectorate rulers were designed to maintain the latter's independence from pore powerful neighbours
whilst the Colony was a cosmopolitan town with large minorities, they could not admit the real reason
which was refusal to lose control over the military base
38 PRO CO 1015/1912/76 - Extractfrom Cabinet Meeting, 8 Sep. 1959
39 PRO CO 1015/1912/77 - Letter Lennox-Boyd to Luce, 18 Sep. 1959
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controlled "demagogues", whilst the Adenis wanted to advance the Colony from
colonial status and rally popular support to themselves. However, once again,
"The first object to Her Majesty's Government's policy in Aden Colony and
Protectorate, in present circumstances, must be to secure the use ofAden
Colony as a military base for as long as possible"40.
Moreover, the Colony was developing towards self-government with an elected
majority legislature, whilst the Federation "remains a traditional South Arabian feudal
oligarchy", creating considerable practical difficulties. Therefore, Luce's proposed
policy of announcing that the British Government would not stand in the way of a
merger was not to happen, and "a public statement ofpolicy in this issue should be
avoided". The one compromise Lennox-Boyd would allow was if the Legislative
Council leaders pressed Luce, then he could privately indicate to them that the British
Government would not stand in the way of co-operation in matters of health, education
and communications, but the initiative, as with the original Federation proposals in
1954, was not to come from the British.
The concern with unfettered use of the base, therefore, meant that a merger of the
Colony and Federation was ignored by the British at first. This did not stop the
expansion of the Federation in other directions, however, as more Protectorate states
saw the benefits of unity with their erstwhile rivals. Lahej was the first to join with the
original six states in 1959, an important addition as the state was the most powerful and
wealthy in the Western Protectorate. The following year, the lower Aulaqi Sultanate,
Dathina and the Arabia Shaikhdom also acceded to the Federation, and in 1962 Wahidi
in the EAP joined, bringing the total number to eleven. This strengthened the
institution, but the Federation was still inherently weak due to its reliance on British
military and financial support. The lack ofmaterial resources meant that the Federal
Government relied almost totally on the annual payment of £1.5 million from the
British Government to survive and economically develop41. Furthermore, politically
the Federation was undeveloped in comparison to the advancing Colony. These
40 ibid.
41
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problems were not insurmountable, but large amounts ofmoney and support would
have been necessary to bring the Federation up to the level of the Colony, let alone
become self-sustainable. However, as British policy-makers began to see the advantage
of an Aden-Federation merger, the financial and political differences were ignored, a
sharp contrast to the policy of 1959 when they had been the main excuse for keeping
the two entities apart.
Initial Hesitations andDifferences
During 1960, British policy came around to the potential benefits ofpermitting the
accession ofAden Colony into the Federation. This was by no means a unanimous
decision on the part ofWhitehall, but pressure from officials in Aden, as well as the
Adeni politicians and Federal Ministers meant that the idea had to be at least
investigated properly. There were numerous obstacles to overcome, not least the
disparities of income and constitutional development between the two bodies, as well as
mutual distrust, but the dangers and threat ofArab nationalism gave added impetus to
all sides concerned.
The problem that constantly confronted British policy-makers was the perceived
conflict between retaining use of the base, but at the same time helping the Colony
develop politically and constitutionally so that it could achieve independence. Luce
was afraid that "another, and inevitably big, advance by the Colony along the
Westminster road will help our enemies, alienate our friends and rapidly jeopardise
British interests in this area"42. He therefore favoured turning the Colony into a
Protectorate and merging it with the Federation to give the Rulers control over Aden43.
However, this conflicted with the belief among policy-makers at the Ministry of
Defence and Colonial Office that sovereignty alone would ensure control over the base.
This view, though, ignored the increasing calls for independence in Aden, including
those from members of the elected Legislative Council. In 1960 Saeed M. Hasson
42 PRO CO 1015/2392/1 - Letter from Luce to Melville, 3 Sep. 1960
43 ibid.
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aimed to move a motion requesting the Governor to inform the British Government of
the desire of the people ofAden to rule themselves and become independent within two
years44. Luce regarded this as "a most unfortunate" motion and was able to amend it to
request the Governor to "consult in due time with all interested parties about the
question of further constitutional development"45. However, the issue showed that not
all the 'moderates' in the Legislative Council were prepared to let the British move at
their own pace, and Luce was only able to deflect that attempt because the Executive
Council were opposed to the motion as they did not want Hasson to gain political
credit.
The appeal of Arab nationalism and the call for independence were both gaining
popularity, which was making it increasingly difficult for the British to resist the
pressure. The Colonial Office were aware of this and the idea that perhaps the British
Government should take the initiative began to be considered:
"There can be no doubt that, with individual exceptions, all the Arabs in Aden
Colony want independence and since they are in the majority of the population,
this force cannot be resisted indefinitely"46.
It was this realisation that British control ofAden might not survive as long as the
Government and the Defence Chiefs desired that caused the re-think of defence policy
and the examination of sovereign base areas. As regards political developments, the
main factor concerning policy-makers seemed to be keeping the Colony 'moderates'
and the Federal rulers in power as they were the closest allies to the British, and the
ones most dependent on the British Government for survival. Moreover, there was a
perceived need to ensure that a friendly government assumed power on independence,
as there was little chance of finding a military alternative to Aden, and (as noted above),
a defence treaty with an independent South Arabia was better than nothing, although far
from ideal. For this reason, the Ministry of Defence advocated that the Government
"should devote all our energies to finding and developing a political solution to the
44 PRO CO 1015/2386/4 - Luce to Secretary ofState for Colonies, 9 Sep. 1960
45 ibid.
46 PRO CO 1015/2392/4a - Minute by Kirkman, 11 Oct. 1960
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long-term problem" of being forced out ofAden by a hostile state and with nowhere to
go to defend interests in the Gulf47. Therefore, when certain members of the
Legislative Council unofficially contacted some of the Federal Ministers on a possible
merger, there was no obstacle raised by the British, as there was a growing realisation
that overseas interests might best be defended by keeping the British Government's
• • 48
allies in power and stopping the Nationalists .
One problem was the fundamental political difference between the Colony politicians
and the Federal Ministers over the issue of constitutional development. Both sides were
willing to discuss a merger, but the Federal rulers refused to permit any form of
constitutional advance before the merger took place, whereas the Adenis demanded the
British granted them some form of self-determination before joining the Federation. At
a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Federation with Melville (of the Colonial
Office) and Kennedy Trevaskis (Adviser and British Agent in WAP) in November
1960, SharifHusain ofBeihan (Federal Minister of the Interior) stated that "the persons
who are called Adenis are quite unfit to rule Aden either now or in the future"49. The
Federal Ministers wanted Aden to join the Federation, but not at the cost of
constitutional development as Adeni self-determination could have put the port beyond
Federal control. The exception to this was Muhammad Farid (Minister ofFinance),
who had once been a member of the SAL, and felt "something should be done in the
way of constitutional changes before 1962 (when current constitution expires)"50. The
rest of the Ministers, however, were opposed to self-determination for the Colony51.
The Adeni Ministers realised that as colonial control diminished with constitutional
development, then they were open to attack from the Nationalists, so,
47 PRO CO 1015/2392/E/l 8A - Letterfrom E. W. Playfair (MoD) to Sir Frederick KoyerMillar, 4 Nov.
1960
48 PRO CO 1015/2386/7 - Agendafor Discussion at Government House with Melville, 10 Nov. 1960




"They see in the Protectorate Rulers a strong and conservative element which
would be reluctant to see extreme nationalism flourish in the Colony and which
would in consequence sustain them against internal and external pressures" .
This gave both sides a common opponent, but the Aden Legislative Council could not
oppose constitutional development due to the growing demand for independence in the
Colony, which meant that the problem of self-determination remained. However, the
advantages of a merger for both moderates and rulers were such that discussions were
still able to take place.
Luce had been replaced by Charles Johnston at the end of 1960, and one of the new
Governor's first tasks was to investigate the question of a merger and recommend a
course of action, which he duly did in March 1961. A major problem was the need to
reach a final decision well before the end of the Legislative Council session in January
1963,
"otherwise we risk giving the impression of abandoning orderly methods and
indulging in last-minute jiggery-pokery, thus adding gratuitously to the
difficulty of defending our action in public" .
The most difficult aspect, according to Johnston, was the exact relationship between
constitutional advance and merger and which should come first? Clearly, the British
had to permit the promised development, but the problem was the probable Federal
opposition to advance before merger. Federal Ministers believed they would be able to
control the political situation, and the security situation, in the Colony better than the
British - but only if there was no constitutional advance before a merger. Moreover,
what was to be the exact status of Aden within the Federation? Should it have equal
status to the rest of the states combined (Adeni view) or merely as one more state
within a larger body (Federal view)? Johnston believed the Colony should have some
special status, but again a compromise would have to be reached with the Federal
52 CO 1015/2489 - Aden Colony and Aden Protectorate: Review ofAffairs, Governor ofAden to
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 March 1961
53 PRO CO 1015/2393/29 - Johnston's recommendations on constitutionalfuture ofAden Colony and
Protectorate, 3 March 1961
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Ministers54. Overriding all this, obviously, was the need to retain special privileges for
the British base:
"Our ultimate aim should be, whilst maintaining our essential strategic facilities
in Aden, to establish in Southern Arabia an independent and prosperous Arab
state in relations of friendly partnership with ourselves"55.
Johnston's view that a merger was desirable was not shared by everybody, either in
London or in Aden. Julian Amery (Secretary of State for Air) believed that British
defence interests were best safeguarded by retaining sovereignty and keeping the
Colony and Federation apart56. This opinion was true from a British point of view, but
would inevitably have lead to the loss of support of all groups in Aden, including the
moderates who were willing to work with the Government to achieve independence.
Despite the fear of losing sovereignty, Iain Macleod (Colonial Secretary) visited Aden
in April 1961, met both the Federal Council and Colony Ministers, had discussions with
Johnston, and decided that merger was the best course to take . Therefore, after some
early opposition, and despite the differences of the two sides, Her Majesty's
Government decided to set in motion the process whereby Aden would accede to the
Federation to form a unitary state in South Arabia friendly to Great Britain, an aim
which ultimately failed.
Merger Talks
Once Macleod had approved Johnston's course of action, the Federal Ministers were
invited to London in June 1961 for talks with the Secretary of State, and were then
joined by the Colony Ministers and the Governor58. By this time the Chiefs of Staff had
stated they had no objection to a measure of self-government and the merger as long as
the British Government retained responsibility for defence, external affairs and internal
54 Johnston - op. cit., pp. 36-9
55 PRO CO 1015/2393/29 - op. cit.
56 PRO CO 1015/2392/45 - Letter from Amery to Iain Macleod, 30 March 1961




security59. This meant there was a broad consensus among British policy-makers
towards merger, but there was still the problem of implementing constitutional advance
and the merger without upsetting both parties. Johnston recommended that "it would
be better at this stage to avoid telling either party that we regard constitutional advance
in the Colony as a first step to our goal"60. This was sensible advice as it would allow
discussions to start, but could have been dangerous as there was plenty of potential for
upsetting the Federal Ministers. Johnston did warn of the probable adverse Federal
reaction when Macleod recommended telling the rulers about constitutional advance, as
he believed they would feel that "Her Majesty's Government and I myselfhave 'ganged
up' behind their backs to betray their interests"61. Therefore, Johnston felt it would be
better to involve them in discussions with the Colonial Office and the Adeni Ministers
first. This had the potential to backfire, but fortunately for Johnston this did not happen
as the Federal Ministers were eventuallymollified by the certainty ofmerger and the
need for limited constitutional advance.
The other serious problem was the question ofwhen to hold the elections for a new
Legislative Council, as the constitution provided for this by January 1963, leaving little
time to bring about the merger. The Foreign Office correctly pointed out that to delay
the elections for too long would "subject the Colony Ministers over a long period to
what will probably be a growing campaign ofhostile propaganda from the U.A.R. and
other outside sources" . They recommended revising the franchise and holding
elections sooner rather than later. However, this would have seriously upset the Federal
Ministers who the British were very keen to keep content as they were the British
Government's best chance of retaining the use of the base. This belief dominated
British thinking until shortly before the actual withdrawal, despite the growing strength
of the Nationalist groups and the inability of the Federation to fight back. Nevertheless,
the colonial authorities never attempted to reach an accommodation with the opposition
until it was too late.
59 PRO CO 1015/2387/76 - Ministry ofDefence to Melville, 10 May 1961
60 PRO CO 1015/2386/24 - Johnston to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 20 May 1961
61 PRO CO 1015/2386/27 - Johnston to Secretary ofState, 26 May 1961
62 PRO CO 1015/2387/91 - Foreign Office to Watt (CO), 24 May 1961
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The need to support the Federal Ministers and bolster the Federation was a popular idea
among those that had actually worked in South Arabia. William Luce (then Political
Resident in the Gulf) "was not pessimistic of our ability to retain almost indefinitely a
secure military position in Aden" but the British Government had to back the
Protectorate rulers or see the opposition grow in influence. Moreover, to grant
constitutional advance would let the young Nasserites enter the political field, thereby
forcing the moderates to be more radical. For these reasons, Luce believed the Colony
should have been turned into a Protectorate and merged with the Federation under
Britain's traditional allies, the Federal Ministers . This kind of thinking had a certain
logic, as the Federal rulers were the most likely to back a continued British presence,
but were only able to do this if the Federation was built up into a strong institution with
the ability to deal with the opposition, as opposed to over-dependent on the British
Government for survival.
Ultimately, Macleod took the risky decision to extend the life of the Legislative Council
to enable enough time to discuss the merger plans and implement Aden's accession into
the Federation. There were to be slight amendments to the constitution before that,
such as replacing the Executive Council with a Council ofMinisters responsible for
most civil departments of the Aden Government64. By delaying the elections, however,
the British Government were leaving both themselves and their moderate allies in the
Colony wide open to hostile propaganda from the opposition. The reason given for the
delay was that,
"The true wishes of the Aden population are much more likely to be
satisfactorily ascertained by an election after a period during which the benefits
or possible disadvantages of the union can be appreciated"65.
This, in reality, was a fudge as the real reason was fear that the elections would bring to
power the Nationalists who would have opposed a merger with the Federation.
Moreover, "Her Majesty's Government are anxious to avoid giving the impression that
63 PRO DEFE 11/421/17 - Record ofMeeting between Luce and COS, May 1961
64 PRO CO 1015/2386/29 - Secretary ofState for the Colonies to Johnston, 5 June 1961
65 PRO CO 1015/2388/184 - Foreign Office Guidance Telegram No. 329, 17 Aug. 1961
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they regard the merger as a step to early independence", again providing potential
ammunition to opponents of continued colonial rule in Aden66.
The discussions in London started on 19 June 1961 between members of the Colonial
Office and the Federal delegation comprising SharifHussain of Beihan, the Sultan of
f\1
Lahej, the Audhali Sultan, the Fadhli Naib and Muhammad Farid . The Federal
Supreme Council had already warned they would view the grant of self-determination
to Aden as a serious threat, "We believe it would be in your interest to see Aden
/TO
incorporated in the Federation and controlled by your old and loyal friends" . In other
words, the Federal Rulers were of the opinion that only they could guarantee continued
British defence rights. This was brought up again in the first meeting between the
delegates and the Colonial Office where Macleod declared British policy as being a
union between the Colony and Federation, subject to the retention of strategic facilities
in Aden. The Colonial Secretary reassured the Sharif that "there was no thought of
giving the Colony independence or full self-government"69. However, the issue of
constitutional advance was one the British could not back out of, and the Colonial
Secretary informed the delegates that it was practical politics to grant a measure of
advance before the union, albeit "a long way short of the kind of advance which the
• 70 • •
Delegation feared" . Again, the rulers expressed their unease with such a plan since
"if the Federal Government agreed to constitutional advance and the Colony leaders
then declined to proceed with union, the Federal Government's position would be
grave"71.
The delegation did finally reluctantly accept that some form of advance would have to
79
take place before the merger . Nevertheless, it was an issue that the British
Government wanted to avoid discussion about during the talks with both the Federal
and Colony delegations in July, the first priority being achieving an agreement to
66 PRO CO 1015/2386/32 - Letter Watt to Johnston, 9 June 1961
67 PRO CO 1015/2386/35 - Departmental Briefon Aden Federation Delegation, 14 June 1961
68 ibid., Annex A, Telegram from Supreme Council to Secretary of State, 14 June 1961
69 PRO CO 1015/2387/117 - Record ofFirst Meeting with Federal Delegation, 19 June 1961
70 PRO CO 1015/2387/120 - Record ofSecond Meeting with the Federal Delegation, 20 June 1961
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further talks about merger in Aden73. The two delegations did agree in a programme
designed to bring about the merger during their talks with the Colonial Office, and also
to further talks back in Aden to reach agreement on the constitutional, administrative
and financial conditions of the union74. In other words, the idea of a merger was agreed
upon, but the actual details were far from being finalised, and the discussions to achieve
this were long and difficult. This was partly caused, according to Johnston, by the
splits in the Colony delegation. The Governor contrasted "the wise and forbearing
attitude" shown by the Federal Ministers with the "unhappy and divided" Adeni
Ministers75. Support for the merger came from Bayumi and Basendwah but they were
initially outnumbered by Sa'idi, Ali Salem Ali and Joshi who "regretted having
committed themselves, in the London Agreement, to anything more than unconditional
constitutional advance"76. The situation was reversed by the resignation ofAli Salem
Ali and his replacement by Husseiny, a pro-Bayumi moderate, but Johnston still warned
• • • 77
of the "grave need for accelerated progress on it (the constitutional exercise) in 1962" .
In order to reach some form of progress, Johnston set up working parties among the
delegates to deliberate individual aspects of the merger, a scheme which had some
no
success, and at least broke the stalemate in the wider talks . However, the main
impetus to an agreement between the delegations came from Bayumi who changed his
mind over the order of implementing the merger. Previously the Adeni Minister had
preferred constitutional advance, followed by elections on the new franchise, and then
merger with the Federation, whereas during the talks Bayumi proposed the merger
7Q
should come before the elections . Johnston was opposed to this policy and believed
the elections should come first, followed by the constitutional advance, and then the
merger, because if the Nationalists won the merger, then Britain could delay the
advance. However, if the elections occurred afterwards and the Nationalists won, then
" PRO CO 1015/2387/139 - Brieffor Secretary ofState for the Colonies on Aden Federation and
Colony Delegations, July 1961
74 PRO CO 1015/2387/144&/148 - Record ofFirst and SecondMeetings between Delegations and
Melville, 5 & 6 July 1961
75 PRO CO 1015/2489 - Aden Colony and Protectorate: Review ofAffairs, op. cit.
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77 ibid.
78 PRO CO 1015/2387/173 - Johnston to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 30 Aug. 1961
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the British position would come in for increasing criticism from the elected Legislative
Council80. The Federal rulers, though, were in favour ofBayumi's "shot-gun wedding"
o 1
approach and a deal was made between the two . The Colonial Office opposed this
approach as they would have preferred early elections on a new franchise which limited
the Nationalist vote82. The situation was changed by Johnston's volte face as he
outlined the three possible courses open to the British Government, which were to
allow the talks to break down and have elections in early 1963, which would be
disastrous, or put the talks on hold and hold elections on a revised franchise, which
0-5
would take 12-18 months, or pursue the Bayumi-Federal "shot-gun wedding" .
Johnston favoured the last option because Nasser was, allegedly, in decline, there was
increased support for Bayumi in the Colony, and if Britain did not back the moderates
and Federal rulers then they would alienate their closest allies. The Colonial Office
were not initially convinced by the Governor's arguments, especially as Johnston
himself,
"recognises that his plan is open to criticism on the grounds that it largely
ignores democratic principles of consent, but argues that, particularly when we
are dealing with Arabs and when we have H.M.G.'s own defence interests to
84
defend, we need not be too scrupulous about this" .
Moreover, the proposals were based on short-term consideration since Nasser could still
have caused problems, the strength of Bayumi's support was questionable, and
elections had to be held by January 1963 which would have been too early a test for the
merger. The Colonial Secretary also had reservations since the achievement of internal
self-government in the Colony followed by the merger would leave the Arabs nothing
to look for but independence, which was certainly not a goal the British were keen to
foster85.
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The Aden Department of the Colonial Office voiced its concerns that Johnston was
proposing "to take advantage ofwhat may be a temporary situation, and please what
may be a very narrow circle of our friends" and advised against accepting the
proposal86. This was supported by the Ministry of Defence who were worried about the
shortening of time to use the base as freely as they wanted, the Treasury had doubts, and
the Foreign Office warned not to discount the appeal ofNasser and criticism from other
Arab states, all ofwhich was supported by the Colonial Office, who also did not believe
87
that Bayumi was strong enough to carry out the plan . The reasons for opposing the
plan had little to do with the lack of elections to approve of the merger, since "we need
not be surprised that Mr. Bayumi and some others are disposed to turn a blind eye to
88
democratic and Parliamentary practices; so are we" . The opposition to the plan had
more to do with the belief that once the merger took place the pressure for
independence would be stepped up. However, despite the doubts, Maudling (who had
taken over as Colonial Secretary in October) approved Johnston's plan to support the
80 •
"shot-gun wedding" towards the end of 1961 . There continued, though, to be
opposition both from within his own department and the Foreign Office. The latter's
opposition stemmed from the view that an early merger might lead to pressure for
independence which would mean putting British defence rights on a treaty basis. This
was a development which would have had to be resisted from a defence point of view,
but could have lost the support of the moderates and produced an irresistible move
towards the secession of the Colony90. J.C. Morgan at the Colonial Office also believed
that after an early merger the elections could well put the Nationalists in power, which
could have meant the use of force to maintain British control of the base in the face of
local opposition91.
The decision to follow Bayumi's scheme involved an extension to the life of the Aden
Legislative Council, an announcement which Johnston favoured making as early as
86 PRO CO 1015/2388/206 - Future Policy, Aden Dept. submission to Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 20 Oct. 1961
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possible since "there would be serious political disadvantages about either a last-minute
prolongation or a prolongation in isolation, and not in the context of constitutional
advance"92. However, there was considerable delay in making the announcement,
partly because of opposition within the Legislative Council, and partly because of
uncertainty in Whitehall. The Governor was allowed to make a statement on 22nd
January declaring the merger was the best possible way of retaining the British position
Q1
in Aden, but there were few details given . The other major problem was the delay in
reaching an agreement, since the original deadline ofOctober 1961 had long since
passed, although there were some in the Colonial Office who preferred to let things
proceed at "the slowest natural pace" since to speed the process up, in their minds, was
to speed up the end ofBritish sovereignty94. However, the two sides did eventually
start to agree on the actual details of the merger in May 1962, and the British
Government did succeed in retaining sovereignty over the Colony.
Johnston had warned the Federal Supreme Council in April that continued delay would
have enabled the opposition to the merger to organise, disappointed those hoping for
political advancement and pleased the extremists95. This seemed to have the desired
effect as the "delicate question ofAden's participation in the Federal Cabinet and
Federal Assembly was settled by the Ministers at an informal meeting"96. The
settlement allocated 24 members to Aden in the Federal Council and 4 Ministers in the
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Supreme Council . On the other issues, the Federation was to have exclusive authority
over education, health, customs, public works, communications and a number of lesser
subjects whilst internal security in Aden was to remain a state subject, important from a
British point of view to defend the base98. Moreover, "the accession of the State of
Aden to the Federation shall not in any way affect the sovereignty ofHer Majesty in
and over the State"99. It was also to be understood that,
92 PRO CO 1015/2389/231 - Johnston to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 1 Jan. 1962
93 PRO FO 371/162784/B1051/3B - CO to Kenya and Zanzibar, 19 Jan. 1962
94 PRO CO 1015/2389/re: 251 - Minute from Formoy to Morgan, 9 Feb. 1962
95 PRO CO 1015/2401/E22 - Meeting between Governor and Federal Supreme Council, 28 April 1962
96 Johnston - op. cit., p. 102
97 PRO CO 1015/2394/25A - Letterfrom Attorney-General in Aden to J.C. McPetrie (Legal Dept., CO),
25 May 1962
98 Johnston - op. cit., p. 102
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ofAden, 30 May 1962
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"Her Majesty's Government... could at any time resume (either permanently or
for a limited period) any or all of the powers exercisable in respect of the State
ofAden under the Constitution of the Federation"100.
These two points meant that Britain would retain sovereignty over Aden, and could, if
necessary, enact emergency powers to ensure continued defence rights and use of the
base, important clauses and necessary from a defence point of view.
Aden Joins the Federation
The agreement between the Federal and Adeni delegations meant the merger process
could continue, but this was only provisional and the conditions of the agreement still
had to be approved by the British, which entailed further discussions in London in July
1962. The main points requiring the Government's approval were on the conditions of
Aden's withdrawal from the Federation, the arrangements for the Aden staff pool, the
provision of funds by the British Government for compensation of loss of customs
revenue, the form of constitutional advance in Aden, and the timing and procedure of
the merger101. However, the prime reason behind the final discussions in London were
to remove "the various suspicions which the Colony and Federal Ministers have of one
1
another", and to ensure the merger went through as smoothly as possible . British
policy, however, was not unduly concerned with the fine print of the merger since "the
British Government's policy in Aden is based solely on the need to retain the military
base for an indefinite period", and a merger was seen as the best method to achieve
this103. Moreover, there was also a belief that to achieve the aims of the policy, there
was a need to keep both delegations happy, as one main object of the merger,
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"is to make the most favourable use of the friendly intentions towards ourselves
of the present Rulers of the Federation and of the present Ministry in the
Colony, both ofwhom are in favour ofmerger"104.
Therefore, the push towards a merger was not out of interest for the well-being and
future stability and strength of South Arabia, but out of self-interest.
Be that as it may, an agreement was reached on all the major points, including
constitutional advance in Aden, and the "blessing" of the Secretary of State for the
Colonies was given. The British Government accepted the need to pay customs
compensation to the Federation, a compromise was reached over Aden's right to secede
whereby it could either withdraw in the first year or after six years, the life of the
Legislative Council was to be extended to January 1964 and the British Government's
right to exclude or withdraw any areas necessary for defence purposes was admitted105.
The most difficult question had been the form of constitutional advance, with the
Federal Ministers still wanting the advance to be conditional on the Colony agreeing to
merger, whilst Joshi, Flusseiny and Saffi on the Aden delegation felt it would be wrong
if the merger took place without some form of free choice by the population. The
compromise that was reached meant that four new members were elected to the Council
before the merger, to sit beside the four ex officio members that they were to replace,
and the election would be postponed for a year. There were other lesser issues,
including the new name of the Federation of South Arabia, and re-titling the Governor
as High Commissioner, but the primary issue was to prove to be the constitutional
advance and the postponing of the elections was to be the opposition's main focus for
attack.
The agreement was published in both London and Aden on 20 August 1962 and
represented eighteen months of stalemates and deadlocks with last-minute compromises
on the more politically sensitive issues106. However, the battle was far from over as
104 ibid.
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regards having the agreement accepted in Aden, with the debate in the Legislative
Council still to take place. There was considerable opposition to the merger within the
Colony, largely driven by the ATUC who organised a series of strikes and
demonstrations, but also from within the 'moderate' groups, in particular Luqman's
People's Constitutional Congress (see below). Those in support included Bayumi's
United National Party, "by conservative opinion generally" (in other words those with a
vested interest in the continuation of the British presence) and most of the merchant
class. Johnston claimed that "our enquiries at the time indicated that a clear majority of
the Adenis were in favour ofmerger, or disposed to acquiesce in it", a claim that was
hard to either prove or disprove, but given that the ATUC's support was largely from
the Protectorate and Yemeni Arabs, then it could well have had some truth. However,
even though a majority of Adenis might well have been in favour, tension still grew
within the Colony during September in the build up to the debate and election within
the Legislative Council. The ATUC's actions not only included demonstrations, but
also, according to Johnston, intimidation and threats towards members of the
Legislative Council and their families which was endangering the Government's
majority107. When the debate finally started on 24th September, a nearly complete
general strike took place, accompanied by noisy demonstrations in the Crater area of
Aden where the Legislative Council building was sited. This almost succeeded in
postponing the vote, but Johnston and Bayumi were able to persuade the Council to
continue, and the vote finally took place on September 26th. Hasson's amendment
opposing Bayumi's motion of support was defeated by 16 to 7, although this was only 9
to 7 in terms of local members, and 7 to 5 of elected members. The Opposition then
walked out of the proceedings and Bayumi's motion was passed unanimously by the
remaining 15 members (one of the Government supporters also having walked out in
disgust at the actions of the Opposition). However, it had been a very close shave for
both Bayumi and Her Majesty's Government's desired policy in Aden.
The vote, in fact, was a narrow escape for the British and their allies since the following




"If the Yemeni revolution had come one day earlier, I (Johnston) feel pretty
certain that the merger plan would never have obtained the support of a majority
1 OR
of local members in the Legislative Council" .
However, for the moment, the British had got what they believed was best for retaining
control of Aden and the base, and with the Federal Council approving the merger on
27th September and the House ofCommons on 13th November, Johnston was able to
proceed with the elections for the four new seats on the Legislative Council. These
took place in December, and were won by four representatives in favour of the merger,
despite another boycott by the Opposition. This left the way clear for the merger to take
place without further problems, and the treaty for Aden's accession to the Federation
was signed on 16th January, with the day of the merger being 18th January when the
amended Federal Constitution took effect. This was by no means the end of the
problems facing the British in Aden, especially as elections for the new Legislative
Council had to take place by January 1964. Moreover, as Johnston warned, Bayumi
would have to keep up with "the nationalist Jones's" if he was to stay in power, and the
British Government would have to spend more money in South Arabia. According to
the Governor/High Commissioner, given the lack of substantial financial assistance
given before the merger proposals were debated "in the circumstance it is remarkable
that the Legislative Council voted the right way"109.
The Rise ofNationalism
The 'Moderates'
The members of the Legislative Council who debated the merger proposal in September




legitimate political party in the Colony whose representatives had won the vast majority
of the votes in the 1955 and 1959 elections (see above, Chapter 3). However, the AA
was not a cohesive group, and by the end of the 1950s, the party was splitting into
smaller units, nominally over the issue ofmerger with the Federation, but also along
personality lines. The two main parties to emerge from the split were Hassan Ali
Bayumi's United National Party (UNP), and Mohammad Luqman's People's
Constitutional Congress (PCC), both formed in late 1960, and neither to last beyond the
end ofBritish rule110.
The two parties were not so much divided over the actual merger, more over the
process and the terms ofAden's accession to the Federation. This can be seen by
Luqman telling the Colonial Secretary in 1959 that he hoped the Colony would join the
Federation111. However, in the merger debate of 1962, the PCC leader voted against
Aden's accession, and Johnston commented that,
"as for the Luqman family, it was common knowledge that their opposition to
merger was not based on principle, but on personal dislike of Bayumi and some
ofhis Ministers; if a Luqman-controlled Government had been formed instead,
the general belief in Aden was that it would have carried out merger with
gusto"112.
This was possibly true, but the PCC was still the dominant Opposition group within the
Legislative Council, and therefore able to rally enough support to come within one local
member of defeating the merger process.
Neither Luce nor Johnston had a particularly high view of the Colony politicians, and
both complained of the lack of an effective moderate party to counter the appeal of the
ATUC and, to a lesser extent by 1959/60, the SAL. Luce reported that if a member of
the Legislative Council was not a Member in Charge of a Government department, then
they tended to automatically view themselves as in opposition, despite many of them
sharing the same political ideas. Therefore he saw the need for the formation of a
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moderate political party to rival the Nationalists, an idea which Kirkman of the Colonial
Office opposed since,
"While I would go part of the way with the Governor on the need for a political
party as a counter to the T.U.C. approach to mob politics, I see dangers in
pressing the middle classes of all communities to define their needs and
objectives since this is almost certain to lead to a crystallisation on a racial basis
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on the present emotional atmosphere of Arab Nationalism" .
Luce, was aware of this danger, but believed it was better than allowing the ATUC to
be the only organised body to contest the next elections. However, Luce was also very
disparaging of the local politicians, and was not optimistic about the construction of
"sound and permanent democratic institutions" since,
"with the possible exception ofHasson Bayumi,... they (the Executive Council)
and the Legislative Councillors are mediocre men, and indeed mediocrity is the
hall-mark ofAdenese generally"114.
The Governor believed that the main interest of the leading Adenis was commerce and
trade, which meant there was a lack of "intelligent, public-spirited men" to lead the
Colony politically.
This highly critical view was shared by Luce's successor, Johnston, again with the sole
exception being Bayumi, a man that the new Governor felt the British could really work
with. Johnston arrived in Aden in September 1960, at which time local politics were
recovering from the period ofnear-continuous strikes by the ATUC in 1959 which had
been ended by the Industrial Relations Ordinance (see below). The main issue was
future constitutional development, but as Johnston commented "there were nearly as
many ideas on this subject as there are individuals to voice them"115. He also
bemoaned the factional nature of Arab politics which meant the moderates were divided
among themselves, so Bayumi's UNP was not as strong as it could have been because
other smaller parties were in the process of forming themselves. In the Governor's
113 PRO CO 1015/2489/4 - op. cit.
114 ibid.
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view, all the moderate groups had three main aims: Aden for the Adenese; a
constitutional advance giving substantial self-government before the end of the
Legislative Council then in operation; and some sort ofmerger with the
Protectorate/Federation. However, instead ofpursuing these aims, "they are now sitting
back and waiting on Government" to offer some proposals116.
As noted above, the Colony politicians were generally in favour of a merger, but
wanted a constitutional advance before this. Some of the Legislative Council members,
in particular Hasson, wanted more than this and agitated for full independence soon.
According to him,
"if the British Government wished to keep in the good books of the future
government ofAden the British Government should grant independence
immediately; the present political leaders in the Colony wanted the existing
arrangements to continue merely in order to safeguard their own personal
position"117.
This was an opinion which the British were never likely to follow given the probable
outpouring ofanti-colonial feeling that would follow such a move. As it was the
majority of the Legislative Council were content to work with the British within the
colonial administration, and gradually achieve their aims. This did not mean, though,
that they were merely approving what the Governor told them , as the differences with
the Federation proved. The Colony politicians were worried that the wealth ofAden
would finance the Federation, and if the Federal rulers controlled the town, then they
could disrupt the merchant lifestyle and halt the move towards self-government. The
Federation, meanwhile, were concerned that the Colony was a breeding ground for
Nationalist opposition to their traditional rule. The gap between the two sides, the
politically sophisticated Adenis and the 'backward' Rulers, was so wide that mutual
understanding was unlikely. The British, however, realised that if the Colony
moderates did not receive the constitutional advance they both desired, and had been
116 ibid.
117 PRO CO 1015/2386/17 - Minutes ofAfternoon Meeting between Secretary ofState, Governor and
senior officials ofColony and Protectorate, 4 April 1961
137
promised, then they would move to a more extreme position, threatening the British
tenure of the base:
"The expectation of further self-government is widespread and could not be
thwarted without a serious risk that the moderates, disappointed would be
unable to sustain their position against the Nationalists. Indeed some of them
might throw in their lot with the Nationalists"118.
Indeed, this was to be the case in the last few years ofBritish rule, as certain Legislative
Council members, such as Maqawi, moved towards a more Nationalist position as it
became clear which way the tide was turning in Adeni politics.
During the merger talks between the Colony and Federal delegates, the opposition in
the Legislative Council initially based their stance on the lack of their representatives at
the discussions. A telegram from nine members of the Council was sent to the
Secretary of State during the first London conference in June/July 1961 protesting
against the talks that were ignoring their opinion119. Included in the nine signatories
were two future members of the Aden delegation, Husseiny and Saffi, which suggests
that Johnston's view of the opposition being the opposition purely because of
personality differences was true. Their stance was to change to one of elections first,
and then talks on merger as the discussions continued (as opposed to Bayoumi's "shot¬
gun wedding"), which was to be the main basis for opposing the talks from then on120.
The PCC, with some justification, claimed it would have been "absolutely
undemocratic" for the British to impose a system of government on the Colony without
first consulting the people of Aden, and supported Sa'idi's stand against the merger
agreement121. However, by that point the pro-merger delegates outnumbered the
opponents, making life easier for both Bayumi and the British.
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Ultimately, Bayumi and his supporters won the Legislative Council debate, and the
UNP continued to be the main legitimate Adeni political party with its leader becoming
ChiefMinister for Aden, and a member of the Federal Supreme Council. However, the
divisions among the moderates remained, and even combined, they were hardly
representative of the population of the Colony in the early 1960s given that the elections
of 1959 had only had a turnout of 27% of a limited electorate. The moderates did
benefit from their willingness to work with the colonial authorities since they received a
certain amount ofpower and were able to preserve their own positions and interests as
heads of the traditional merchant and commercial families in Aden. However, their
link to the British was also a handicap and provided much useful propaganda to the
Nationalists, who were still largely based around the trades unions which gave them
access to the politically unrepresented working classes in the Colony.
The ATUC/PSP
The trade union movement in Aden had successfully campaigned for better working
conditions during the 1950s. However, much to the mounting concern of the British
authorities, the ATUC under Abdullah al Asnag's leadership was increasingly seen to
use its ability to organise industrial action for political ends. The first example of this
had been in 1956 with the demonstration in favour ofNasser during the Suez crisis, and
by 1959 the unions, under the control of the ATUC, were causing increasing problems
for the companies and industries in the Colony, as well as for the colonial authorities.
During 1959 alone there were 84 strikes. The most affected industries were the port
which was paralysed for 48 days and the oil refinery which suffered 34 days of
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strikes . Moreover, there was no agreement reached between the unions and
employers. The situation, according to Luce, was getting unbearable, and action was
deemed necessary to limit the number of strikes and industrial action, and thereby the
amount ofNationalist activity disrupting the business of the port and refinery, as well as
British policy.
122 Kostiner, Joseph - op. cit., p. 45
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Luce had hoped that the internal struggle in the ATUC during 1959 would deflect the
unions actions and ability to bring industrial activity to a halt. However, with the defeat
of the SAL faction in August, the ATUC had continued its series of debilitating strikes
towards the end of the year. Once again, the British organised an examination of the
causes behind the strikes, this time by a Mr. Parry, who visited Aden in December
1960. In his report, Parry noted that "the dominant factor which influenced them (the
trade unions) was the undesirability of British rule in Aden, and that the most effective
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way to get rid of it was to cause industrial unrest" . However, it seemed that al Asnag
was not in total control of all the unions. The BP and Refinery Unions in particular, as
well as the Forces Union, did not fully support the ATUC leadership, and the BP strike
was ended against the Secretary-General's wishes. Parry was not very impressed with
Abdullah al Asnag and, unlike Luce, did not view him as a moderating influence, rather
he was "a fanatical Arab nationalist who has used, and will continue to use, the trade
unions in Aden to further his rabid political aims"124. The main concern ofParry was
that the situation would explode into open conflict, and action would have to be taken
to encourage those opposed to al Asnag within the ATUC to put industrial interests
before Arab nationalism.
The Governor's first action after Parry's visit was to appoint a Special Adviser on
Industrial Relations in January 1960 as "at no time since trade unions and employers'
organisations were established in Aden have so many disputes and stoppages ofwork
19*5
taken place" . The Special Adviser, though, was unable to obtain the co-operation of
the ATUC whilst, at around the same time, the ATUC was applying for affiliation to
the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU) in Cairo. This would,
Luce believed, increase the political nature of the Aden trade unions and provide a more
direct channel for UAR influence and subversion within the labour movement126. The
political aims of al Asnag and the unions were underlined by his speech at an ATUC
meeting in February 1960, a speech which clearly set out his opposition to British rule:
123 PRO CO 1015/2566/45 - Note ofa Visit by Mr. Parry to Aden in December 1959, 27 Jan. 1960
124 ibid.
125 PRO CO 1015/2566/16 - Draft Statement, Jan. 1960
126 PRO CO 1015/2566/24 - Luce to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 13 Jan. 1960
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"A nationalist programme will be carried out to strengthen your belief in a
united Yemen - one Nation, one Yemen and one struggle only. No North, no
South, but one Yemen. No Legislative Council, no Federation. We do not
recognise them. We are one nation whether we are in Taiz, Aden, Yafai or
elsewhere. There is only one Yemen, the occupied part ofwhich should be
liberated"127.
Further confirmation ofBritish fears for the unions ability to cause them trouble was in
the booklet published by al Asnag, 'Our Labour Movement' which attacked the British
19R •
base and the Federation . The booklet also stated the ATUC's intention to continue
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its, according to the British, "political machinations" with the help of the UAR . To
counter these "political machinations", the Aden Legislative Council enacted the
Industrial Relations (Conciliation and Arbitration) Ordinance on 17th August 1960,
which was an initially successful attempt to limit industrial action in the Colony:
"The new legislation has moreover relieved the Colony for the time being of
continued industrial dislocation caused by A.T.U.C.'s exploitation of the strike
weapon as a means of acquiring power and prestige, and of creating discontent
1 30
from which it could derive a political bonus" .
The Ordinance banned strikes and introduced compulsory arbitration in industrial
disputes, which meant the unions had to negotiate with employers rather than use the
strike weapon, which in turn greatly reduced the amount of industrial action in Aden in
the early 1960s. The ATUC denounced the Ordinance as "Bayoumi's law" and
intensified their campaign against the Minister for Labour whom they referred to as
i i . i 131
"more imperialist than the British ... Our women are more intelligent than he is" .
Despite the legislation, the ATUC leadership was still powerful, and maintained a
strong hold over the unions, a situation which was somewhat surprisingly consolidated
by the introduction of the Ordinance. The Industrial Relations Ordinance forced the
ATUC into reorganising in order to keep up the pressure on the British and the
employers, and the main beneficiary of the reorganisation was the leadership.
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Individual unions were organised into larger associations or federations, ofwhich there
were eight created in 1960, each with a secretary and between two and four
representatives in the ATUC's consultative assembly (the body which annually elected
the nine-member executive council) 132. Moreover, the central leadership was given
control of over half of each unions' funds, and through the new associations was able to
curb the powers of individual unions. This centralisation benefited al Asnag, giving
him and his supporters greater control over the ATUC, as well as increased funds, and
meant there was continued use of industrial action for political ends. The constitution
of the ATUC emphasised this point with its list of aims including to represent
labourers, supervise the labour movement, end unemployment and illiteracy, secure
freedoms of opinion and so forth The other aims, however, included "to struggle for
the realisation of complete Arab Unity and to put down the weak, forged regimes" and
"To maintain positive neutrality, To denounce foreign military bases in the Arab
fatherland"133. However, as strikes were illegal without arbitration first, the ATUC's
ability to achieve their political aims was limited at first. This was eventually overcome
by the formation of their own political party, the People's Socialist Party (PSP) in July
1962.
The ATUC did test the attitude of the Aden Government with strikes by the Transport
and General Workers Union in October 1961 and by the BP (Refinery) Union in
December of the same year, but both unions met with sharp sentences. The individual
unions could have achieved exemption from the Ordinance by accepting its validity, but
the ATUC refused to recognise the Ordinance, the Legislative Council and the
Ministerial system, which therefore prevented the unions from legally striking134. To
achieve their political aims, therefore, the leaders of the ATUC established a political
organisation, the PSP, in 1962. The announcement came from Muhammad Salim 'Ali
'Abdu, the head of the ATUC's political department (which had been established in
132 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 46 & Watt, D.C. - 'Labor Relations and Trades Unionism in Aden, 1952-1960',
in The Middle East Journal, Vol. 16, no. 4, Autumn 1962, pp. 443-50 - the eight were for oil workers,
port and export, governmental and municipal, industrial, teachers, civilian defence employees, private
business and bank employees, restaurant and entertainment
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1959), and the new party's first action was to call a general strike on 23rd July for
political purposes, not industrial, as both 'Abdu and Said Hasson Suhbi (head of the
PSP's research department) were keen to point out . The PSP was formed during the
nationalist campaign against the Federation, and its aims and principles "echoed
faithfully" those of the ATUC, the main exception being the link to the UAR, which the
PSP Constitution does not mention, but was explicitly proposed in the ATUC's policy
statement in 195 9136. The membership of the PSP also mirrored the ATUC, with the
membership of the party's Supreme Council and the Heads of the five departments all
being prominent in the unions, the only exceptions being four professionals who were
1 T7
probably included to give the party an air of respectability .
The merger process was a key issue for the Nationalists, but also gave rise to a policy
problem as they had long been campaigning for a united Yemen, including Aden, the
Protectorate, and North Yemen. The merger, therefore, could have been viewed as step
towards that aim. However, as it was organised by the British and the Federal rulers, it
was opposed. The principles of the party not only stated that "the natural Yemen" was
part of the Arab nation, but also to liberate that area from the "imperialists and
1 38
reactionaries", unifying it on the basis of democracy and socialism" . This meant that
the merger could be opposed on grounds of lack of democracy, which was a justifiable
accusation given the nature of the "shotgun wedding". The PSP called for elections
before the merger and warned, after Bayumi had won the Legislative Council vote, that,
"Our party in declaring non-recognition (of the Legislative Council resolution)
reaffirms such undemocratic measures may oblige people to resort to
undesirable steps leading to serious consequences at British Government
• • 1 3Q
responsibility" .
The PSP was defeated and the merger went ahead on British terms, but their opposition
campaign, including alleged intimidation of Legislative Council members, endangered
the Government majority. Had one Government supporter voted in favour ofHasson's
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amendment, then the numbers of local members would have been tied at eight each,
making it very difficult for the British to proceed. However, the PSP was not defeated
for long, as the Yemeni revolution the following day gave a great impetus to the




Since the end ofWorld War One, the Imams of Yemen had opposed British
intervention in the Protectorate/Federation, although they had been willing to recognise
Aden as a colony. Their methods of opposition had generally been to support those
tribes who had suffered loss of income or power through British support of a rival, and
during the 1950s, 'rebels' such as Muhammad Aidrus and the Ahl Abu Bakr bin Farid
would receive arms, money and supplies from the Yemen. The relationship between
the Imams and the British was never friendly, and often based on misunderstanding,
largely due to differing interpretations of the Treaty of Sana in 1934. However, towards
the end of the 1950s, the relationship did begin to improve, and Yemeni interference in
the Protectorate diminished, partly because of visits by Luce to Taiz to meet with the
Imam, and also because there was a growing opposition to Imamic rule within Yemen
itself.
There had been an opposition to the Imam since the 1940s, based around the Free
Yemeni Movement, which had campaigned for reform of the Imamate, although not its
removal. The reformist leaders (Muhammad al-Zubayri, Ahmad Nu'man) established
the Movement in Aden in the early 1940s140. However, the Free Yemeni leaders had
been sent back by the British when the Imam complained during the 1950s, although it
140 Dresch, Paul - Tribes, Government andHistory in Yemen (OUP, Oxford, 1989), p. 238
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had also helped the British as some of the Free Yemenis were involved in the UNP
opposition to British rule. There had also been two 'revolts' against the Imam's rule;
the first in 1948 saw the assassination of Imam Yahya with Free Yemeni involvement,
which his successor Ahmad blamed on the British. The second in 1955 saw Ahmad
overthrown in a palace coup, but his son al-Badr restored him to the throne with
Egyptian help, the price being closer ties to the UAR. The opposition, however, was
only slowly moving away from the idea of a constitutional Imamate towards
republicanism, and was not particularly 'radical'. This would change during the 1950s
as emigrants who had studied or worked in other Arab cities returned with the ideas of
Nationalism that Nasser was spreading. During the decade branches of the Communist
party, the Arab Nationalist Movement and the Ba'ath were founded within Yemen, and
an increasingly large number of Yemenis were adhering to Nasserism by the end of the
1950s141. This meant that the aim of the opposition was no longer to reform the
Imamate, but to remove it altogether. Moreover, the opposition were also gathering
more support as Ahmad's rule saw minor shaikhs sell their landholdings, and there was
disaffection among the army officers.
Imam Ahmad went to Rome in April 1959 for medical treatment, which was seen by
both the opposition and the Crown Prince al-Badr as a chance for reform, but the return
ofAhmad saw the plans for reform disintegrate142. According to Dresch, the mere
presence ofAhmad was enough to paralyse the opposition, and some ofhis opponents
fled the country. However, when the Imam died on 18th September 1962, the reformist
al-Badr took power, and immediately took steps to appease the opposition143. This
move by the new ruler failed as, a week after coming to power on the evening of the
26th, the army attacked his palace, proclaimed the Imam was dead and established the
Yemen Arab Republic, with Abdullah al-Sallal as the new President. In fact al-Badr
had escaped to the north ofYemen and was able to organise a Royalist opposition to the
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Republicans, setting in motion an eight year civil war which dragged Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and the UK into the conflict.
Reactions to the Republican Regime
The initial reaction among British officials in Aden to the Yemeni revolution was one
of relief that it had not happened the day before the Legislative Council debate on
merger rather than the following day. However, the implications of the revolution were
quickly realised once Nasser became involved in supporting the Republicans which
brought UAR troops onto the border of the Federation. This gave the Federal rulers a
shock, and brought about "a wave of desertions from the Federal forces" as many went
north to join the Republican forces144. According to Johnston,
"the ministers became acutely aware that the chilling shadow cast across the
mountains and wadis of the Federation was that ofNasser himself, now virtually
standing on their frontiers"145.
The Federal rulers became very concerned about the state of the Federation's defences,
for which the British were responsible. Initially the rulers informed the British that they
would always be willing to provide the British Government with full facilities for the
operation of the base and with sovereignty in any specific areas required for military
purposes146. However, there was a later deterioration of Federal-British relations as
wider political concerns limited the British Government's response to UAR/Republican
air and artillery attacks on border villages, whilst the rulers wanted to fight fire with
fire.
In Aden, the revolution brought about a change of heart among many of the Ministers
who then decided elections should come before the merger, despite having voted
against this scheme147. The revival ofNasser's influence also gave a boost to the
144 PRO DEFE 11/332/1522 - Aden: Review ofAffairs in the Colony and Protectorate during 1962
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Nationalists in Aden, in particular the PSP, with pan-Arabism making a serious impact
on South Arabia for the first time. Once again this caused the Federal rulers concern,
and they told the Governor that "It is with deep regret and with sincerity that we inform
you that we have lost all our confidence in the Aden Government" and that they wanted
148 • •
the ATUC and PSP destroyed . The boost to the Nationalists was countered by the
arrest and imprisonment of al Asnag in December 1962, which left the PSP/ATUC
leaderless for the winter149. In the long-term, however, the influence ofNasser and
UAR supplies could be felt in the Colony until June 1967 and the Six Day War.
The British reaction was varied, and there is a certain amount of evidence suggesting
covert operations against the Republicans and in favour of the Royalists. Johnston was
concerned about a pro-Nasser regime in Yemen as it would mean "the threat to the
Aden base may well be serious"150. However, the Governor initially could not make up
his mind about the question of recognising the Republicans. At first, when it was
presumed the Republicans had complete control of the situation, Johnston argued for
recognising the new regime because the chances of a Royalist victory were slim151.
However, the same day he sent that recommendation, he also endorsed covert aid to the
claimant to the Yemeni throne, Prince Hussein (al-Badr had been advised to step aside
as his father had not been popular), who also confirmed he was receiving Saudi and
i M
Jordanian aid . Given his view that he felt Royalist chances were slim, it is surprising
that he endorsed the risky action of supporting them. However, once it became clear
that the Royalists were not going to be easily defeated, then the Governor argued in
favour of supporting them since the Republican regime was dangerous to the British
base in Aden with its ability to supply the Nationalists and the possibility ofmass
• 1
desertions from the Federal Regular Army (FRA) . The Commander-in-Chief of the
Middle East Forces, however, was not so sure that the Republican regime would have a
serious effect on the loyalty of the FRA154. This was a dangerous claim to make,
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though, given the experience ofmass desertions in the Federal forces during the
troubles in the Protectorate in the 1950s,
The British Charge d'Affaires in Taiz (Christopher Gandy), meanwhile was
recommending recognition of the Republicans since the Imamate had been so
unpopular anyway. Gandy was also unhappy that relations were resumed with Saudi
Arabia on the one hand, but there was to be no recognition of the Republicans on the
other155. However, Gandy was in a minority among British officials, the majority
unwilling to grant international recognition to a pro-Nasser regime which potentially
threatened British interests. The US, though, did grant recognition to the new regime.
No recognition was forthcoming from the UK, however, and the British response to
American recognition was one of impotent rage. Macmillan, the Prime Minister, tried
to persuade Kennedy not to recognise the regime and press for a UAR withdrawal first.
The US President replied that he felt Sallal would turn to the Soviet Union and by the
end of 1962 had recognised the Republican regime whereas the British Charge
d'Affaires was asked to leave the country156.
Officially the British played no active role in the Yemeni civil war, other than to lodge
complaints at the United Nations when there were infringements of the Federation.
However, despite the prevarication over whether to recognise Sallal's Republican
regime, there was a more immediate response to the perceived threat to British interests.
Possibly without the knowledge of either the Governor in Aden, or even the higher
levels at Whitehall, supplies were being sent to the Royalists. It was fairly common
knowledge that the Federation was being used by Saudi Arabia to bolster their allies,
with the support of the Federal rulers, but British arms were also being supplied. The
British representative at Taiz informed the Foreign Office on 11th October that "British
weapons have been found at Marib. Rifles could have been explained away but there
1 S7
are heavy weapons including A/A guns" . There were also further pleas for arms and
ammunition from the Royalist leader Abdullah bin Hasan, which the MP Colonel
155 PRO DEFE 11/329/1108 - Taiz to FO, 11 Jan. 1963
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Maclean recommended should be given, otherwise the Royalist front in the east would
collapse158.
Whilst these claims were never officially sanctioned, according to a Colonial Office
representative working in the Federation at the time there certainly were supplies being
sent to the Royalists. Furthermore, this clandestine support from British officials in
Aden and the Protectorate started almost immediately after the coup overthrowing the
Imam took place159. This was proven by the Secretary of State for Defence
(Thorneycroft) calling for a "sharp increase in 'deniable' support in terms ofboth arms
and money for the Royalist tribes and other tribes capable of interfering with Egyptian
plans in the Yemen" in July 1964160. Had there been no support in the first place,
Thorneycroft would not have been calling for an increase, an admission of British
involvement in the Royalist cause.
The Yemeni revolution had an impact throughout the Middle East, involving the
regional powers in a proxy war, tying down at least a third ofNasser's forces by 1967, a
fact which greatly hindered his military capacity in the June War with Israel. Moreover,
there was a smaller proxy war between the UAR and Britain, with covert supplies, at
the very least, being sent to the Royalists, and Egypt supplying the Adeni Nationalists
with arms and ammunition, as well as training them in camps in Yemen. Before the
September revolution, the Nationalists within the Colony had conducted a largely
peaceful campaign for independence and the withdrawal of the British base. However,
from 1963 onwards, this campaign became increasingly violent, as more radical
Nationalists emerged that would challenge al Asnag and the PSP, and create a situation
for the British whereby the majority of troops in the base were involved in security
duties rather than the defence of British policy in the Gulf.
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Conclusion
The clear fact from British Government documents dealing with Aden in the 1950s and
1960s was that British defence interests east of Suez were paramount. The
establishment of the Federation and then its merger with Aden were both moves that
policy-makers calculated would preserve the British presence in South Arabia for the
longest possible period of time. Whilst sovereignty was the most desirable state of
affairs from a British point of view, a balance had to be struck in order to ensure
continued local goodwill, without which, Defence Chiefs repeatedly warned, the base
would be useless. However, it was becoming increasingly clear that local goodwill was
not as forthcoming as it had been before the 1960s. This was especially true after the
Yemeni revolution brought the support and influence ofNasser and the UAR onto the
very doorstep of the British zone of influence in South West Arabia. The increased
pressure from the Nationalists as a result of the Yemeni revolution would force the
British Government into repeated changes ofpolicy as they sought to maintain their
position in Aden.
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Chapter Five; The Granting of Independence, 1963-1966
Introduction
The accession ofAden to the Federation of South Arabia had been viewed by British
policy-makers as the most acceptable means ofmaintaining their hold on the military
base. However, the merger process had been protracted and strongly opposed by many
within the Colony, although the Legislative Council vote was finally won by the
Government ofAden. This victory was short-lived as the proximity of the Egyptian
army following the Yemeni revolution was a boost to the Nationalists in Aden and the
Federation, who now had a supplier and supporter in a neighbouring state. This gave
them arms and propaganda with which to fight the British and their allies within South
Arabia. The result was an increasingly violent campaign by those opposed to colonial
rule and the presence of the base. Ultimately, the Conservative Government was
compelled to grant the promise of independence in order to undermine the opposition,
but this tactic failed as the violence continued. Their successors, the Labour Party,
despite their socialist and allegedly anti-imperialist stances, also failed to quell the
Nationalists, who were becoming increasingly radical with the appearance of the
ultimate winners in the conflict, the National Liberation Front.
Conservative Policy
The Little Aden Plan
British Foreign and Defence policy under the Conservative Governments of the late
1950s and early 1960s centred on 'east of Suez', and by 1960 Aden was the
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headquarters for the Middle East region of this policy. However, within the
Government, and between London and Aden, there were, at times quite extreme,
differences over the best implementation of the policy and maintenance of the base.
The prime example of these differences was over the concept of sovereign base areas
(SBAs) in the Colony, a scheme which was repeatedly rejected by the Chiefs of Staff.
Nevertheless, its chief supporter, Duncan Sandys, insisted it was the best means of
preserving British defence rights in Aden, which were essential to uphold British
interests in the Persian Gulf (primarily Kuwait and the oil supplies it provided). The
debate over the SBAs continued until mid-1964, by which time the deteriorating
security situation in Aden and the Federation gave rise to the question of granting
independence to South Arabia in order to appease the Nationalists who were gathering
enough support to threaten British interests.
Sandys had finally seemed to be convinced by the beginning of 1963 that excluding the
base areas from the Colony was impracticable as the base would still be reliant upon
local goodwill for water and power supplies, let alone air and naval access. However,
sovereignty was still the Colonial Secretary's goal, so instead of excising the current
base, he proposed building a new base in the uninhabited western part of the Little
Aden peninsula and an airfield in the adjoining Federal territory1. To achieve this,
Sandys wanted to play a game of bluffwith the Federal Ministers by initially asking the
Governor to propose that the British Government required the continued use of the base
areas in Aden itself. Then, when the Ministers gave the expected rejection to sovereign
base areas, Johnston was to suggest that the British Government might well content
themselves with a new base in the western part of Little Aden. However, Sandys' aim
was not to actually build a new base given the expense of such a plan, but at least to be
in the position to threaten to do so since he believed,
"The people of Aden derive so many advantages from our presence in the town
that they would, (I think) be very reluctant to see us go and it is very unlikely
that we should in fact have to move from our present position" .
1 PRO CO 1055/128/13 - Cabinet, Overseas Policy Committee: Aden, Memorandum by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 17 Jan. 1963
2 ibid.
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Moreover, the Colonial Secretary did not want to enter into negotiations with the
Federal Ministers about extra aid until they could also negotiate for the setting aside of
the proposed areas. Sandys was willing to pay in financial terms for the territory, but
would rather no political concessions were involved.
This scheme was met with opposition by certain officials in Aden, and also the
Treasury, but had some support from Johnston. His Deputy, Kennedy Trevaskis,
however, did not believe the Federal Ministers would be alarmed by the proposals, and
•3
were more likely to press for "a political 'quid pro quo'" . Given the Ministers
opposition to constitutional advance, Trevaskis believed it was likely that the only
political concession they would have desired was independence. The Treasury's
opposition was based on its reluctance to add to the already heavy commitments in
Aden4. This was largely because the estimated cost of building a new base in Little
Aden was £50-£75 million, and would take 7-10 years5. The other opposition to the
scheme came from the Foreign Office who thought the plan would be viewed as an
expansion of colonial government (which it effectively was) and was "likely to give
another pretext to the Yemenis to attack our Aden policy"6.
Despite these criticisms, Sandys wanted Johnston to press the Federal and Colony
Ministers to agree to the transfer ofKhormaksar, Steamer Point (Tawahi) and other
areas from Federal to British sovereignty so as to secure their agreement to the Little
Aden plan7. Johnston was in favour of the plan as the best fall-back option, which was
basically how Sandys viewed it since in the best case scenario, the British Government
would have maintained sovereignty over the existing areas with full local consent. In
order to fulfil British defence requirements, according to the Governor,
3 PRO CO 1055/128/22 - Letter from Trevaskis to J.C. Morgan (CO), 30 Jan. 1963
4 PRO CO 1055/128/E31 - Minute from John Boyd-Carpenter (Treasury) to Secretary ofState for the
Colonies, 1 Feb. 1963
5 PRO CO 1055/128/36 - Brieffor Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 6 Feb. 1963
6 PRO FO 371/168629/B1051/14G - Memo by R.S. Crawford, 6 Feb. 1963
7 PRO CO 1055/128/33 - Letter Eastwood (CO) to Johnston, 5 Feb. 1963
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"we need to avoid depending on a treaty for our facilities as in Libya or Jordan.
Therefore we need sovereignty. We also need to avoid sitting on bayonets, as in
• Q
the Canal Zone or Cyprus. Therefore we need goodwill" .
The need for sovereignty and, in particular, goodwill was true, from a British defence
point ofview, and was underlined by another Ministry ofDefence report highlighting
once again the necessity ofAden to best protect interests in the Gulf.
The report was examining alternatives to Aden in order to defend British interests in the
Middle East since,
"it is conceivable that political developments in the Arabian Peninsula may
make it difficult for us to rely on the continuing use of our defence facilities in
Aden after 1967"9.
This was a remarkably accurate piece ofprophesying, as this was the year that the
British withdrawal took place. However, the report, whilst offering alternatives to
Aden, such as re-deployment to the Gulf, partial re-deployment to the Gulfwith support
from Singapore, or to re-establish the base in Little Aden, concluded that the existing
facilities were "fundamental to any lasting and effective presence in the Persian Gulf
and to our ability to meet effectively our Middle East commitments"10. The next best
option was re-location in Little Aden, but this would have cost £44 million more than
the current plan, and would also require the continued use ofAden harbour which was
possibly politically unfeasible and, it was also pointed out, the new base would not be
ready by 196711.
The British, therefore, either had to admit that a sovereign base in South Arabia was not
feasible and so rely on defence rights, or cut back the British Government's
commitments in the Middle East, neither ofwhich was ever really properly considered
under the Conservatives. William Luce had warned that independence would have to
8 PRO DEFE 11/330/1318D - Johnston to Secretary ofState, 27 Feb. 1963
9 PRO DEFE 11/331/1411 - Methods ofMeeting middle East Defence Commitments in the Event of the




be granted eventually and the goodwill of the Adenis should be cultivated in order to
preserve defence rights. However, his advice was ignored and successive Secretaries of
State for Defence and for the Colonies persisted in the belief that sovereign base areas
were the only way to defend British interests. The fact that SBAs were becoming a
political anachronism as ideas ofArab Nationalism and Nasserism grew never really
penetrated British policy-making. Sandys even opposed the High Commissioner's and
Commander-in-Chiefs proposal to eventually give the Colony the military's surplus
land and buildings for nothing because it would not have retained local goodwill for
long enough. This plan could have been a relatively cheap means ofwinning a certain
amount of local favour by returning land to Federal control. Instead, the proposal was
to be held as a potential concession in future discussions, and Sandys still favoured
sovereign base areas as the best way to maintain British defence capabilities in the
region12.
British Defence Interests and Independence
The debate over future policy in South Arabia continued to hinge on unfettered use of
the base and how best to achieve this. The question that began to dominate the debate
was whether granting independence was the best way of retaining sovereignty over the
base areas, and whether the British Government should bargain over this point. From
June 1963 to mid-1964, there was a flow of reports on this issue, as well as many
telegrams between London and Aden as Kennedy Trevaskis, who became High
Commissioner in August 1963, disputed the conclusions reached by the Colonial
Office. Eventually, it was decided that independence should be granted, but only when
it finally became clear that the situation in Aden and the Federation was becoming
increasingly unstable, and the British hold on power was not as strong as had been
assumed.
12 PRO DEFE 11/332/1534 - Memo from Secretary ofState for the Colonies to Minister ofDefence, 15
May 1963
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The first proposals about independence came from the Federal Supreme Council who
sent a letter to Duncan Sandys after Muhammad Farid and 'Umar Shihab had met the
10.
Colonial Secretary in London . The Council drew up a programme leading to
independence "following the discussions in London", which would suggest that Sandys
had either instigated the proposal, or at least supported the idea of one. The plan was to
abrogate the Advisory Treaties and annul Article V of the 1959 Treaty as they gave the
unfavourable impression that the Federation was "completely subjected to British
dictation". Aden was to be granted independence within the Federation (and the
elections postponed) and the British would terminate the 1959 and 1963 Treaties in
1969 to give the Federation complete independence. In order to maintain the "friendly
and mutually advantageous relationship" the Council was willing to let the UK excise
such areas as they required for military purposes. They would also allow Britain
unrestricted use of such areas, in return for: financial aid; help for the defence of the
Federation (and, where necessary, for the maintenance of internal security); the support
of technical, military, professional and administrative officers; and help in preparing
the Federation for independence. The Council concluded that "the absence of a
programme [for independence], we believe, is likely to prove equally embarrassing for
both the Federation and the United Kingdom". The fact that neither side seemed
particularly worried about the "embarrassment" of colonial rule at the time was ignored.
The counter-proposal to this was from Bayumi, ChiefMinister in Aden, and one of the
few local politicians that Johnston admired, who only demanded self-government for
Aden14. This proposal was the High Commissioner's preferred policy as it would
ensure better use of the base for the British with continued sovereignty over the areas
surrounding the base, and anyway, Johnston did not want to give Bayumi any more than
he asked for, in other words full independence15.
Once again, the Aden Department of the Colonial Office considered the question of
future policy in Aden, in particular the Supreme Council's proposals for
13 PRO CO 1055/129/85 - Letterfrom SharifHusain, Chairman, Supreme Council to Duncan Sandys,
Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 3 June 1963
14 PRO CO 1055/129/80 - Telegram Johnston to Secretary ofStatefor the Colonies, 5 June 1963
15 PRO CO 1055/129/81 - Telegram Johnston to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 5 June 1963
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independence16. The proposals, in fact, had been encouraged by Johnston, with the
agreement of the Secretary of State17. The High Commissioner pointed out that the
course of action would be an amalgam of the third and fifth options in the previous
paper on future policy. The Department considered that the loss of advisory powers
was not significant as they were, "ofno more practical use than the reserved powers in
Aden since they could only be used in the last resort and at the risk of a crisis in
1 8
relations with the Federation", and could secure political benefit . On the question of
constitutional advance, the Department agreed with Johnston that a grant of internal
self-government should be the limit. The Paper even questioned whether any form of
constitutional advance was necessary at the time, unless an agreement could be made on
the base areas in return. Whilst the Federal Ministers wanted a new Constitution for
Aden in order to postpone the elections, this would still have created problems in
Parliament. Nevertheless, the question ofwhether to permit elections and face the
dangers of a possible PSP victory or to delay elections was relevant to the entire
process. The date of 1969 for independence was acceptable to the Aden Department as
this corresponded roughly with Article X of the Treaty of Accession regarding the
withdrawal ofAden from the Federation. The more controversial point was over the
excision of base areas, which the Department believed was the Colonial Secretary's
'quid pro quo' in return for constitutional advance. However, Sandys himself noted
that,
"I have never accepted that this is a 'quid pro quo'. We have already given the
'quo' in the form ofmerger and the recent constitutional advance. We are now
entitled to the 'quid' without further payment"19.
This was, again, a rather narrow outlook by the politician who frequently seemed
unwilling to accept the need for granting concessions to Britain's allies in return for the
continuation of the British presence in South Arabia.






Another problem was the question of future assistance to the Federation, which was
strongly supported by the High Commissioner. However, it was highly unlikely that the
Treasury would agree to an open-ended commitment, especially as further financial
grants to the Federation would increase the existing burden. The final difficulty raised
by the Department was the question of timing since the sooner constitutional change
was permitted, the greater the pressure for independence would be. On the other hand,
if delays were introduced, then some concession would have to be granted to local
Ministers, such as a Constitutional Conference. The conclusion that can be inferred
from this paper is that the British Government of the time, and in particular Duncan
Sandys, were very unwilling to grant any further constitutional advance without first
getting what they wanted out ofAden - sovereign base areas. Sandys and the Colonial
Office did not seem to have learned from the continual warnings from the Chiefs of
Staff that the base would be effectively useless without local goodwill, and by denying
Adeni politicians a chance to appease the opposition, that goodwill was unlikely to be
forthcoming.
There was, however, some opposition to the Supreme Council's proposals within the
Federation as SharifHusain of Beihan believed that 1969 was too early for
• • ?n
independence, and he wanted to keep the Advisory Treaties . Johnston opposed this as
it would prejudice Beihan's relations with the other Federal states, but it is interesting
to note the reluctance of at least one Federal ruler to end British influence in the
Protectorate. This was, though, probably representative of a minority among Federal
(and certainly Adeni) Ministers, who were on the whole willing to grant the British
certain rights, but at the same time aware of the growing calls for independence.
Johnston, in his 'Valedictory Reflections', was also aware of the need to see the bigger
91 •
picture and take into account the modern world . The departing High Commissioner
pointed out that,
"The winds of change have been blowing hard for some years; Afro-Asian
opinion at the United Nations and in the world at large is powerful and violently
20 PRO CO 1055/129/91 - Telegram Johnston to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 13 June 1963
21 PRO FO 371/168630/B 1051/33 - Aden: Valedictory Reflections ofSir Charles Hepburn Johnston,
K.C.M.G., High Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 July 1963
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anti-colonial. It is clear to us that we cannot shut ourselves up on the rocks and
islands which still belong to us and try to ignore the modern world. Early
independence for territories like South Arabia must be our real goal and not
99
simply a matter of lip-service" .
Nevertheless, the British Government should not "flabbily give in to the currents of
world opinion" and Johnston still believed that sovereignty, at least over excised base
areas, should be maintained until the late 1960s, when independence should be granted
9^
(probably in 1969) . Moreover, he outlined three preconditions necessary for
independence to succeed: unification, which had been partly achieved through the
merger ofAden and the Federation; stabilisation, which was far more difficult to
achieve, especially as the introduction ofmodem weaponry meant "it is now child's
play for a few young officers in tanks and jet aircraft to storm the palace, kill or capture
the ruler, take over the radio station - and they are home", and he predicted a coup to
follow once British executive control had been removed; and economic self-
sufficiency, which involved a need for the diversification and development of the Adeni
economy away from oil. Johnston also showed a realistic outlook on the region,
advising that Britain's relations with Nasser should be pragmatic, and that the concept
of a Greater South Arabia was not one to be opposed. In conclusion, he noted that "as
long as we need the oil of the Persian Gulfwe shall have a mercenary motive for
keeping the idea ofAnglo-Arab partnership alive"24. Leaving behind an independent
and prosperous South Arabia, Johnston proposed, would be a good advertisement for
• • • • 9*?
maintaining the British connection .
Johnston was here showing a more considered and realistic view ofBritish policy in the
Middle East, but, as with Luce, his approach was not necessarily one that the Colonial
Office wanted to take into account. The idea of not instinctively opposing Nasser
would have been especially hard for British policy-makers to agree with. This could be






• • • 26the supplying and training of the Royalists by 'ex-SAS' soldiers (see Chapter Six) .
Moreover, Johnston's ideas about granting independence were also not universally
accepted, despite his informed view that by doing so, the British Government should be
in a position to retain sufficient influence to defend its interests. The Foreign Secretary
believed that, if Britain had a choice about granting independence, it would depend on
an assessment of the British Government's interest in supporting the independence of
Kuwait27. The Colonial Secretary thought independence would actually come sooner
than 1969, but rather optimistically held the view that "the Federation will remain
dependent on us for so many years to come that we need not fear that they will be unco-
• • • 98
operative for as long as it suits us to keep the base" . This view clearly had not taken
into account Britain's other experiences in the Middle East since 1945, something
which Johnston had done and which did influence his views on future British policy.
Trevaskis vs. Sandys: Policy differences between Aden and the Colonial Office
Johnston's successor as High Commissioner, Kennedy Trevaskis, held similar views to
his predecessor, but was much more aggressive in his attempts to get the Colonial
Office in London to listen to them. Trevaskis had served in the Protectorate and
Colony since 1953, and knew the situation probably better than any other British
official working there at the time. However, his long experience and narrow focus on
South Arabia coloured Trevaskis's views on wider British policy-making, especially as
he felt that the Protectorate rulers, with strong British support, could run the Federation
effectively. The new High Commissioner set out his theories on future policy shortly
after taking office in which he reasoned that,
"if there were no positive prospect of independence under the leadership of our
friends, it is all too likely that there would be a general move throughout the
26 A former Aden Government official, who wishes to remain anonymous, has evidence of the almost
immediate reaction to the Yemeni coup by certain British civil servants in Aden and the Federation at the
time, involving clandestine operations in support of the Royalists and against the Republicans
27 PRO FO 371/168630/B1051/36 - Comments on Valedictory Reflections ofJohnston, Sep./Oct. 1963
28 ibid.
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Federation towards an 'independence' band wagon under the control of our
enemies"29.
In his view, there was a likelihood of a Republican victory in the Yemen, and so an
independent republic with good relations with other Arab states would have greater
appeal to the politically conscious than the status quo. Therefore it would be in a better
position to resist the challenge of "Yemeni irredentism". Trevaskis believed that a
cautious approach, retaining constitutional power for as long as possible would result in
a PSP-led government. For this reason, the British Government should be bold and
give Aden independence within the Federation as soon as feasible, although this meant
delaying the elections to ensure the moderates took power. As regards sovereignty in
the base areas, Trevaskis advocated flexibility through agreeing to renounce sovereignty
after a certain period of time or maybe only retaining it in certain key areas such as
Khormaksar airport. Moreover, Britain would need to act quickly before the UN and
the YAR "go into action against us" or else "we shall be courting disaster"30. The High
Commissioner believed that the Republicans and Egyptians in the YAR should be kept
too busy dealing with the Royalists, and so buying time for the Federation to establish
itself.
These views, however, were not welcomed by Sandys and the Colonial Office, who felt
that the best future policy would be to confer internal self-government on Aden to the
same degree as the other Federal states. This would have meant that British
sovereignty, the Federal advisory clause (the right of the UK to advise the rulers on
defence and security matters) and the High Commissioner's power to override in
security matters would have been retained. There would also have been an immediate
undertaking to grant the Federation (including Aden) independence on any date after
the end of 1965, the Aden Legislative Council would have its life extended, and the
base areas would be immediately excised. There was agreement with Trevaskis that the
"colonial" relationship should be ended as soon as possible, but time was needed to
build up the Federation into an institution capable of governing an independent South
29 PRO CO 1055/129/128 - A Note on Constitutional Advance in the Federation andAden, Kennedy
Trevaskis, 17 Sep. 1963
30 ibid.
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Arabia. Moreover, Sandys believed that, since elections were likely to produce a PSP
victory, then the British Government should not hand over complete control to the State
■J 1
Government until the Federation became independent .
These counter-proposals produced a series of, at times acrimonious, telegrams between
Aden and London as Trevaskis attempted to have his views accepted by London, but
generally to no avail. The High Commissioner's view was that,
"our agreed aim is that Aden should gain its independence within an
'independent' Federation linked firmly to ourselves by treaty and subject to our
influence and indirect control: our purpose being to safeguard our interests in
Aden (the sovereign base areas and our freedom to operate the base) through the
agency of the Federation rather than through our present Colonial constitutional
powers"32.
The problems that the British Government faced in achieving this were: firstly,
possible UN pressure (which Eastwood noted was "not valid"); secondly, the
moderates would require substantial inducement to accept inclusion in the Federation
on the present basis, whilst the PSP would oppose it; and finally, retaining control of
the base would either require financial inducement to the moderates again, or be leased
from the PSP - if they were willing. In Trevaskis's opinion, no inducements were
offered by the Colonial Office's plan and decisions were being deferred. The High
Commissioner believed that decisions on independence would have to be made
immediately and inducements to the moderates made. Moreover, the PSP should be
excluded from political power until the plan had gone through and a constitutional
conference should be called to agree upon Aden's independence within the Federation
(subject to the excision of base areas), as well as granting independence to the
Federation. The question of the timing of elections should be left to the Government of
Aden once it got independence.
Trevaskis did modify his proposals in the face of opposition from Whitehall, but only
over the idea of sovereign base areas. The Defence Secretary favoured treaty relations
31 PRO CO 1055/129/154A - Telegramfrom Eastwood to Trevaskis, 11 Oct. 1963
32 PRO CO 1055/130/158 - Telegramfrom Trevaskis to Eastwood, 14 Oct. 1963
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instead of SBAs since sovereignty would sour local goodwill, and the High
Commissioner agreed with this . This, though, was again amended to retaining
sovereignty over Bir Fuqum in Little Aden to show the British Government's "friends"
that the British were not going34. In London, the debate focused on Sandys's proposals
rather than those of Trevaskis, in particular making Aden a protectorate within the
Federation, as opposed to granting full independence. The Chiefs of Staff welcomed
the proposal, but were still uncertain that creating SBAs would produce the desired
results35. The Foreign Office also worried that the retention of sovereignty over the
base would end the possibility of goodwill in Aden. One Foreign Office official noted
that, whilst SBAs might be the right answer from a British point of view, they would
definitely be seen as objectionable by the Arab world, "condemning a part of the Arab
world to perpetual colonial rule" .
The State ofEmergency and its Effect on Policy
Policy had to be re-thought once more, however, after the grenade attack against
Trevaskis at Khormaksar airport on 10th December 1963, which missed the High
•97 m m
Commissioner, but killed two others . This lead to the British declaring a State of
Emergency in the Colony, and meant sovereignty could not be ceded without appearing
weak, according to Sandys, and so Aden was only to be given an advanced degree of
self-government . The implication was that sovereignty would have been ceded had
the grenade attack not taken place, but instead the Colonial Office had to retain
sufficient control in order to keep the base secure. The base at this time was being
expanded, partly due to the need for troops for internal security (IS) duties. The Chiefs
of Staff therefore recommended an extra infantry unit in either Aden or Bahrein so that
the IS battalion in Aden would not be used in any operation in Kuwait39. This need for
reinforcements after declaring a State ofEmergency should have suggested to policy-
33 PRO CO 1055/130/168 - Telegram Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 24 Oct. 1963
34 PRO CO 1055/130/181 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 5 Nov. 1963
35 PRO CO 1055/130/212 - Extractfrom CoS Meeting, 3 Dec. 1963
j6 PRO FO 371/168631/B1051/43(G) - Brieffor Secretary ofState for Defence, 3 Dec. 1963
37 Trevaskis, Kennedy - op. cit., pp. 198-9
PRO CO 1055/130/245 - Telegram Secretary ofState for the Colonies to Trevaskis, 16 Dec. 1963
39 PRO DEFE 11/163/72 - Force Levels in Aden and the Persian Gulf, Nov./Dec. 1963
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makers that their hold on South Arabia was not that secure. However, instead of trying
to relinquish that hold, create allies, and try to retain defence rights by treaty, which was
the preferred policy of the defence chiefs, the continuation of colonial rule, albeit
somewhat diluted, was the answer according to the Colonial Office.
The aim of the policy was for the relationship between the Colony and the British
Government to be as near as possible as that between the other federated states and the
British Government40. There were differences to the relationship, since Aden would
remain under British sovereignty, the High Commissioner would become a
representative of the British Government and a local "personality" would become the
Queen's representative. Moreover, the right to excise base areas for defence purposes
would be retained as would the right to withdraw Aden from the Federation. However,
the High Commissioner would relinquish direct responsibility for internal security and
the police although he would still retain overriding legislative powers. The Aden
Legislature would be given the right to amend its own Constitution, but this was subject
to the British Government's overriding power to legislate by Order in Council. In the
Federation, Britain would retain full control of defence and external affairs, but
surrender the power ofmandatory advice on other matters. Once again, Trevaskis
disagreed with the proposed policy from the Colonial Office stating,
"our ultimate aim should remain independence for Aden within the Federation
since we are more likely to safeguard our interests here in long term (sic.) if the
Federation is given a free hand to deal with our enemies in Aden than if, as a
consequence of the persistence of British sovereignty, British Parliamentary and
other pressures result in a hostile Government emerging in Aden under British
protection and thereafter the Federation going sour on us"41.
However, despite advocating Aden independence within the Federation, Trevaskis was
wary of giving away all the concessions advocated by the Colonial Office since it would
leave the British Government with much less bargaining power, and also upset the
Federation. There was agreement with most of the points made by London, but the
power of the High Commissioner should not be diminished. This was particularly true
40 PRO CO 1055/131/264 - Telegramfrom Sir John Martin (CO) to Trevaskis, 6 Jan. 1964
41 PRO CO 1055/131/270 - Trevaskis to Martin, 11 Jan. 1964
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over the issue of internal security with the danger of a PSP government coming to
power. The threat of a PSP victory in elections was also why Trevaskis felt the Aden
Legislature should not have the power to amend its own constitution. Even if the other
concessions were made, that would have still given Aden a substantial degree of
constitutional advance and enhance the authority of the moderates, leaving the British
with sufficient further inducements to get Aden to agree to independence within the
Federation.
This was not accepted by the Colonial Office who felt "such limited concessions" were
unlikely to be viewed favourably in Aden nor were they likely to improve the electoral
prospects of the moderates42. Trevaskis admitted the concessions were limited, but he
seemed to believe the fact that they would be made before an election meant they would
be accepted since "opinion generally only expects concessions after elections"43.
Sandys claimed that he did take these views into account and sought Cabinet approval
for various concessions. These included the appointment of a local personality to be
appointed 'Wali' or Governor to perform ceremonial functions, the Chief Minister to
become Premier and preside over a Cabinet and the Aden Government to get full
legislative and executive powers over State subjects and the power to amend the
Constitution44. These were the minimum Sandys felt necessary to offer the moderates
assistance in winning the elections, but Trevaskis still disagreed with the policy. The
High Commissioner again stated independence within the Federation was essential for
British interests as the consequence of continuing British sovereignty being a
deteriorating situation which would cause friction with the rulers45. The importance of
good relations with the Federal Ministers was because of the often-repeated need for
local goodwill and "the friendship of the Federation" in order to maintain the British
presence46. Trevaskis suggested offering the Adeni representatives at the forthcoming
conference independence within the Federation to be granted after elections and have
42 PRO CO 1055/131/271 - Martin to Trevaskis, 12 Jan. 1964
43 PRO CO 1055/131/273 - Trevaskis to Martin, 13 Jan. 1964
44 PRO CO 1055/131/286 - Martin to Trevaskis, 27 Jan. 1964
45 PRO CO 1055/131/291 - Trevaskis to Martin, 29 Jan. 1964
46 ibid.
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all political parties present. Trevaskis, however, was not listened to, and his advice
generally ignored as the Colonial Office proceeded with their own proposals.
Ultimately, the Secretary of State had to inform Trevaskis that independence within the
Federation was simply not possible at the time. The reason given was that it would
have been impossible to convince the UK public that the surrender of sovereignty was
not a weakness, and that was the priority as far as Sandys was concerned47. The
Colonial Office proposals were therefore the chosen policy that Sandys presented to the
• 40
Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy Committee in January 1964 . The proposals
had been reconsidered following the Khormaksar grenade attack, and the Secretary of
State was convinced of the need to make some concessions. Despite this, only a limited
form of constitutional advance would be offered and not the independence that the
Federal Ministers desired or the independence within the Federation that the Adeni
Ministers were expected to demand. The proposals were aimed to bring the
relationship ofAden to the UK and the Federation into line with the relationship of the
other federated states, without giving up British sovereignty, in other words ignoring
Trevaskis's views. The changes (see above) were to be introduced at the same time as
giving up the mandatory power of advice to the Federal Government in all matters other
than defence, external affairs and internal security.
There was considerable opposition within Whitehall to these proposals. The Treasury
were not happy to be committed to a general compensation scheme for British civil
servants in Aden, nor were they pleased about giving up the power ofmandatory advice
in the federation as it would remove the legal basis ofBritish financial control there49.
The High Commissioner remained unhappy at the proposals as, without independence
for Aden, Trevaskis felt the concessions went too far, a stance which lead to him being
called an '"all or nothing' man" by the Colonial Office50. Trevaskis was not alone in
his belief that Sandys' policy was not the best way forward for British interests in South
47 PRO CO 1055/131/293 - Secretary ofState to Trevaskis, 31 Jan. 1964
48 PRO CO 1055/131/284 - Defence and Overseas Policy Committee: Aden, Memorandum by the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Jan. 1964
49 PRO CO 1055/13 l/E/284 - Draft Note to the Secretary ofState, Jan. 1964
50 PRO CO 1055/131/307 - Note from Fisher to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 7 Feb. 1964
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Arabia, as Mountbatten, Chiefof the Defence Staff, stated his concerns about the
military implications ofpolicy in Aden51. He was afraid that the facilities the British
used would disappear unless a long lasting answer to the situation in the Colony was
found. Mountbatten also believed that independence within the Federation was the best
option as the only reliable friends that the British Government had were the Federal
rulers. Moreover, the move could have been represented internationally as a step
forward, and would, in his opinion, remove much of the point to the Nationalist
campaign. Mountbatten admitted that if the Federal rulers were overthrown then there
would be no sovereignty to fall back on. However, even if there was still sovereignty,
Britain would be in an untenable position as there would be no local goodwill.
The Colonial Office disputed this, since previously the Chiefs of Staff had stated that
the only secure tenure for the base was foil sovereignty, and also because it was
unlikely that the goodwill of the Adenis would be retained by putting them under the
^9
thumb of the Federal Rulers . However, the Secretary of State for Defence,
Thorneycroft, supported the Chiefs of Staff, preferring "a Malaysia rather than a
Singapore solution for Aden". This meant independence within the Federation, relying
on the rulers to maintain the British presence, since without the rulers sovereignty
would only be of theoretical value as there would be no goodwill .
Trevaskis put forward similar views in reiterating his proposals for constitutional
advance, since the British Government had only two possible courses of action to
follow5 . Firstly there was independence within the Federation, which meant the
Federal rulers could take responsibility for internal security, the Adeni moderates would
be encouraged, the surrender of sovereignty could be seen as a forward step and Aden
could be viewed as a force for progress in the Federation. However, once independence
was granted there would be nothing for the British Government to fall back on if the
Federal rulers "went sour" or were deposed. Moreover, even if British sovereignty still
51 PRO CO 1055/131/311A - Draft Minute byMountbatten to Minister ofDefence, 7/8 Feb. 1964 & PRO
DEFE 11/423/2452 - Minute from Chiefof the Defence Staff to Minister ofDefence, 12 Feb. 1964
52 PRO CO 1055/132/320 - Note from Formoy to Fisher, 12 Feb. 1964
5j PRO CO 1055/132/336 - Note from Minister ofDefence to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 18 Feb.
1964
54 PRO CO 1055/131/316 -Notes on Constitutional Development in Aden, 7 Feb. 1964
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existed then the base would probably be untenable. The second option was
constitutional advance short of independence, which would mean that if things went
wrong then Britain could still resume direct rule, and the Adeni moderates could claim
they were making progress. The problem with this option was that a hostile Nationalist
Government would campaign against the Federation, the British Government would
still be criticised for colonialism, and whilst British influence would be reduced,
Federal power would not be increased. Trevaskis still believed the first course of action
was preferable, but whatever policy was followed the status quo was not an option.
The combined opposition from the High Commissioner, the Ministry of Defence, and
also the Treasury, did force yet another re-think ofpolicy as Sandys came round to the
idea of granting Aden independence within the Federation. The basis of the new paper
submitted to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee was that the Colonial
Secretary accepted the argument that the Federal rulers were the British Government's
most reliable friends55. This was especially true as there was a real possibility that the
"extremists" would win the elections, which had to take place by 25th October.
Therefore, sovereignty was to be relinquished and Aden was to be made "a fully
autonomous State in the Federation". The reasons given were the same as those
Trevaskis had been advocating for the previous six months with the British
Government retaining responsibility for defence and external affairs, as well as the right
to withdraw from the Federation any part ofAden considered "desirable for defence
reasons". Whilst Sandys had finally accepted Trevaskis's proposals, the Colonial
Secretary was still wary of the changes being seen as withdrawal, and so the public
presentation of the new policy was to be minimised since any impression ofwithdrawal
"would make it more difficult to retain effective influence"56.
55 PRO CO 1055/132/350 - Aden: New Paperfor D.O.P.C., First Alternative Draft, 24 Feb. 1964
56 PRO CO 1055/132/367 - Telegram Secretary ofState for the Colonies to Acting High Commissioner, 3
March 1964
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Policy Re-thinks and the Grant ofIndependence
Future policy had, therefore, been decided, but the decisions had taken so long that
further re-thinks were made necessary as the situation within Aden and the Federation
began to change quite radically. The result was that the challenges facing the British
grew increasingly difficult to meet. Trevaskis informed Sandys of the "grave threat to
our position in Aden" in April 1964, only a few weeks after the constitutional changes
had been agreed upon57. The presence ofNasser's army in the Yemen posed a serious
potential threat meriting "urgent and extraordinary measures"58. These measures had
not been implemented despite the warnings of both Johnston and Trevaskis since
November 1962 which meant that "we are now confronted with the consequences of
our failure to act in time"59. Whilst the YAR "is a meaningless farce", propped up by
40,000 UAR troops with the Royalists still in control of large areas, that was not how
the Adeni public at large perceived the situation thanks to the propaganda coming from
'Saut al Arab' (Voice of the Arabs) on Cairo Radio, as well as Republican views from
Sana Radio. The threat from the YAR was creating low morale among "our friends",
the Federal rulers and the moderates, and Trevaskis warned that "we could only expect
to maintain our present position by resort to stern repressive measures undertaken
thoroughly and with determination", which was not possible given the political
consequences60. Therefore, the High Commissioner saw only two alternatives short of
disengagement and withdrawal - to either give the Federation immediate independence,
or to seek to come to terms with "our enemies"61.
Trevaskis's concern was mirrored by the Prime Minister who wanted,
"a well though out plan for the political advance and economic development of
Aden which would give us a reasonable chance of keeping, for some time yet,
the military facilities we need"62.





62 PRO DEFE 11/497/2980A - Prime Minister's Personal Minute, 5 May 1964
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Furthermore, Douglas-Home stated,
"I am not convinced that we are doing all that we might to secure the political
support of the inhabitants ofAden and the Federation. Their political advance
and economic development are essential, ifwe are to keep our hold on Aden"63.
The threat to British interests in South Arabia from the YAR was such that, for the first
time, the British Government considered asking the United Nations for observers along
the frontier and for help in reaching an agreement on demilitarisation and demarcation
of the border64. Moreover, further changes in future policy were being considered by
the time the conference on South Arabia was to open in June. It was no longer deemed
necessary to keep the brake on constitutional advance and to rely on the Federal rulers.
The Colonial Secretary by this point believed it would be safe, even necessary, to allow
the Federation (including Aden) to move towards independence since "everyone in
Aden and the Federation now recognises the need to retain the British base"65.
However, the Ministry ofDefence were still worried that the rulers would suggest they
should be given full independence as the best means of "riding the punches ofArab
nationalism" since "events in Yemen do not suggest that we ought to place very much
faith in their judgement"66. For this reason, the Ministry suggested that Thorneycroft
should not agree with the Colonial Secretary about future policy.
Independence was granted to the Federation at the conference in London, but it would
not take place until 1968, and there were no plans to withdraw from the base.
However, this actually did little to appease the Nationalists who were being encouraged
by the support ofNasser and the UAR in the Yemen to intensify their campaign. The
Ministry ofDefence were aware of the dangers coming from the Yemen, but warned
that,
"whilst swift and robust military action may well be effective in the short term,
no lasting solution can be expected from such action by itself. The most that
63 PRO DEFE 13/569/59 - Prime Minister's PersonalMinute to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 8
May 1964
64 PRO DEFE 11/498/3162 - UKMission to UnitedNations to Foreign Office, 16 May 1964
65 PRO DEFE 13/569/109 - Brieffor Secretary ofState for Defence for DOPC Meeting, 3 June 1964
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military action can achieve in the long term is to help to promote stable
f\1
conditions in which political and economic development can proceed" .
Moreover, the Secretary of State for Defence recommended countering the influence of
z:o
Nasser by "a sharp increase in 'deniable' support" for the Royalists . It was also
recommended that funds for road building and well digging (with full publicity) inside
the Federation should be granted69. The latter was approved by the Cabinet with an
additional £500,000 for development, £500,000 for increased political grants, £120,000
to meet the cost of local labour and material, and a £500,000 reserve fund to prevent
revolts70. The "deniable" support to the Royalists was more of a problem since, as the
Chiefs of Staff pointed out, the amount of aid necessary was £600,000, 11,000 rifles, 20
mortars with bombs, 20.5 machine guns for AA defence, 20 bazookas with bombs and
500 anti-tank mines, all ofwhich would last about three months and could not be kept
secret71. Trevaskis by this time, however, was not in favour of supporting the
Royalists, who he believed would have collapsed by the end of the year. Therefore, the
High Commissioner proposed that the British Government should come to terms with
Egypt by recognising the YAR, at the same time providing the rulers with arms and
money to regain the confidence of the tribes, and resorting to repressive action against
79
the PSP . The High Commissioner repeated that Britain was heading for certain
disaster in Aden, and that "this is the last warning I can give" because his previous
warnings about the threat from the Yemen and Egypt had gone unheeded for too long.
The grant of independence was the last policy announced by the Conservatives, as in
the October 1964 elections they were defeated by Harold Wilson's Labour Party. This
was generally greeted with dismay among the Federal rulers who thought that Labour
would appease the Nationalists and undermine their rule, but surprisingly little actually
changed in the immediate aftermath of the elections. The Conservative Government
67 PRO DEFE 11/499/3264 - Aden and the South Arabian Federation, Report by the Defence Planning
Staff, 26 June 1964
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had hesitated over future policy for South Arabia on several occasions, and the
reluctance ofDuncan Sandys to accept the views of either the Defence chiefs over
sovereign base areas, or Trevaskis over independence for Aden, meant that
opportunities to consolidate the British position in Aden were possibly lost. The
unwillingness to grant constitutional advance in the Colony undermined the position of
the moderates who were coming under pressure from the increasingly influential
Nationalist parties. Moreover, Sandys's inability to realise that sovereignty was useless
without local goodwill meant that the British Government kept to an increasingly
untenable and self-injuring position. A more flexible approach, one which would have
ceded sovereignty earlier and granted constitutional advance, might have undermined
the Nationalists appeal. Instead the refusal to listen to the British Government's
representatives who had personally experienced the situation in South Arabia, men such
as William Luce, Charles Johnston, and Kennedy Trevaskis, meant that the British were
in an increasingly unpopular position, and one which was proving difficult to defend.
Labour and Maintaining the Empire
Different Party, Same Policy?
The approach shown by Labour in their first twelve months in power was not markedly
different to that of the Conservatives, as regards maintaining the remnants of the
empire. Wilson still aimed for Britain to play a world role, despite the increasing
domestic financial and economic difficulties, and as such there were no immediate
moves towards relinquishing the few remaining colonies and overseas territories.
However, there probably was a slightly more realistic approach to Britain's overseas
role, in particular by certain Cabinet ministers, such as Richard Crossman, who wanted
to cut the British Government's commitments. As regards Aden and the Federation, the
situation was growing more difficult by the day as the Nationalists' assault on
'imperialism' and 'colonialism' was increasing in popularity, and the more violent
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campaigns of the NLF were beginning to show signs of success. The Labour
Government's attitude to the problems was to attempt a more inclusive form of debate
about the future of South Arabia, and attempts were made to involve certain Nationalist
groups in the talks. However, by then it was probably too late as Nationalist rivalry
was causing different groups to grow increasingly extreme in their methods, and
anybody seen as 'collaborating' with the British was threatened with execution.
The problem facing the British was that, with independence due within approximately
four years, the Federation was in no state to either govern or defend itself as it had been
reliant on British advice, aid and military support since its creation in 1959. The
Federal forces were in need of expansion and improvement if they were to be able to
defend an independent state without British military aid. The Geraghty and Penfold
reports were commissioned to achieve this aim, but the problem was financing such a
move. The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommended that the Secretaries of State for
Defence and Colonies allied "in a joint assault on the Treasury" to get the necessary
expenditure . The Colonial Secretary, Anthony Greenwood, did write to the Treasury,
pointing out the improvements in organisation, equipment and pay that were necessary
to sustain the Federation. Moreover, he warned that whilst the British Army could
contain the military situation,
"at a pinch (and at great expense)... but by themselves they can no more prepare
the way for peaceful Independence than could the Belgian army in the Congo or
the French army in Algeria"74.
This line was supported by the new Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, as the attempt
was made to pressure the Treasury into giving the necessary funds75.
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75 PRO DEFE 11/523/3714 - Secretary ofState for Defence to the Treasury, 18 Dec. 1964
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The Threat to the Protectorate
The threat to the British position in South Arabia had been underlined by successive
Governors and High Commissioners, and generally ignored or the reaction had been too
late. Once more, the British Government was warned of the urgent need to act quickly
if their chosen successors, the Federal rulers, were to survive independence. The
Western Aden Protectorate Security Committee followed up their 1962 paper on "The
Nature of the Threat to the Western Aden protectorate and the Steps Needed to Deal
with it" with another paper on "The Situation in the Federation of South Arabia on 1
7f\ « > • >
January 1965" . The report opened with the implied criticism that,
"Although it is not possible to assess the effect of the Committee's
recommendations to deal with the threat, because they have so far only been
implemented in part, and then only comparatively recently, there can be no
doubt that the Committee's estimate of the threat to the Protectorate has been
• 77
proved by events during the past 2 years to have been extremely accurate" .
The main threat, according to the Committee was Egypt, which had two targets since,
"if the Federation as such can be destroyed our position in Aden will become
untenable; alternatively, our premature withdrawal from Aden would ensure the
70
collapse of the Federation" .
The former was viewed as Egypt's more likely aim rather than direct action against
Aden. The UAR had five possible courses to achieve the destruction of the Federation:
subverting the existing authority in the Federation, with some rulers already "looking
over their shoulders"; undermining the position of the rulers by exploiting family/tribal
rivalries; undermining the Federal Government's authority, including the establishment
of a "liberation army" (as foreseen in the 1962 paper); subverting individuals within
the Federal Forces, as there was already concern over the morale of the troops; and
establishing a "Government in Exile" by using notable Protectorate defectors to provide
76 PRO DEFE 11/595/3818 - The Situation in the Federation ofSouth Arabia on 1 January 1965, Paper




an air of "respectability" to the National Liberation Front (NLF). There was evidence,
according to the Committee, that all five options were being pursued concurrently, in
addition to direct pressure on the British presence through "terrorist and propaganda
activity designed to upset Adeni/British relations and to undermine our will to
remain"79. Moreover, the 1962 report had emphasised the inability of the Federal
Forces to deal effectively with more than one of the following three threats: overt
aggression by Yemeni forces; the employment of a "Liberation Army"; tribal
disaffection. To counter this, the Committee recommended increased air support,
strengthening of the Federal Regular Army and Federal Guard, and the provision of
additional vehicles, but apart from additional air support, none of these "palliatives"
had been implemented. At the same time, the FRA and FG had been faced with two of
the three situations envisaged by the 1962 paper, the sole exception being overt Yemeni
aggressions, and had done so without the recommended increases. The British needed
to find extra resources to enable the enlargement of the Federal Forces and improve the
conditions since the large scale use ofBritish troops was unsatisfactory on political and
economic grounds:
"The Arab argument is that if there were no British in Aden there would be no
reason for aggression from Egypt, and if the British insist on remaining in
Arabia for their own economic and strategic reasons, then they have an
OA
obligation to protect the Federation from the consequences" .
Once again, the Committee made certain recommendations to deal with the threat, since
there were two factors in Britain's favour: the fear ofEgyptian domination, which was
becoming clear among both Royalists and Republicans in the north, and should be
made clear to inhabitants of the Federation; and the economic value of the base, which
was vital to the economy of South West Arabia. In 1962, the Committee had
recommended making "a reality of the Federation", through measures such as:
changing the nature of the British relationship with the Federation; expanding the
Federal forces; constructing a macadamised road system; introducing a Federal




Instead "only halfmeasures have been taken to implement the previous committee's
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recommendations and then only after considerable delay" . All these actions were still
necessary, and in addition there was a need to: convince the Federal rulers that the
British Government intended to stay in Aden, at least until the Federation was a viable,
independent state; urgently complete the Aden-Mudia section of the Aden-Beihan
trunk road; increase the sums available for economic development; train a small corps
of administrators to become liaison officers between the States and central
Government; and review the financial control by the Colonial Office and the Treasury
so that Federal Ministers could develop a more responsible attitude to the expenditure
of resources. Furthermore, there was an "extreme urgency" to establish a high powered
transmitter for propaganda purposes in order to expose "Egypt's intentions". The final
recommendations were: to undertake "offensive action over the border against the
Yemeni tribes"; and to reorganise and expand the Federal Forces to make them more
mobile and effective. The report concluded somewhat pessimistically,
"The fact that the retention of our position in SW Arabia is the result as much of
the failures of our enemies as of our own measures to counter the situation gives
little cause for congratulation. More positive measures on the lines
recommended must be taken as a matter of urgency ifwe are to ensure that the
Federation is to be capable ofwithstanding the pressures from Egypt which will
• 89
undoubtedly continue and indeed increase" .
Similar warnings and recommendations came from the Chiefs of the Defence Staff.
They, together with the Commander-in-ChiefMiddle East and the High Commissioner,
considered that,
"we shall need a military base in Aden for a period ofmany years and that, in
order to allay uncertainty, we should affirm loud and clear our intention to
remain. Our military presence is vital, but not enough"83.
In order to maintain the base, which was necessary to support the British Government's
declared policy ofmaintaining peace and promoting progress east of Suez, the Chiefs of
81 ibid.
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Staff and High Commissioner set out some remedial measures. Firstly a programme of
social development was needed to benefit the Federation Arabs. Secondly, support for
the rulers had to be enlarged to stop them going over to Nasser. Finally, the High
Commissioner estimated £20 million was necessary over three or four years to invest in
civil affairs, such as road building and water supplies. The recommendation by the
WAP Security Committee on propaganda was supported by D.J. McCarthy, the
Political Officer for Middle East Command (POMEC), who stated that the South
Arabian Broadcasting Service could not compete with Cairo and Sana Radios and
• • • • 04
should be allowed "the occasional descent into something more Arab in character" .
Labour's Response to the Threat
The new Colonial Secretary, Anthony Greenwood, had visited the Colony shortly after
assuming office, in order to gauge for himself the nature of the situation. On his return
he announced that the Federal States would be fused into a unitary state, which was
approved by the Aden Legislative Council (12 December), and called for a conference,
Of
t
including al Asnag, in London in March 1965 . However, by this time, the NLF had
extended their campaign to Aden, as well as the Protectorate, and in February issued
warnings that they would kill anybody attending the conference86. This was one of the
factors behind the conference being postponed, but there were also problems over the
parties disagreeing over the purpose of the conference and the representation of the
assorted political bodies invited87. There was also hesitation within Whitehall to the
idea of a unitary state without the support of the Federal rulers, from the Ministry of
00
Defence, who felt it would cause disruption .
There were continued attempts by the British Government to improve the situation in
South Arabia, but they generally failed. Partly this was due to the increasingly difficult
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situation within both Aden and the Protectorate created by the NLF's campaign, as well
as the campaigns of other Nationalist groups. The actions of these groups had eroded
the morale of the Federal rulers and the Federal forces, as well as seriously hampered
the ability of the British forces to provide security for the base. However, there was
also an unwillingness to permit the Armed Forces to use force at times, much to the
disgust of the Defence chiefs who wanted the Government to "show a strong hand in
Aden" to discredit the Aden Government which had become openly hostile to Britain,
• on .
and also to boost the morale of the Federal security forces . Ultimately, the internal
security situation in Aden deteriorated to such a point that the Constitution had to be
suspended by the High Commissioner (Richard Turnbull, who had taken over from
Trevaskis the previous December) and a State ofEmergency was declared on 25th
September90.
The State ofEmergency lasted until November 1967 (see below) when the British
withdrew from Aden. From September 1965 onwards, British policy in South Arabia
concentrated on finding a successor to take over the reins of power when independence
came. Preferably, in the minds of the British, this successor government was to be
based on the Federal Ministers, but increasingly such a situation mattered less and less.
By the end of 1965 the decision to withdraw had been taken, and the question ofwho
ruled South Arabia was gradually taken out ofBritish hands. The Nationalists, in
particular the NLF, came to dominate the political scene, and the prime aim ofBritish
policy by 1967 was to ensure a safe withdrawal. It is probable that by the time Labour
came to power, it was already too late to ensure the survival of the Federation. Drastic
measures, such as permitting cross-border retaliation against Yemeni/UAR incursions
(which may well have been occurring anyway), might have dented the Nationalists
campaign and bolstered the Federal rulers for a time. However, the political scene in
both Aden and the Federation had been steadily undermined by the successes of the
NLF, the PSP and other groups whose popularity continued to grow.
89 PRO DEFE 11/598/4298 - A Review ofthe Situation in South Arabia, A Note by the Army
Department, 8 June 1965




The British refusal to withdraw from Aden was dominated by the view that the base
was vital to British overseas commitments, which neither the Conservatives nor Labour
at first were willing to cut. Even ifAden was not necessary for the defence of British
interests in the Gulf, which the Defence Chiefs had underlined repeatedly as being the
case, then to withdraw from Aden would be seen as a surrender to Nasserism and
weaken the British Government's position elsewhere in the Middle East91. Therefore,
whilst the British Government was determined to maintain an overseas role, the east of
Suez policy, then Aden was vital to its interests and control there could not be
relinquished. However, the British were aware of the need to grant political
concessions to the Adenis in order to retain local goodwill. The intended beneficiaries
of these concessions were the 'moderate' Colony politicians, in particular Hasan 'Ali
Bayumi, the ChiefMinister, and generally regarded by the British as the most able of
the Adeni politicians. Bayumi, according to Luce and Johnston, was the best man to
promote British interests in the Colony, and also the Adeni politician most willing to
work with the Federal Ministers
The gradual grants of constitutional advance were, therefore, part of the policy to retain
control of the base. It was deemed necessary to make limited concessions in order to
give the moderate politicians a chance to undermine the Nationalists' campaigns.
However, the PSP/ATUC were a potent force in Adeni politics, albeit as an illegitimate
political group. They were able to amass enough support and cause enough trouble to
the Aden Government to ensure the moderates had to adopt increasinglyNationalist
stances in order to retain any support themselves. The first national government in
Aden was formed following the merger with the Federation, and was led by Bayumi as
91 PRO CO 1055/61/1 - Letterfrom William Luce, Political Resident in the Gulf, to Sir Roger Stevens
(FO), 17 Jan. 1963
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ChiefMinister, with the majority of the Ministers coming from his UNP group .
Fortunately for the British and the new Aden Government, the merger was quietly
received, partly because the main figure of the ATUC/PSP, Abdullah al Asnag was in
prison and so unable to co-ordinate his group's activities. Even so, the PSP was
strengthened by a further amalgamation of unions, the General and Port Workers'
Union, the Aden Port Trust Employees' Union and the Civil Aviation Employees'
Union into the Transport, General and Port Workers' Union, concentrating power in the
hands of the leading Adeni Nationalists.
Aden remained quiet, though, for as long as al Asnag was in jail, permitting the Aden
Legislative Council to carry out its work unimpeded for a time. There was still an
Opposition within the Legislative Council, however, and it attempted to have elections
called before the end of the year, a motion which was defeated . This showed, though,
that, even among the moderates, the British were not going to easily get their way,
especially with the revision of the franchise and the question of the timing of elections
dominating political circles. Even so, with the support ofBayumi, the British
Government always had a reasonable chance of success. However, this chance of
success was struck a serious blow in April 1963 when the ChiefMinister suffered a
heart attack94. Although he continued to play a small role in Adeni politics for another
few months, Bayumi died on 24th June 196395. This was damaging to British hopes, as
their policy in Aden politics was centred on Bayumi to a great extent. From his death
on the British were left to rely on a succession ofpoliticians who were unable to
command the support Bayumi had in the Legislative Council.
Baharun 's Attempts to Stay in Power
The new ChiefMinister was Sayyid Zain 'Abdu Baharun, who had been Minister of
Finance under Bayumi, but was not a member of the UNP, or indeed of any party,
92 PRO CO 1055/62/2 - Resume ofAden Intelligence Summary No. 1, Jan. 1963
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which would later undermine his position. Initially, however, Baharun's appointment
in July 1963 was generally well received96. His endeavours to form an all-party
committee to study revision of the franchise met with some success, attracting 7
members - including one from the PSP who had to be referred to as independent as the
PSP were both an illegal organisation and unwilling to be openly represented. This
limited success increased when the PSP/ATUC nominated seven members to sit on the
07
Joint Advisory Council for Labour Affairs . This could have been an important step
towards integrating the Adeni Nationalists into the mainstream, although ultimately
nothing really came of it. However, the problem facing both the British and the
moderate politicians was that the PSP was looking increasingly likely to win the
elections which had to take place once the franchise had been revised. The moderate
parties (UNP, PCC) wanted the British to delay the elections until after independence
had been granted, whereas the PSP wanted the elections first so that independence
• QR • • •
could be on their terms . According to Trevaskis, the elections would be dominated by
the PSP, which was why he advocated granting Aden independence within the
Federation so that the Federal rulers could control a Nationalist Government in Aden99.
The Federal rulers, however, did not support Baharun and wanted him replaced by the
UNP member, Federal Minister and editor of 'A1 Yaqdha': Muhammad 'Umar
Girgirah. Baharun's main problem was his lack of support from any party or
organisation, and so he had to cast himself as "a conciliatory neutral leader", trying to
sink political differences and unite all the parties under his leadership in a "National
Front" 10°. The ChiefMinister believed that Aden should be a one party state, but to
achieve this he needed the elections postponed. Furthermore, Baharun wanted Aden to
become independent within the Federation, and his own appointment as executive
President of Aden State with the dissolution of the Legislative Council and the
replacement of its members by his own nominees. Trevaskis admitted that Baharun had
had some success in achieving co-operation from among the different political groups
96 PRO CO 1055/62/6 - Resume ofAden Intelligence Summary No. 7, July 1963
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in Aden, including establishing a good relationship with the PSP, cultivating the PCC
leaders and some independents, as well as being close to the SAL (ofwhich he was
once a member). However, to achieve all this he had to make, in Trevaskis's view,
considerable concessions, including lifting the ban on a number ofEgyptian
newspapers, appointing Ali Salem Ali (an unofficial PSP member) as Minister for
Labour, opposing any resort to repressive measures in Aden, and calling for the return
of the exiled SAL leaders. As regards the UNP and the Federal Ministers, Baharun
looked to the British "to bring them into line" and avoided conflict with them himself.
Overall, Trevaskis thought Baharun would have to be "four faced" to maintain his
position posing as: a moderate conciliatory leader to the British Government: a
discreet Nationalist to the PSP/SAL; a moderate who would win concessions from the
British to the PCC and others; and as an honest and dedicated leader who stood above
party politics to the public101. However, the High Commissioner found it difficult to
believe the ChiefMinister could continue to be successful at maintaining all four faces
and at some point he would have to choose between Left and Right. Therefore, the
British Government should give him what he wanted to avoid the prospect of Baharun
going over to the Left and embarrassing the British position.
Baharun's position was crumbling, however, as the UNP turned against him over the
misuse of the power ofpatronage, and the ChiefMinister was having to rely on Ali
109
Salem and the PSP to retain power . The alternatives open to the British were not
much better, though, since Girgirah was not as popular as Basendwah in Aden,
although he had the support of the Federation. The other main option was Khodabux-
Khan, who was little more than a compromise candidate, and Trevaskis believed it was
better not to rock the boat by dismissing the ChiefMinister anyway103. Baharun
continued to come under attack in the Legislative Council during the first half of 1964,
but was helped by the disunity among the UNP, and also the common desire to resist
Federal intervention in Aden among all the Ministers. The UNP split was partly
fostered by the ChiefMinister out of rivalry with Girgirah, but also by the personal and
101 ibid.
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political ambitions of the party's members as they manoeuvred for Ministerial
vacancies104. The resentment at Federal intervention was not enough, however, to stop
ten members of the Legislative Council from signing a letter ofno confidence in the
ChiefMinister in February 1964 as Baharun's support began to disappear105.
Part of the problem was the State ofEmergency which had been declared following the
grenade incident at Khormaksar airport on 10 December 1963. This had been the first
violent act by the Nationalists within Aden, who had previously relied on strikes and
demonstrations, and saw a revival of activity by the PSP/ATUC. The Nationalists'
leaders were placed under detention following the attack, but the "less dangerous
detainees" were released in an attempt to reduce the pressure on the ChiefMinister106.
This failed since the Aden Ministers all resented the Federation's declaration of the
State ofEmergency without consultation107. Furthermore, the concessions were seen as
Britain succumbing to pressure which helped to encourage the opposition. Relations
between the Aden Ministers and the Federation continued to deteriorate, and this gave
Baharun the chance to revive his position since,
"Anti-Federation feeling is, of course, immensely strong in Aden and no doubt
Baharun is warmly applauded in Aden circles when he is critical of fellow
Federal Ministers"108.
The ChiefMinister, however, was still in a precarious situation, despite the continuing
internal splits in the UNP, partly due to his own vacillations as he came under pressure
over the State ofEmergency. Trevaskis believed that Baharun would ask for
concessions to take the sting out of the Opposition attacks, such as ending the State of
Emergency and getting constitutional reforms109. Instead, the ChiefMinister tendered
his resignation on 11th April, which he then withdrew four days later. Baharun still
complained, though, that the British Government's proposed constitutional reforms
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(which were still being debated between Trevaskis and Sandys) were too little, too
late110. Baharun continued as ChiefMinister, and there was some respite with the
London conference granting Aden independence within the Federation, which he
supported, and was generally well received in the Colony. However, Adeni politics
grew more heated after the London conference as the elections approached, with the
main question being PSP participation.
Baharun met with both al Asnag and Jiffi (the SAL leader) in Cairo in August 1964,
and both proposed a coalition government, which the ChiefMinister supported as he
was anxious to get Nationalist co-operation to help stabilise Aden111. However, the
PSP was under Egyptian pressure, and eventually boycotted the elections on a party
• 119
basis, although individual members did stand as independents . The boycott, unlike
those in 1955 and 1959, largely failed as there was a 70-75% turnout in the October
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elections . Another boost to the British was that the majority of those elected were
'moderates' and Baharun was able to form another Government. The "one fly in the
ointment", though, was the election ofKhalifa Abdullah Hasan Khalifa, with the most
votes of any candidate, the man in prison for the grenade attack at Khormaksar the
previous December114. Fifteen of the sixteen candidates elected campaigned for
Khalifa's release, which Greenwood sanctioned, despite the Federal Ministers'
opposition, and the issue was yet another bone of contention between Aden and the
Federation.
The elections initially appeared to be a victory for the 'moderates' , especially as
Baharun was able to from a new State Government on October 30th115. Most of those
elected were either previous members of the Legislative Council, or gave the
impression that they were of similar political persuasions. However, the PSP, despite
officially boycotting the voting, still gave covert support to certain candidates, not least
Khalifa, who would be expected to support their aims within the Legislative Council.
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Moreover, even the 'moderates' were coming under more and more pressure from the
Nationalists to contest British policy, and were having to take up more 'radical' stances
to ensure support. The situation, despite Trevaskis's first impressions after the
elections, had not really been improved for the British Government and its interests in
South Arabia. In fact, in under a year, Britain was faced with an openly hostile Aden
Government, and was forced to suspend the Constitution in order to retain control in an
increasingly volatile situation.
Maqawi and the Suspension ofthe Constitution
By the end of 1964 the more violent tactics of the NLF were being used in Aden as their
urban campaign got underway, creating an increasingly dangerous security situation
within the Colony. The British, in response, intensified their use of force and in
February 1965 asked the Federal Supreme Council to introduce extra emergency
regulations, a move which was blocked by the Aden Members of the Council.
According to the new High Commissioner, Richard Turnbull, this move was intended
to provoke the Federation into declaring another State ofEmergency, thereby further
discrediting it and the British Government116. The Nationalist campaign, and in
particular the NLF, was succeeding in its aim to undermine the Aden Government,
resulting in the resignation of the Baharun Government just four months after it took
office117. Following this, Greenwood suggested to Turnbull that al Asnag should be
brought into a National Government, a move which the High Commissioner
opposed118. He was similarly opposed to the eventual ChiefMinister, Maqawi, whose
government was sworn in on 7th March and Turnbull's opinion of the new Ministers
was not complimentary: "I fear they are a pretty poor lot"119. The British Intelligence
view of the new Government was that it was "anti-British and anti-Federal", which did
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not bode well for the future .
116 PRO DEFE 11/595/3820 - Turnbull to Marnham (CO), 3 Feb. 1965
117 PRO CO 1055/63/36 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Feb. 1965
118 PRO DEFE 11/596/3899 - Record ofTeleprinter discussion between Secretary ofState and Turnbull,
2 March 1965
119 PRO DEFE 11/569/3913 - Turnbull to Colonial Office, 8 March 1965
120 PRO CO 1055/63/42 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, March 1965
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This view was, to a certain extent, supported by the actions ofMaqawi, who in April
called for the lifting of the State ofEmergency, the release of all detainees and the
• • *191
return ofpolitical exiles with implementation of the December 1963 UN Resolutions .
The Federal Ministers were dismayed by these actions, but the move was favourably
received by the Aden Legislative Council, the PSP, the SAL and, according to British
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Intelligence, "most political and labour extremists" . Maqawi did modify his
demands to just negotiations over the future use of the base and a UN presence during
elections. However, it was increasingly apparent that the new ChiefMinister was not
going to make life easy for the British, as he denounced the Constitutional Commission
which the British Government had proposed to examine the question ofpolitical reform
in South Arabia. The open opposition of the Aden Government to the British was
having a widespread effect on the civilian and military population in the Colony,
lowering morale, which was already seriously damaged by the actions of the NLF.
New Emergency Regulations were introduced in June, and aroused the expected
denouncements from Maqawi and the Nationalists, although the reaction among the
1 90
public and press was comparatively mild . Worse was to follow, however, as the
Constitutional Commission was abandoned after the obstructive tactics ofMaqawi's
Government, although the proposal for a Constitutional Conference in London was
accepted124. However, at the working party to arrange the Conference, Maqawi and al
Asnag again employed wrecking tactics, which the British believed was probably on
• • • 19 S
Egyptian instructions . The Conference was called off, although this was more due to
NLF threats against any participants than by Maqawi's obstructions. Even so, the Chief
Minister was not popular among British defence chiefs and policy-makers, with the
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, stating that "the first urgent step is to get rid of
MacKawee (sic) and his thoroughly useless and dishonest bunch ofMinisters by
• • 19 f\
suspending the Constitution" . This was the action that the British did resort to on
121 PRO CO 1055/63/43 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, April 1965
122 ibid.
12j PRO CO 1055/63/46 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, June 1965
124 PRO CO 1055/63/49 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, July 1965
125 PRO CO 1055/63/51 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Aug. & Sep. 1965
126 PRO DEFE 11/599/4625 - CinC ME to MoD UK, 21 Sep. 1965
186
25th September, blaming the Aden Ministers, in particular Maqawi for their support for
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the NLF and refusal to condemn "terrorism" .
Perhaps surprisingly, Maqawi's reaction was not one of anger, in fact, Turnbull
reported that,
"Far from being indignant or dejected they (Maqawi and his Ministers) were
clearly relieved and happy to be quit of their responsibilities. They undoubtedly
felt they had got themselves out on to a limb from which they could not return
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without endangering their lives" .
From a British point of view, the suspension of the Constitution was a positive step as
Aden got quieter, and the police estimated that about 70% of the population were
• 19Q
relieved whilst Arab officials were being co-operative . However, this was only a
lull, and there was no real let-up in the NLF campaign against the British (and other
Nationalists). Moreover, the British had at that time only announced independence for
the Federation. There was no withdrawal planned as yet, and so the British
Government still needed some form of government to work with in the Colony.
However, this became increasingly unlikely as NLF pressure, and success, left few
politicians willing to be seen co-operating with the British, who still needed Aden,
albeit preferably under Federal control. This latter policy, though, was looking less and
less possible to achieve, not only due to the Adeni politicians, but also because of the
reluctance of the Federal rulers to accept political reform.
127 PRO DEFE 11/599/4652 - Colonial Office to Turnbull, 24 Sep. 1965
128 PRO DEFE 11/600/4673 - Turnbull to CO, 25 Sep. 1965
129 PRO DEFE 11/600/4696 - POMEC (Aden) to FO, 29 Sep. 1965
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Federal Politics
Federal Problems and Weaknesses
The main problem facing the Federation following the accession of Aden into the
institution was the effect of the Yemeni revolution on the tribes of the Protectorate.
Initially the tribesmen returned from the YAR disillusioned and there were no
indications ofYemeni or Egyptian attempts to organise them into a force for dissident
activity130. The only overt aggression against the Federation at first were violations of
airspace by UAR/YAR aircraft as they attempted to take the Royalist-controlled town
ofHarib on the Yemeni side of the border across from Beihan. This area remained the
key point of the Republican-Royalist struggle in the south of the Yemen, and was also
the focus for Yemeni incursions across the frontier for most of 1963. However, there
was also the problem of subversion within the Federation by Egypt/Yemen-backed
forces, which was to become of great concern towards the end of the year as the NLF
started its campaign. Before then, though, the number of incidents were minor and,
with the exception of Beihan, the frontier remained quiet.
On 14th October 1963, the South Yemeni Revolution was proclaimed by the recently
formed NLF in the Radfan mountains, an area which had long been outside of the
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control of either British or Federal influence . The Radfan would prove to be an
embarrassment to both the British and the Federation as successive attempts to bring
the dissidents under control and regain the use of the Aden-Dhala road were thwarted
by well-organised groups of tribesmen under the banner of the NLF (see below).
Whilst the Radfan unrest can be seen as yet another outburst of tribal discontent it was
used by the NLF to instigate their 'national revolution'. Whatever the motives (tribal
discontent or NLF revolution) for the Radfan revolt, it was the start of four years of
continual conflict in the Protectorate which played a large part in undermining the
130 PRO CO 1055/62 - op. cit.
131
Strictly speaking, the Radfan revolt was yet another outburst of tribal dissidence and was only later
adopted by the NLF as the start of the 'South Yemeni Revolution'. NLF propaganda was very effective
at claiming tribal revolts as part of their campaign against the Federation and the British.
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Federation and possibly forcing the British to withdraw. The trouble spread from the
Radfan to other areas as the NLF opened up other fronts in the Protectorate, and the
dissidents were effective not only against the Federal forces, but also against British
troops as well, including the SAS. The NLF's campaign in the Protectorate, although
the only real success was in the Radfan, highlighted the weaknesses of the Federation
militarily, and showed how much support (military, financial and political) the Federal
rulers needed if they were to survive.
The Radfan was not the Federation's only problems, however, since there was also the
question of the relationship with the Adeni Ministers which had deteriorated markedly
with the death ofBayumi and the appointment of Baharun. Bayumi had been the main
supporter of the merger, and with his passing the doubts and divisions among the Adeni
politicians re-surfaced, with Baharun trying to appease different groups at different
times. The deteriorating security situation within Aden was also a factor as the Federal
rulers felt that neither the British nor the Aden Legislative Council were doing enough
to stop the Nationalists. The Federal Ministers were particularly alarmed by the
Khormaksar grenade attack and wanted drastic action taken against the Nationalists.
Their desire for revenge, however, was frustrated by British Parliamentary
"interference" and they were, "irked by the necessity to establish legal evidence to
support charges against those believed to be responsible for throwing the hand
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grenade" . However, their own actions did little to improve relations with the Adeni
Ministers, such as imposing the State ofEmergency without consultation and opposing
the release of detainees, which added to Adeni resentment at Federal intervention133.
A large part of the problem, though, was lack of funds for the Federation to establish its
authority and introduce development projects to make a favourable impression on
public opinion134. The result of this was that,
132 PRO CO 1055/131/266 - op. cit.
133 ibid.
134 PRO CO 1055/131/305A - op. cit.
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"the Federal Government has failed to prove itself either effective or beneficial
and has been severely criticised in these respects both in the Federal Council
1 3S
and the local press" .
Moreover, the reluctance by the British Government to take retaliatory action against
the Nationalists was undermining the relationship between the Federation and Britain, a
relationship which was vital to the interests of both parties. The Federal rulers were
effectively the British Government's last allies in South Arabian politics after the death
ofBayumi, and were necessary ifBritain wanted to keep control ofAden even after
independence. From the Federal point of view, British military and financial support
was the main reason why the Federation had not already disintegrated back into rival
states. Furthermore defeat by the Nationalists was a distinct possibility without British
support since the Federal forces were incapable of defending the Protectorate from
external attack without the support of the British. Admittedly, within the Federation the
only British Army troops on active service were in the Radfan/Dhala region and the
FRA coped reasonably well with outbursts of dissidence. However, internal dissidence
combined with an external assault could well have proved more than the Federal
security forces were able to deal with. The uncertain friendship was further tested by
the Yemeni air attack on Beihan in March 1964, an action which demanded instant
retaliation from the rulers' point of view, but an issue which again divided opinion in
1 ^6
London and Aden .
The Question ofRetaliatory Action
The issue in London was not the undermining of the Federation, but the wider
international consequences of a retaliatory attack by British forces against Republican
positions within Yemen. The Foreign Office told the defence chiefs that they were not
even certain that the Yemeni attack was deliberate whilst by the time the Chiefs of Staff
met, they decided it was too late to retaliate for that attack, but that British forces
1 37
should be prepared to do so in case of future attacks . This brought forth an indignant
135 ibid.
136 PRO DEFE 11/424/2545-7 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 13 March 1964
137 PRO DEFE 11/424/2558 - Chiefs ofDefence StaffMeeting, 17 March 1964
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response from Trevaskis, who had already criticised British policy on several occasions,
and was unimpressed by arguments involving the wider implications. The High
Commissioner informed the Colonial Secretary that the Assistant Adviser in Beihan
had warned that "tribal leaders now generally believe that we are powerless to do
anything" and if the British Government once more fail to act then there was a risk of
1 TR
tribal defection followed by an internal security problem in a traditionally stable area .
When Sandys informed Trevaskis that Cabinet Ministers were opposed to a retaliatory
attack, the High Commissioner replied that the Government
"should be made fully aware that the action which they have decided to take will
in no degree impress the Federal Rulers or the tribes on whose support they
depend ... should we fail to take the only effective course open to us ... we must
expect not only protests and accusations at our failure to honour our Treaty
obligations but also a general and widespread loss of confidence in the British
connection"139.
Moreover, this had been the third air attack against Beihan since the Yemeni revolution,
and there was already an undermining of confidence among the Federal rulers.
Trevaskis believed there was a need to hit the Egyptians harder than they were hitting
the British and their allies in South Arabia and he was not interested in the view that
retaliation could have undermined British interests elsewhere140. There was ultimately
a volte face by the British Government, two weeks after the initial attack, and a
retaliatory air strike against Harib fort was approved141. This, in turn, "greatly
heartened" the Federal rulers142. Other reactions were not as favourable, however, as
the Arab League complained, the Yemen called for a UN Security Council meeting and
the US was not impressed143. From a narrow, and local, perspective, though, the strike
did boost the British position among the Federal rulers.
138 PRO DEFE 11/424/2566 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 18 March 1964
139 PRO DEFE 11/424/2586 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 19 March 1964
140 PRO DEFE 11/424/2601 - Martin to Trevaskis, 20 March 1964 & /2602-3, /2610 - Trevaskis to
Colonial Office, 20-21 March 1964
141 PRO DEFE 11/425/2649 - Secretary ofState for the Colonies to Trevaskis, 27 March 1964
142 PRO DEFE 11/425/2694 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 30 March 1964
143 PRO DEFE 11/425/2713 - Minute from Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister, 1 April 1964
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The British retaliation against Nationalist subversion within the Federation, though, was
not successful. The Aden-Dhala Road was not secure for travelling and there was a
likelihood that by Spring 1964 other Nationalist fronts were about to be opened
elsewhere in the Protectorate. These included the possible return ofMohammad Aidrus
and the Ahl Abu Bakr bin Farid to the Federation. Trevaskis, in a letter to Sir Charles
Harington, compared the unrest to that of 1954-58, and concluded that the damage
could be far worse since the UAR was able to supply far better equipment than the
Tmam had been able to in the 1950s144. Moreover, tribal revolts sponsored by Nasser
and in the name ofArab Nationalism were much more menacing "than those which
were staged by so grotesque and disreputable a figure as the Imam Ahmad in the name
of union with a notoriously backward Yemen"145. The problem was that conventional
techniques failed because "the rebels can hit us and when they please and we can
seldom find them to hit"146. In order to counter rebel tactics, therefore, Trevaskis
recommended air proscription to pressure the rebels by attacking livestock and making
it impossible for a tribal group to carry on living and working in a normal fashion. The
High Commissioner admitted that,
"Air proscription, it is true, has the political disadvantage that its employment
gives us a bad Press and earns us international criticism if or when news of it
leaks out. The alternative is to let rebellion spread with all the damaging and
possibly disastrous consequences which that would entail"147.
This was a valid point given that Trevaskis's prime concern was to retain British
control of South Arabia. However, policy-makers in Whitehall also had to take into
account the High Commissioner's own misgivings about the wider ramifications of air
proscription.
144 PRO DEFE 11/522/2797A - Copy ofSecret and Personal Letter dated 5th April to Lieut. General Sir





Pressure on the Federal Rulers
The disillusionment with British policy among the Federal rulers gave impetus to their
demand for independence and increased responsibility for the government of their own
1 4o #
territory . Trevaskis favoured this policy in order to give the Federation some
international recognition and the opportunity to act against its enemies without the fear
of external interference. Whilst the Federation continued to be dependent on British aid
for survival, then this would ensure the preservation of the British Government's
interests in the region149. The need to counter UAR/YAR subversion was imperative if
the Federation was to survive, but little was being done according to both the High
Commissioner and the Federal rulers. Moreover, there was plenty of opportunity to
exploit the opposition's weaknesses given the internal splits affecting the Nationalists
in Aden and the Protectorate (see below), but concern about international repercussions
limited British policy.
Eventually the Colonial Office did agree with Trevaskis's proposals to grant Aden
independence within the Federation and then to give South Arabia independence at a
later date. By June 1964, though, this may well have been too late as the Nationalist
campaign was successfully being extended. The pressure on the Federal rulers was
mounting, not only from the Nationalists, but also from the British who wanted political
reform within the Protectorate, which the rulers did agree to150. However, the threat of
a Nasser-backed Nationalist victory was enough to force the defection of the Fadhli
Sultan to Cairo at the London conference in June 1964. The danger of another security
threat, though, was lessened by the appointment of the Sultan's brother Nasir bin
Abdullah who had influence among the tribes'51. The same threat was probably also
the reason for the SharifofBeihan and the Audhali Sultan's worries about the
Federation "drifting towards eventual disaster" and considering contacting the SAL
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leaders to bring them onto the Federal side . Given that the SAL had become a Saudi-
148 PRO DEFE 11/522/2831 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 20 April 1964
149 PRO DEFE 11/522/2832 - op. cit.
150 PRO DEFE 11/498/3177 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 3 June 1964
151 PRO CO 1055/62/30 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, July 1964
152 PRO DEFE 11/499/3355 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 16 July 1964
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backed organisation by that point, and was nothing like as influential as it had been in
the 1950s, this would probably not have achieved much of significance. Nevertheless,
it was significant that some rulers were willing to work with their erstwhile opponents.
The situation continued to deteriorate throughout 1964 and 1965, with the repeated
warnings of the High Commissioner, the Federal rulers and the defence chiefs being
effectively ignored. The WAP Security Committee in its 1965 paper on the threat to
the Protectorate reminded the British Government of the necessity to make a political
reality of the Federation and to expand Federal forces in order to deal with the
worsening security situation. Above all, though, was the need to convince the rulers
1^
that Britain intended to remain in Aden at least until the Federation was viable .
However, little was done, and with the establishment of the Maqawi Government in
Aden things began to deteriorate even further. The Federal rulers were feeling
increasingly friendless and uncertain about the future, although a walk out by the Adeni
Federal Ministers at a meeting of the Council did enable the rulers to avoid debating the
implementation of the UN resolutions154. This was a minor respite, though, as the
rulers remained uncertain of the continuing support of the British Government and so
became less inclined to publicly support the British, which had an effect on the morale
of the Federal forces who relied on British aid155. The need was for positive steps such
as road building, well-digging, the strengthening of Federal forces, and economic
investment from the British. However, none were taken, which was only helping the
Nationalists in their campaign against increasingly disillusioned opponents.
The situation was not helped by another Yemeni air attack against Beihan in June 1965,
which Tumbull wanted to respond to with retaliatory action against the Republican fort
at Badiya, rather than simply refer the matter to the UN Security Council156. The
Federal rulers also wanted action, and the Supreme Council sent a letter to the Colonial
Office stating that, "It is felt that retaliation is essential if only because our tribes will
realise that we are weak unless they know that we have taken counter-action against the
153 PRO DEFE 11/595/3818 - op. cit.
154 PRO CO 1055/63/45 - op. cit.
155 PRO DEFE 11/598/4298 - op. cit.
156 PRO DEFE 11/598/4373 - Turnbull to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 29 June 1965
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aggressor"157. However, on this occasion, there was no retaliation as there were too
many objections, and Greenwood would only send a "suitable message" to the Supreme
1 •
Council . The Labour Government, like their predecessors, were accused by the
Supreme Council of destroying the Federation politically and undermining the authority
of the Federal Government159. The Federal accusations were true to a large extent as
the failure to successfully challenge the external Nationalist threat coming from the
Yemen was harming the Federation, which had insufficient forces to defend itself.
However, the British Government were not only afraid of international repercussions to
the use of force, but by late 1965 were beginning to consider a complete withdrawal
from Aden. Furthermore, the Labour Government were also in favour of a more
consensual approach to South Arabian politics, involving the Nationalists in any
progress towards a peaceful independence.
However, to the Federal rulers, this was no help, and they wanted action from Britain in
order to ensure their survival. Mohammad Farid (Federal Minister ofFinance) warned
the C-in-C that the Federal opinion ofBritain was that it was "neither tough enough nor
reliable enough to look after either their (Federal) defence or external affairs"160.
Moreover, "unless we showed resolution in dealing with that they [i.e. the Federal
Ministers] would lose all faith in us"161. The Federation was not in a position, however,
to threaten the British Government since the Government was the only thing that stood
between them and defeat at the hands of the Nationalists. Fortunately for the
Federation, the British were also still wanting to ensure its survival. Nevertheless, this
was not to be at any cost since the prime importance to the British Government for
overseas interests was to ensure that Aden "was comfortably bedded down with the
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Federation" . This put the Adenis in a stronger position since they were in a better
bargaining position as the base was part of the Colony. Despite their disillusion with
the British Government, once the constitution was suspended the Federal Ministers still
sent a message to the UN defending British policy in South Arabia. The rulers blamed
157 PRO DEFE 11/598/4374 - Turnbull to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 29 June 1965
158 PRO DEFE 11/598/4380 - Galsworthy (CO) to Turnbull, 30 June 1965
159 PRO DEFE 11/599/4619 - Turnbull to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 20 Sep. 1965
160 PRO DEFE 11/599/4625 - op. cit.
161 ibid.
162 PRO DEFE 11/601/4796 - Turnbull to Marnham (CO), 23 Oct. 1965
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certain Adeni politicians, backed by a "foreign power" (i.e. Egypt), for frustrating
progress towards independence163. Moreover, the Federal rulers did not just lie back
and wait for the Nationalists to achieve victory as in November they went on a tour of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt to defend their position, and were given oral promises
of assistance in the first two countries164.
However, by the end of 1965, the worsening British economic situation was forcing a
major re-think of overseas policy and Denis Healey, the Secretary of State for Defence,
was realising cuts would have to be made to British commitments. This did not
necessarily mean the inevitable defeat of a Federation without the British base in Aden
to ensure continued support. However, it did mean that new tactics were necessary,
including a rapprochement with the Nationalists if at all possible. This was highly
unlikely, though, given the series of successes that the NLF and others had had against
Federal and British forces in the previous two years. Admittedly the Nationalists had
not had it all their own way, but without substantial expansion and re-organisation, the
Federal Army was not in a position to defend the Federation on their own given the low
morale and poor conditions of service. Moreover, politically the Federation was being
outmanoeuvred by the different Nationalist groups who had the popular appeal of Arab
Nationalism on their side. In contrast, the unwieldy Federal Government had little real
power and was unwilling to implement necessary political reform to make it more
popular. Therefore, it seemed unlikely that the Federation could survive independence
without British support, which was by no means guaranteed following the 1966
Defence White Paper
Conclusion
One of the major problems facing British officials in South Arabia was the ever-
changing attitude of the Government in London towards future policy. The importance
of the base was rarely questioned, but the best method of ensuring continued British
"" PRO CO 1055/63/53 - L1C (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Oct. 1965
164 PRO CO 1055/63/54 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Nov. 1965
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control was frequently debated. Moreover, by the time that independence was promised
in June 1964, the Nationalist campaign was having a greater and greater impact on
Adeni and Federal politics as well as the security of the base. The death of Bayumi and
the need for the Colony politicians to take into account the popularity of the
Nationalists weakened Britain's ability to influence events. However, if British policy
was to be maintaining the base at all costs, then the UK did little to help themselves
with the half-hearted support given to their closest allies the Federal rulers. The
hesitant responses to UAR/YAR incursions of the border, as well as the inability to deal
with the NLF revolt in the Protectorate, were undermining the authority of the
Federation. The result was that, during 1965, the Nationalist position grew in strength
as the Federal position weakened, the difficulty from a British perspective was
identifying which Nationalist group was the most dangerous.
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Chapter Six: Arab Nationalism in South Arabia
Introduction
The pattern ofpower politics in the colonies and mandates of the Middle East was
generally along the lines of the foreign power granting independence, followed by a
period of rule by the local notables and elite, which was nearly always overthrown by a
coup or revolution. However, in Aden and the Protectorate, power was passed directly
from the colonial power (in this case Britain) straight to the younger, more radical
Nationalists (in this case the NLF), bypassing the notables (the Aden 'moderates' and
the Federal rulers) entirely. The reasons for this lie partly in the weakness of the
Federation and the lack of support it received from the British, but more so because of
the strengths (and a certain amount of good fortune) of the Nationalist Liberation Front.
The formation of the NLF, who would form the only 'Marxist' regime in the Middle
East, needs to be studied to understand how and why they were able to take power.
Moreover, the British response, or lack of it, and the attitude ofEgypt also need to be
examined as they were two more factors in the rise of the NLF.
The Formation of the NLF
Background
The origins of the National Liberation Front (NLF) lay in the wider world of Arab
Nationalism, an ideology which grew out of discontent with foreign domination of the
Arab world, both political and economic. There were two main bodies which had Arab
Nationalism at the core of their ideology: the Ba'ath Party and the Arab Nationalist
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Movement (ANM), and both established cells in Aden, the Ba'ath in 1956 and the
ANM in 19591. The Ba'ath Party claimed to be socialist, although it was anti-
Communist, and developed in Syria in the 1930s and early 1940s as a pan-Arab
movement. Whilst the party had success in both Syria and Iraq, it was never a major
force in South Arabia, largely because it was confined to Aden's middle and working
classes and had minimal impact on the Protectorate. The leaders of the trade union
movement in the Colony were linked to the party, with Abdullah al-Asnag writing for
the Syrian newspaper 'al-Ba'ath' and Muhsin al-'Ayni acting as the Ba'athi
representative for both North and South Yemen . However, following the break up of
the Egypt-Syria union (the United Arab Republic) in 1961 and the Yemeni revolution in
1962, the Ba'ath's links to Syria meant the party was largely opposed by Nasser who
had become the dominant Arab Nationalist, not just in South Arabia, but in the whole
region3. Moreover, the fact that the Ba'ath limited their activities to Aden meant that
they failed to attract dissidents from the Protectorate. This was a weakness of both the
ATUC/PSP and the Ba'ath as it meant they could not compete with the NLF in the mid-
1960s as the latter had established small cells throughout South Arabia.
The Arab Nationalist Movement, in fact, was the most important component of the
NLF, and it was South Yemeni ANM members who were the leaders and founders of
the Front. The ANM was formed in Beirut after the Arab defeat in 1948 by a group of
Palestinian intellectuals and the movement spread through the Middle East, although
the only state which would be governed by ANM members was South Yemen. The
ANM was an influence on Nasser, whose Nasserite socialism in turn dominated the
Movement in the late 1950s following Suez. However, in the early 1960s there was a
split between the 'left', and anti-Nasser, wing and the 'right', who still supported the
Egyptian leader. This split in turn would have a profound effect on the leadership of
the NLF. The ANM cell in Aden was mainly composed of students who lived in the
Colony, but were originally from the Protectorate, and who returned to the hinterland to
spread the Movement's ideology and establish cells. The future leaders of the NLF
1 Lackner, Helen - P.D.R. Yemen (Ithaca Press, London, 1985), p. 32 & 36
2 Kostiner, Joseph - The Struggle for South Yemen (Croom Helm, London, 1984), p. 54-5
3 ibid., p. 56
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were nearly all from either the Aden or Cairo cells of the ANM, including Qahtan al-
Sha'bi, his brother Faisal Abdul Latif, Taha Muqbil and others4.
However, the ANM may well have also remained a minor movement in South Arabia,
along with the Ba'ath, had it not been for the Yemeni revolution in September 1962.
The military coup, whether it was engineered by Nasser or not, meant that Egypt, as the
leader of pan-Arab Nationalism could not be seen to be standing by when they were
needed by a Nationalist ally. The arrival ofEgyptian troops and equipment in North
Yemen commenced in October 1962 as the Republicans sought to establish their rule in
the face of a Royalist challenge. Moreover, the presence ofUAR troops in South West
Arabia gave Nasser the opportunity to pressure the British in Aden as well as further
establish his Nationalist credentials. However, by Spring 1963, the Republican hold on
North Yemen was being severely challenged by the Royalists (with covert British
support) who, despite early predictions of collapsing, were maintaining their positions
in the mountainous areas of the Yemen. Therefore, a supportive southern flank in
South Yemen was seen by Nasser as a means of both aiding the Republicans in their
drive against the southern Royalist town ofHarib (which was being used by Sharif
Hussein of Beihan as a centre for aid for the Royalists), and also of further pressuring
the British and their allies in the Federation. It was in this context that the NLF was
established out of the ANM cells in both North and South Yemen, as an extra front in
Nasser's struggle to establish Egyptian influence in the Arabian Peninsula.
Establishment ofthe NLF
The formation of the National Liberation Front for Occupied South Yemen (NLF) was
announced by Sana Radio on 19th June 19635. This was the achievement of the YAR
Ministry of Occupied South Yemen, headed by Qahtan al-Sha'bi, formerly of the Lahej
State Council, and consisted ofvarious opposition groups from the Protectorate and
Colony6. However, beyond these basic facts, British intelligence knew very little of the
4 ibid., p. 57 & Lackner - op. cit., p. 37
5 PRO DEFE 11/333/1619 - Johnston to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 19 June 1963
6 PRO DEFE 11/331/1410 - Johnston to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 21 March 1963
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new organisation, other than that a "liberation army" was to be formed by the Ministry .
British Intelligence, or rather the lack of it, was to prove to be a major obstacle in the
campaign against the NLF. The only information the British received concerned the
differences between certain dissident leaders, and very little was ever known about the
movement and strengths of the Front's troops. For example, it was known that a
liberation army was being formed and that,
"serious differences have arisen involving Office of South, headed by Qahtan
Muhammed al Shabi and dissident leaders and groups over leadership of any
o
future dissident activity in Protectorate" .
However, other than the names of a few of the leaders, British Intelligence was almost
totally unaware of the organisation of the Front and who were its members, at least until
the end of 1965. In fact, the British believed that because of the differences between
Qahtan and older dissident leaders such as Muhammad Aidrus and the Ahl Abu Bakr
bin Farid over the leadership of dissident activity, then the Protectorate would remain
relatively calm, a beliefwhich would be proved to be very wrong by the end of 19639.
Admittedly, the lack of certain knowledge about the formation, motives and activities
of the Front was also partly due to the fact that it did not strictly speaking exist as a
coherent, disciplined force in 1963. The NLF remained, probably until 1965, an
umbrella organisation for numerous different groups and took credit for tribal uprisings
that often had little to do with the Front's actions. Nevertheless, British knowledge of
the NLF was actually greater than has previously been thought. The security services
were not totally ignorant of the Front, but there was still insufficient information about
the NLF to combat the threat adequately.
The NLF, unlike the South Arabian League, or the People's Socialist Party, was not as
such a political party, rather it was a coalition of ten groups, the most important of
which was by far the Arab Nationalist Movement10. The leaders of the South Yemeni
7 PRO CO 1055/62/5 - Resume ofAden Intelligence Summary No. 3, March 1963
8 PRO DEFE 11/33/1795 - Acting High Commissioner to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 31 July
1963
9 PRO CO 1055/62/6 - Resume ofAden Intelligence Summary No. 7, July 1963
10 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 53 & Halliday, Fred - Arabia Without Sultans (???), p. 191 - the other groups
were 'The Nasserite Front', 'The Revolutionary Organisation in the Occupied South', 'The Patriotic
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ANM cell, which was based in North Yemen following the September 1962 revolution,
went to Cairo in December 1962. After discussions with Nasser, a fighting
organisation for the Protectorate was established. Moreover, Nasser instructed
Egyptian army headquarters in the YAR at Sana and Ta'izz to aid this Nationalist
organisation11. In February 1963 at a conference in Sana, attended by over 1,000
representatives of different revolutionary organisations, the first step was taken towards
the NLF's formation12. The establishment of the Front was then officially confirmed at
a further conference in June 1963 and announced on Sana Radio in the same month and
then on 'Voice of the Arabs' on Cairo Radio in July13.
Organisation and Ideology ofthe Front
In its early stages the NLF was little more than the coalition mentioned above, and had
little coherent political ideology to speak of. Its first political statement, announced on
Sana Radio in July 1963, underlined this as it concentrated on the need for unity among
the various Nationalist groups that existed at the time in South Arabia:
"Our aspiration in the occupied Yemeni South has now entered a phase which
demands a fundamental change in the methods of the struggle to win complete
independence and to overcome imperialism. The weakest point is the lack of
coordination in the struggle in the Yemeni South as a whole. The reason for this
is the lack of a common command for national action in Aden and the Amirates.
Another reason lies in the circumstances that the majority of the political
organizations limit their activity to Aden. They meet together merely for
common opposition; but some political rulers have not been able to raise
themselves above narrow party interests to the level of national
responsibility"14.
Other statements were issued reiterating the Front's position, stating that the Federal
rulers and Ministers did not represent the people of the South, and so treaties signed by
Front', 'The Secret Organisation of Free Officers and Soldiers', 'The Yafi'i Reform Movement',
'Formation of the Tribes', 'The Revolutionary Pioneers', 'The Secret Organisation of the Freemen of
Occupied South Yemen' and the 'Mahra Youth Organisation'
11 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 57
12 ibid., p. 57 Lackner - op. cit., p. 37
13 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 59 & Lackner - op. cit., p. 37
14
Halliday - op. cit., p. 192
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them were not to be recognised, and demanded the right to self-determination and
evacuation of the military bases15. However, there was no actual manifesto until the
First Congress of the Front at Ta'izz in June 1965, which lasted for three days and
adopted a National Charter16. The Front declared itself to be the sole representative of
the South Yemeni population aimed at "the radical transformation of the social reality
1 7
created by colonialism" and called for Arab unity . The Charter praised the role of the
UAR as the leader ofArab Nationalism, but was also further to the left than any of
Nasser's policies, such as denying any role to the "national bourgeoisie" and calling for
1 S
a social revolution, not just a national one .
The First Congress also established a 42-member National Council, first convened in
August 1965, and an eight-man executive committee, called the Politburo, including
Qahtan and Faisal al-Sha'bi, Taha Muqbil, Salim Zain (the author of the Charter), Ali
Salami, and Sayf al-Dali19. The Politburo dealt with propaganda, foreign affairs and
ideology, but was not the only organ of the NLF, as a 12-man General Command (with
half tribal members, and halfANM) a financial body and a military body had also been
established20. The wider organisation of the NLF was based on small cells throughout
the Protectorate, independent of each other but able to work together if necessary.
Saleh Musleh Qassem described the structure of the Front and its cells, emphasising the
small size of each cell as well as the political instruction given to them by the leaders:
"The internal party cells were made up of three to five members and there were
periodic secret meetings mostly at night. That was the time when the armed
commandos would tour the villages and meet with each of the organisation's
secret cells separately. During such meetings they would clarify the latest
developments, gather information, assign tasks and distribute pamphlets, as well
as gather contributions for the National Front Political Organisation ... No cell
knew of the others except in extraordinary circumstances related to security. A
member joining any of the secret cells of the Organisation had to go through a
probationary period of six months at the most before being accepted as a full
member."21
15 ibid., p. 193
16
ibid., p. 193 & Kostiner - op. cit., p. 58 & Lackner - op. cit., pp. 40-2
17 Lackner - op. cit., p. 40
18
Halliday - op. cit., p. 194
19 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 58 & Lackner - op. cit., p. 40
20 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 58
21
Lapping, Brian - End ofEmpire (Granada, London, 1985), p. 295
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This meant that on the rare occasion that a Front member was captured by British
Intelligence, he could only inform on his own cell, not the entire NLF.
Whilst the NLF had been established as an umbrella organisation for different groups,
cutting across political ideologies, increasingly the ANM was the only name to be
heard. The Front had become a party organisation dominated by the Arab Nationalist
Movement, the early tribal members were expelled, and the only divisions were in
effect between two wings of the ANM. However, this did not limit the Front's efficacy,
largely because of the support of Nasser and the UAR until 1965, a link which
permitted the supply and financing of the NLF's activities to continue. There was other
support, including from the Arab League, which created a fund to aid the NLF, and
Qahtan was to claim that as well as Egyptian support, there was also help from Iraq,
99
Algeria, Kuwait and other Arab states .
Whilst the organisation of the NLF and its external support were vital to its success, the
other factor for the success of the Front was its doctrine of the violent struggle against
the colonial power. The NLF adopted the concept of the popular armed struggle as a
means to improve its morale and solidarity, which, according to Kostiner, explains why
there was continued fighting after Britain had announced its withdrawal in February
90
1966 . Another reason for the continued fighting was simply because the inter-
Nationalist struggle had not been resolved, between the NLF and the Egyptian-backed
Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), a struggle which continued until
November 1967 (see below and Chapter 7).
The establishment of the National Liberation Front was a key development in the final
years ofBritish rule in South Arabia. However, at the time it was largely overlooked by
the authorities in Aden, a situation which continued effectively until it was too late to
do much about the Front. Whilst the NLF started life as a broad coalition, representing
different Nationalist and tribal organisations, by the time of its First Congress in June
1965 the Front was effectively an Arab Nationalist Movement offshoot. This link to
22 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 59
23 ibid., p. 67
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the ANM provided a coherent ideology, but would also prove divisive. However, the
divisions were largely kept from the British, and even the Egyptians, enabling the NLF
to maintain at least a unified facade in its campaign against the Federation.
The Radfan Revolt
The 'National Revolution'
According to the NLF, their military campaign against the British and the Federation
commenced in the Radfan mountains in the Amirate ofDhala, on the 14th October
1963. However, this was not strictly speaking the case, as the 'revolution' was actually
an existing tribal revolt by the Qutaybi, whose leader had been killed whilst resisting
the British24. Nevertheless, the NLF did take over the leadership of the revolt, and
turned the Radfan mountains into the centre of their first front against the British. The
British themselves did not realise that this was anything other than another outburst of
tribal dissidence as in October 1963 they still believed that the NLF still had little
influence due to continuing differences over the leadership . Moreover, their
Intelligence lead them to believe that the Radfanis had been rebuked by the Yemeni
Republicans for starting trouble too soon, and that there had been no progress on the
formation of a liberation army26. However, whether the revolt was instigated by the
NLF or not was ultimately of little importance as the Radfan revolt grew into a major
source of concern for both the British and their allies in the Federation.
The Radfan mountains were strategically important for both sides in the struggle due to
their position overlooking the Aden-Dhala Road, and their proximity to the Yemeni
border. The British needed the road for security purposes in the area, and also to supply
24
ibid., p. 71 - There is some doubt as to whether the patrol in question was actually a British one,
according to an Aden Government official it was actually a Federal patrol the Qutaybi were resisting and
the NLF leadership only took over and added political ideology after the event.
25 PRO CO 1055/62/9A-Resume ofAden Intelligence Summary No. 10, Oct. 1963
26 ibid.
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the Amir ofDhala, a member of the Federation. The road continued to Bayda in the
Yemen, however, and so was also a source for supplies for the NLF from the
Republicans to the north. The NLF exploited the tribal revolt to their own ends, and
claimed to target the whole Federation, rather than just the Amir as the Qutaybi usually
did, a claim that was only fulfilled later in the campaign. Their methods were adopted
from the traditional tactics of small scale surprise attacks, using their superior
knowledge of the geography of the area to ambush convoys on the road, and then
quickly disappear into the mountains27. However, whilst the cause of the revolt, and
certain of its tactics, was tribal, the actual revolt was not defeated in the usual short
period of time. This was partly due to the improved organisation of the dissidents, but
more because of the supply ofEgyptian arms, in particular mines. The British were not
expecting an organised, trained, and also 'multi-tribal' force, and so were surprised by
the duration of the revolt:
"This is the first occasion on which uniformed rebels have appeared on the
scene and the first also within my experience when rebels have operated in a
tribal area other than their own. This would be the first attempt to put a unit of
• 90
the so-called Liberation Army into the field" .
Trevaskis's conclusion was greeted with doubt by the Colonial Office, with the
Secretary of State surmising that the most likely explanation was that the rebels had
simply received the uniforms from the Republican National Guard rather than being an
9Q
"organised military unit" . In fact, according to the Political Officer in Dhala at the
time, the 'Liberation Army' was basically a Qutaybi force, bolstered by a few Amiris
from Dhala, and so was not really a 'multi-tribal' force. Nevertheless, what cannot be
argued with was the duration of the rebellion which had already lasted four months by
that point. The British attitude, however, was to continue to treat the revolt as tribal,
which given the usual short-term nature of tribal revolts in South Arabia, was somewhat
careless.
27 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 71
28 PRO DEFE 11/423/2388 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 28 Jan. 1964
29 PRO DEFE 11/423/2404 - Secretary ofState for the Colonies to Trevaskis, 29 Jan. 1964
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The British Response: 'Operation Nutcracker' and 'Radforce'
The ability of the NLF-led revolt to impede travel on the Aden-Dhala Road for three
months meant that some form ofBritish response was necessary, and so 'Operation
Nutcracker' was initiated in December 1963. 'Nutcracker' was composed of three
Federal Regular Army (FRA) battalions with British officers and RAF support who
moved into the Radfan to subdue the area . The tactic of using force was questioned at
the time since,
"There were many local officials, with a profound knowledge of the Arabs, who
believed strongly that any attempt to subdue the tribes by force was doomed to
be a waste of time and effort" .
The doubts were ignored, but proved to be correct as, although the FRA did succeed in
occupying parts of the Radfan after suffering losses, they were isolated wadis which
•29
needed supplying from the air and came under heavy attack from the NLF . Moreover,
as soon as the FRA were withdrawn in order to defend the frontier, the tribes quickly
re-occupied the Radfan, necessitating another British operation .
There were several reasons for the success of the NLF in the Radfan in the first few
months of the campaign. The British-led Federal forces were severely hampered by
their lack of intelligence about their opponents and there were insufficient numbers to
penetrate into such difficult terrain. Moreover, the NLF guerrillas were fighting a new
type of campaign that neither the British nor the FRA were used to in South Arabia.
The object of the Front was not to win territory and then hold their ground, but to harass
their opponents and weaken them politically34. Therefore, as soon as the FRA moved
out in March 1964, the NLF moved back in, re-occupying the Wadi Rabwa on the 21st
March, one of the two spots the Federal forces had eventually succeeded in subduing35.
30
Geraghty, Tony - Who Dares Wins: The Story ofthe SAS, 1950-1980 (William Collins, Glasgow,
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Moreover, once again the Aden-Dhala Road was deemed no longer secure by the
British because the area was under rebel control36. The situation demanded some form
of action from the British if they and the Federation were to retain any credibility.
Moreover, even when territory was recovered by the Federal forces, the tribes were still
able to cause them enough trouble to warrant further operations by the British. These
took place from April to June 1964 with a mixed force amounting to a brigade of
Federal and British troops again with RAF support, including helicopters, and a
•37 #
squadron of tanks . This 'Radfan Force' ('Radforce') aimed to use Paratroopers and
Royal Marine Commandos to capture certain peaks in order to allow the rest of the
force to move into the Radfan. However, at first the operation was something of a
disaster as an attempt by the SAS to penetrate the Radfan on the night of the 29/30
April 1964, in order to secure a 'drop zone' for the Paratroopers, went wrong with the
TO
loss of two men and the failure to achieve their goal . This in turn forced the British to
call for reinforcements from the UK since it was felt that they could no longer rely on
• -3Q
the FRA in the face of a stronger, better organised and better equipped force . The loss
of the two SAS men finally seemed to convince the British that they were no longer
dealing with the usual tribal revolt as they witnessed the significant improvements in
'rebel' discipline, fire accuracy, the large number of automatic weapons they possessed
and the fact that all the attackers seemed to be wearing a uniform40.
However, this was in reality over six months too late to grasp the facts of the situation.
The excuse given by the Army for the failure to at least contain the Radfan revolt was
that,
"We have not got the forces to deal with it and as some ofyou have seen, the
terrain is exceedingly rugged and we would soon lose a regiment of soldiers
here against these guerrillas in the wide open spaces around these mountains
and in the very deep wadis"41.
36 PRO DEFE 11/425/2756 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 7 April 1964
37
Geraghty - op. cit., p. 86
38
ibid., pp. 87-99 & de la Billiere, General Sir Peter - Lookingfor Trouble (Harper Collins, Glasgow,
1994), pp. 219-222
39 PRO DEFE 11/497/2912 - CinCME to MoD, 1 May 1964
40 PRO CO 1055/62/26 - LIC Aden Monthly Intelligence Summary, April 1964
41 PRO DEFE 11/497/2941 - HQ ME to MoD, 3 May 1964
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This was not the whole truth, though, as a combination of over-confidence and
underestimating the ability of their opponents was at least as much to blame. The
commanding officer of the SAS squadron involved in the Radfan in April 1964, (later
General Sir) Peter de la Billiere, who had served as an Intelligence Officer with the
Federal Army, admitted that,
"We did not appreciate the intensity of the violence of the tribal reaction to our
presence. I expected a few dissidents to pop off a few rounds and then go home
again ... So often, we underrate our enemy"42.
The lack of Intelligence about the strength of the opposition was another factor
weakening the British campaign, one member of the SAS later commented that,
"In those early days of the Radfan campaign, no one knew anything about what
would be needed. They didn't know whether there was water up in the hills, or
anything about the people"43.
The combination of these factors meant that the attempt to impose Federal rule on the
Radfan took far longer than expected, and proved far costlier than was desirable.
Eventually, in June 1964, the Radfan mountains were subdued, albeit temporarily, after
the Qutaybis were defeated at their centre of Jabel Hurriyah44. This, though, was not
the end of the NLF campaign, nor even the end of the Radfan revolt, which continued
off and on until the British withdrawal.
Military means were simply not enough, a lesson which some, although not all, within
the British colonial and military establishment never really learned. Trevaskis believed
that the only lasting solution to the dissidence was "by repaying the Yemen two-fold in
kind", which was something of a short-term view, and not necessarily bound to
succeed45. There were complaints, however, from the Army that whilst they were
imposing Federal rule by force, nothing was being done politically and economically to
42
Geraghty - op. cit., p. 83
43
ibid., p. 86 - according to the Political Officer who briefed the SAS patrol, lack of intelligence was not
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44 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 72
45 PRO DEFE 11/522/2860 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 23 April 1964
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support military methods. The Commander-in-Chief ofMiddle East forces, Lieutenant-
General Sir Charles Harington, informed the Chiefs of Staff in June 1964 that, whilst
the operations were coming to an end, "the situation cannot be restored until the
political aim [the tribes submitting to the Federation] has been achieved"46. Moreover,
he was of the opinion that,
"If the Federation had been given more financial help in the past the temptation
to the Radfanis to go elsewhere for the price of subversion might have been
avoided. The money thus paid out would have been the insurance premium I
know so many governors in the past have asked for"47.
The General also wanted permission to use his troops to correct the situation "by
beating their bayonets into plough shares", which was eventually done, but once again
• • 4R
came too late to stop the decline of the Federation .
The Radfan revolt, even though British and Federal forces had finally succeeded in
subduing it, should be regarded as a victory for the NLF. The Front had failed to
'liberate' any territory, or even inflict unacceptable losses on the British forces, but
these are not criteria by which the revolt should be judged. Whilst the Qutaybis were
forced to make peace with the Federation and so could be seen as failing to achieve
their aim of conquering the Radfan, the NLF had different ambitions. The Front were
not aiming to conquer the Radfan, rather to embarrass the British and/or Federation, and
increase their own reputation. They proved to be a significant burden on their enemies'
forces and they disrupted law and order sufficiently to warrant the sending of
reinforcements twice ('Radforce' and then further troops were sent from the UK after
the failed SAS mission). Moreover, and most importantly, they were able to become a
constant irritant to the British and the Federation, not just in the Radfan, but throughout
the Protectorate as they extended their campaign to other areas of traditional tribal
dissidence.




Spread of the Revolt
According to Kostiner, the NLF's greatest success was by using "fluidity of force"
tactics to open other fronts whilst still maintaining the Radfan campaign49. There is a
lot of truth in this, as during 1964 the Front were to exploit other tribal revolts, just as
they had done with the Qutaybis in Radfan. Moreover, the other fronts were also able
to harass the Federal and British forces in the same way that the Radfan front did, even
though the British were well aware that the NLF was attempting to spread its campaign
into other parts of the Protectorate.
Trevaskis estimated that there were about 4,000 armed tribesmen in Dhala (ofwhom
500 were certainly disaffected), 3,000 in Haushabi (1,000 disaffected) and 3,000 in
Subaihi (500 disaffected)50. Moreover, if the situation deteriorated in the Radfan, then
the British could expect these other areas to cause trouble, and, "If things go badly in
Dhala, Haushabi, and Subeiha then we could expect disaffection to spread throughout
the population of the whole area"51. As things turned out, this prediction held a lot of
truth, as the NLF did succeed in stirring up dissent in other parts of the Protectorate.
The first expansion was in Fadhli and Dathina, the 'Middle front', which was
announced by the NLF via Sana Radio on 28th June 1964 . As the British and Federal
forces were in the process of completing their mission in the Radfan, Dathina became
the centre of the NLF's activities. Reports came through once more of the opposition's
better planning and co-ordination, accuracy of fire, and increased determination with
which the attacks on Federal Guard posts were carried out . From then on, the NLF
almost continually expanded their activities, causing Federal and British forces constant
trouble, and threatening security in the Protectorate.
49 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 72
50 PRO DEFE 11/497/3025 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 10 May 1964
51 ibid.
52 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 73 & PRO DEFE 11/499/3274 - Acting High Commissioner to Secretary ofState
for the Colonies, 29 June 1964, & PRO CO 1055/62/27 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary,
June 1964
53 PRO DEFE CO 1055/62/30 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, July 1964
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After Dathina, the western front moved from Radfan and was opened in Dhala, which
then spread into Haushabi (as Trevaskis had predicted) from August 196454. The
effects ofEgyptian training were taking their toll on the British and Federal forces as
the ability to mount simultaneous operations against widely separate targets, with
ambushes or mines laid along the likely reinforcement routes, were bringing the NLF
considerable success55.
As NLF campaigns spread the security situation continued to deteriorate with the
British repeatedly remarking on the sophistication and efficacy of their opponents56.
The British themselves used tactics which, according to Halliday, they would repeat in
Dhofar, albeit to better effect, as the use of air proscription to 'deny an area to the
enemy' was implemented . The tactic of destroying crops and bombing villages (after
first dropping leaflets to tell the villagers to get out) was effective in Radfan, albeit
highly controversial, raising criticism from both the media and the House ofCommons,
but ultimately failed . Whilst the Radfan mountains were eventually cleared, it had
taken over six months and inflicted casualties on both the FRA and the British Army.
Moreover, the NLF had succeeded in tying down thousands of troops and they were
able to initiate fighting in twelve other areas of the Protectorate (according to Kostiner).
The Front made themselves a constant thorn in the side of the Federation and the
colonial authorities in Aden, obstructed the supplies for British forces, and also cut
supplies to the Royalists in the Yemen. These achievements were considerable, causing
serious damage to the Federation and the credibility of the British, as well as aiding the
Republican cause in the north. The NLF were branded as "terrorists" by the British,
and the tactics they used were similarly condemned (although the British tactics were at
times no better). Admittedly, the troubles of the mid-1960s were possibly no more
serious in terms ofmilitary success than those of the mid-1950s since no forts were
captured or serious casualties inflicted upon British or Federal forces. However, the
54 PRO CO 1055/62/31 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Aug. 1964 & PRO CO 1055/62/32 -
LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Sep. 1964
55 PRO CO 1055/62/31 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Aug. 1964
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Front's actions had a symbolic effect, raising the price which the authorities were
willing to pay to remain in power:
"terrorism has usually been adopted not as a method to obtain immediate
military gains, but rather because of its cumulative effect. It has a deleterious
effect on society and makes it difficult for the government to function"59.
This was very true of the situation in South Arabia, especially when the NLF turned
their attention on the Colony of Aden itself.
The Urban Campaign
The NLF in Aden
The NLF's tactics in the Protectorate were primarily designed to destabilise the
Federation whilst also embarrassing the British. The campaign in Aden, however, was
directed with the aim of driving out the colonial power. The extension of the Front's
activities to the Colony took place in the summer of 1964, at the same time as other
fronts were being opened in the Protectorate, thereby creating widespread unrest. This
was a new situation for the authorities to deal with, an organisation which was active in
both the Colony and Protectorate, whereas previously the Nationalist groups had only
been active in one or the other. Moreover, by undermining the security situation in
Aden, the NLF were maintaining pressure on British troops which might well have
otherwise been used either in the Protectorate or elsewhere in the Middle East.
The number of security incidents within Aden was to rise remarkably during the last
three years of British rule, although not all were caused by the NLF. There were 36 in
1964, which increased to 286 in 1965, then 510 in 1966 and finally approximately
59 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 73
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2,900 by November 196760. The different Nationalist groups used grenade attacks
against gatherings of people (parties, cafes, cinemas), bombed vital installations
(including the oil refinery), and assassinated leading public figures, in particular Police
Special Branch officers61. This last activity was especially effective, with the
successful assassination of a Special Branch Officer in December 1964, followed by
two unsuccessful attempts in January 1965, creating low morale among the Arab
officers62. This intimidation reached the point where the Special Branch effectively
ceased to function, which, according to the British, was one probable reason why the
interrogation ofNLF suspects yielded nothing on the Front's cells within Aden . The
other reason was more to do with the NLF's structure, whereby individual cells were
separate from others so that if one cell was identified, it could not reveal information on
another cell. However, the campaign against the Special Branch was just as effective,
in particular after the defection of the Arab Deputy Superintendent Hubaishi to the
Yemen (and then to Cairo) in February 196564. Hubaishi was the final Arab officer
within Special Branch, and his defection lead to a further drop in morale, and the drying
up of all sources on the NLF as the public were too scared of informing, even had they
so desired65. It was clear to the British that the NLF were demoralising Adeni society,
including the politicians and civil servants, as the security situation became increasingly
unstable66.
Furthermore, the NLF's campaign by 1965 included the penetration of the Federal
security forces, increasing the unreliability of the FRA and the Aden Police from a
British point of view67. The Commander-in-Chiefwas worried about the morale of
both the Federal and British troops as indications ofNasserite and NLF sympathies
became clear, a situation that he blamed on "our pitiful weakness and indecision"68.
The British attitude to the NLF urban campaign was, in fact, characterised by
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indecision, the clearest example being that the Front was not even outlawed until July
196569. Moreover, there was no co-ordination of the different counter-intelligence
bodies (Special Branch, the Army, Colonial Office) until June 1965, from which point
there actually was an improvement in the British operations against the NLF. The
number of incidents in August 1965 was 40 (the highest so far), but this dropped to 29
70
in September following the arrest of over 30 "known terrorists" . The security forces
were also able to seize NLF documents and plans and their main printing press in
Aden71. However, as the Intelligence Summary pointed out, the NLF were relying
increasingly on their gunmen, so the drop in the number of incidents "was offset by the
quality of several of their acts". These included the assassination of the British Speaker
of the Legislative Council, of a senior British Special Branch Officer, and of another
79
Arab police officer .
Nevertheless, the security forces were still able to hamper NLF activities in Aden
towards the end of 1965, especially after the capture of the Aden Commander, Ali
7*3
Abdul Alim in October 1965 . The nature of the Front's organisation, though, meant
that other cells were still able to carry out attacks, albeit 'only' 18 in November 1965.
Furthermore, despite continued pressure from the security forces, the Crater murder
squad ( a NLF cell responsible for numerous attacks on British servicemen) was also
reactivated which further threatened the stability of the colony74. The seizure of
Chinese, Soviet and Egyptian arms and explosives was also a blow to the Adeni NLF
7c
cause at the end of 1965 . These setbacks did harm the Front, but were not enough to
do so seriously. The NLF probably did themselves more harm with their internal
struggles and divisions which weakened the campaign against the British and the
Federation as well as questioning the unity of the Nationalists.
69 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 75
70 PRO CO 1055/63/51 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Aug. & Sep. 1965
71 ibid.
72 ibid.
73 PRO DEFE 11/601/4813 - MELF to MoD (Army), 31 Oct. 1965
74 PRO CO 1055/63/54 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Nov. 1965
75 PRO DEFE 11/601/4892 - Ashworth to Noakes (CO), 28 Dec. 1965
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Internal Politics of the NLF: The 'Secondary Leadership'
The structure of the NLF was a major benefit when a cell was broken by British and
Federal security forces, but was also a weakness as it meant there were many cell
leaders outside the direct control of the Politburo. At first, the Front was an umbrella
organisation, exploiting existing conditions of unrest to further their aims. To this end,
different groups were relied upon according to the needs of the time and area, thus in
the Protectorate it was mainly tribes and peasants, in Aden it was the more educated
elements of society76. Above these groups, the NLF leadership would impose
themselves, acting as the ideological and commanding elite of the fighting bodies which
allowed them to control the rank and file77. The actual NLF members of a group would
also be distinguished from the rank and file by functioning as political directors and
staff officers78.
However, a rift emerged between the cells in the Protectorate and the elite leaders,
partly due to the attempt to merge the NLF with other Nationalist groups (see below),
but also due to conditions within the Front itself, and within the ANM as a whole. The
leaders were accused by the cells of concentrating on diplomatic affairs whilst the rank
7Q
and file were risking their lives in the Radfan and elsewhere . Moreover, a group of
more militant NLF members had emerged from the cells, men who had fought the
British and Federal forces, but were not going to the conferences in Cairo, Sana and
elsewhere that the elite were attending, again causing resentment. These cell leaders
were more concerned with the immediate tactical and organisational problems that the
NLF faced during their campaign, and were not impressed by leaders like Qahtan al-
Sha'bi who was not a military commander. Another element was the radicalisation of
some of the Adeni cells through their contacts with the Communist People's
• • RO . .
Democratic Union (PDU) . The combination of these factors produced what was
known as the 'secondary leadership', which in January 1966 claimed the supreme
76 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 76
77
ibid., p. 76




Halliday - op. cit., p. 208
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command of the NLF whilst others from the elite leadership were in Cairo for the
creation of the Front for the Liberation ofOccupied South Yemen (FLOSY, see below,
Chapter 7). The 'secondary leadership' was composed of some already high ranking
members, such as Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, Muhammad ali Haytham and Ali 'Antar
o i
m t
(commander of the Radfan NLF), but others were more obscure . This new leadership
had sided with the 'radical' Ibrahim faction of the ANM (the 'left') at the Beirut
conference in 1964 (along with the North Yemen ANM delegation). Qahtan and the
'official' NLF leadership, on the other hand, had sided with the more moderate and pro-
89
Nasser Habbash group (the 'right') . Moreover, most of the 'secondary leadership'
were from the well-educated Aden intelligentsia that the ANM had recruited, a move
• 8^ .
which then proved counter-productive . They were also younger and less attached to
Nasser, more influenced by Marxist and Maoist ideology (hence the adherence to the
concept of the popular armed struggle) and less willing to follow the orders of Cairo.
The old leaders defeated the 'secondary leadership' at the NLF's First Congress in June
1965, but the issue ofjoining FLOSY fully exposed the rift between leaders such as
Qahtan al-Sha'bi and Salim Zain and the rank and file. The 'secondary leadership' took
over the Politburo at a conference in Ta'izz in January 1966, expelling those that joined
• • • 84
FLOSY, and a resolution was signed declaring Nasser to be an "Arab imperialist" .
Whilst peace was restored between Qahtan and the 'secondary leadership' towards the
end of 1966, certain members were not permitted to return as the merger with FLOSY
was rejected completely, ensuring the NLF lost Nasser's support. The 'secondary
leadership' was in reality simply a confirmation of the radicalisation of the NLF, as
certain tribal leaders had already been expelled "for having a mercenary attitude"85.
The old leaders like the al-Sha'bi brothers had lost touch with the NLF cells who were
carrying out the fighting and adopting their own ideology based on their experiences.
They were also able to continue their military campaigns at the same time, despite the
internal splits and the denial ofNasser's support. Moreover, the British remained
81 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 120
82
Halliday - op. cit., p. 209
8j Kostiner - op. cit., p. 120-1
84 ibid., p. 124
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unaware of the split, believing that Qahtan was the leader throughout, and that it was he
who refused to join FLOSY rather than the 'secondary leadership'.
Nationalist Rivalry
The Influence ofNasser and the Yemeni Civil War
The position of Gamel Abd al-Nasser as figurehead for Arab Nationalism had been
established by Egypt's stance against the British and French during the Suez crisis in
1956. This had been further cemented by the union with Syria in 1958 , creating the
United Arab Republic (UAR), a name which was still used for Egypt after the split with
Syria in 1961. Thus, Egypt was able to influence and direct other Arab Nationalist
groups elsewhere in the Middle East, in particular the Arab Nationalist Movement. The
high prestige accorded to Nasser, however, was a hindrance as well as a benefit, since it
meant that the UAR had to shoulder the burden of fighting 'colonialism' and
'imperialism' in the Middle East, the 'reactionary' Arab regimes (by which was meant
the more conservative monarchies of states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia), as well as
Israel. Therefore, when a group of army officers staged a coup against the Imam in
Yemen in September 1962, they naturally turned to Nasser and Egypt for support in the
ensuing civil war.
It is difficult to establish whether the Egyptian leader knew of the coup beforehand, as
some colonial officials and historians have claimed, but once it had taken place, Nasser
had no option but to get involved. The secession of Syria from the UAR a year earlier
had damaged Nasser's prestige as leader ofArab Nationalism, and the Yemeni civil war
provided an opportunity to re-establish his Nationalist credentials. Therefore, within a
fortnight of the coup, Egyptian troops and equipment had landed in Yemen to bolster
Sallal's Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Unfortunately for Nasser, the Royalists proved
very effective at resisting Republican and Egyptian advances, in particular in the
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mountains of north and east Yemen, which meant that an ever-increasing number of
UAR troops were stationed in the towns. Most historians estimated that at least a third
ofNasser's army (approximately 40,000 troops) was involved in the Yemen by 1967,
which proved to be a serious liability during the Six Day War of June that year when
Israel overran the Sinai peninsula86. Despite such large numbers of troops, the
Royalists maintained their positions, and at times pushed the UAR and YAR forces
back, embarrassing the numerically superior and better-armed Egyptian army and its
leader Nasser.
The success of the Yemeni Royalists in their Spring 1963 offensive was actually a help
to the NLF as it gave an impetus to Nasser to establish a southern front to cut off links
between the Federation and the Yemen, as well as create trouble for the British in Aden.
This southern front turned out to be the NLF in Radfan and then elsewhere in the
Protectorate, but even their successes were not enough to sufficiently damage the
Royalists. Despite these setbacks, Nasser was still a vital source of inspiration, as well
as supplies, for the vast majority ofNationalists. Arms, equipment and training all
came from Egypt, which meant that in theory the NLF and other groups should not have
been able to survive as an effective force in South Arabia without Nasser's backing.
This was true as far as men like Abdullah al Asnag of the PSP/ATUC were concerned,
albeit it was the propaganda value that was important to him given his opposition to an
armed struggle. Moreover, it was also true of Qahtan al-Sha'bi and the other leaders of
the NLF up to 1966, who were tied to Nasser through the ANM, but far less true of the
younger, more radical 'secondary leadership' that emerged from the Front's cells during
1965.
Thus, when Nasser wanted increased control of, and unity between, the separate
Nationalist organisations in South Arabia, he was able to exert sufficient pressure on
the PSP and other dissident groups to form the Organisation of the Liberation of the
86 Precise numbers are not known, for example: Kerr - op. cit., p. 96 & Mansfield - op .cit, p. 272, state
there were 40,000 troops; Yapp - op. cit., p. 296 & Kelly, J.B. - Arabia, the Gulfand the West
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1980), p. 26, state there were around 70,000 Egyptian troops in the
Yemen by 1965 but the number was later reduced; and O'Ballance, Edgar - The War in the Yemen
(Archon Books, Hamden, 1971), p. 153, puts the figure at 60,000 by November 1966
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Occupied South (OLOS, see below). However, Qahtan and the NLF remained aloof at
first, although representatives of the Front were at the first OLOS conference in April
196587. This situation was still not acceptable to Nasser, however, as the Egyptian
intelligence services exerted further pressure on the NLF to merge with OLOS. The
leadership of the Front did seem to succumb in January 1966, with the creation of the
Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), but this move was totally rejected
by the 'secondary leadership'. Despite continuing pressure, the NLF did remain
separate from FLOSY, a move which caused the loss ofEgyptian support, and therefore
of arms and equipment, but the Front continued to exist, surviving on political
oo
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contributions and robbing banks . Ultimately, the split with the UAR worked in the
NLF's favour, as defeat in the Six Day War meant that Egyptian troops withdrew from
the Yemen, causing severe problems for FLOSY in the fight to win power in an
independent South Arabia.
Nasser and the UAR played a vital role in the Nationalist campaign against the British
in Aden and the protectorate. However, Egyptian involvement in the Yemen also
tarnished Nasser's reputation, not only because of his forces' inability to defeat the
Royalists. Many of the Republicans in the north grew to resent the Egyptian presence,
so much so that there were attempted moves to make peace with the Royalists. These
moves failed, largely because of Egyptian opposition, yet at the same time, Nasser also
made attempts to force a settlement in the civil war through peace talks with Saudi
Arabia, a move which alienated the 'secondary leadership' and played a part in their
rejection of OLOS and FLOSY. Therefore, whilst Egypt was an important player in
both the Yemeni civil war and the Nationalist campaign against the British, Nasser was
still not able to achieve control of either regime when the conflicts were over. This was
partly due to the Six Day War, but in the south it was more due to the NLF's refusal to
become Egyptian puppets, an accusation leveled against certain Nationalists, in
particular Abdullah al Asnag.
87 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 114
88
Halliday - op. cit., p. 213
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Al Asnag and the PSP
Since the mid-1950s, the trade unions, and subsequently their party the PSP, had been
the prominent Nationalist organisation in Aden. The British viewed the PSP, and its
leading light Abdullah al Asnag, as dangerous and a threat to their interests, which was
true to a certain extent as publicly the party called for the withdrawal of the base and
OQ
were opposed to the Federation . However, al Asnag was probably the most
'moderate' of all the leading Nationalists in the Colony, and was generally opposed to a
policy of violent opposition to the British presence90. Despite this, there were few
attempts by the British to involve the PSP in any of the talks on independence, at least
until Labour came to power, but even then the High Commissioner was usually
opposed to a Nationalist presence in talks on Aden's future91. Having said that, it is
doubtful whether al Asnag would have accepted due to the fear of being labelled as an
'imperialist stooge', and he declined the offer of the vacant nominated seat in the
Legislative Council in November 1964 as he was afraid members of the PSP would
defect to the NLF92.
The PSP's opposition to violence was not always clear from the statements that were
made by some of its leaders, such as Idris Hanbala declaring in a Youth Cultural Club
debate that "ifpeaceful methods failed to bring independence, civil disobedience or
even armed force should be resorted to" . There was, in fact, a wing of the PSP which
favoured a more violent approach to their campaign, the most notable member of this
camp being Khalifa Abdullah Hasan al-Khalifa, who threw the grenade at Trevaskis in
December 1963 (see Chapter Five). However, with the exception of this attack at
Khormaksar, the PSP rarely resorted to violence before the NLF started their campaign
in Aden, despite ANM pamphlets stating that "that grenade has not been the first one to
be thrown. There will be others"94. British Intelligence were also aware of al Asnag's
89 Lackner - op. cit., p. 30
90 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 110
91 For example: PRO DEFE 11/596/3899 - Record ofTeleprinter discussion between Secretary ofState
for the Colonies and Turnbull, 21 March 1965 - Greenwood wanted al Asnag involved in a National
Government after the resignation of Baharun, but Turnbull was opposed
92 PRO DEFE 11/523/3737 - Aden Monthly Intelligence Summary, Nov. 1964
93
'Paper on Aden Trade Union Congress' - Trevaskis Papers, Part I: MSS Brit. Emp. s367
94 ibid. - the paper believed the ANM were distributing the pamphlet on behalf of the PSP
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non-violent approach and even his view that the base should not be evacuated given its
value to the economic welfare ofAden95. Nevertheless, this stance did not mean that
the PSP were going to make life easy for the British as the demonstrations and strikes
continued during 1963 and 1964, although when al Asnag was absent, the party's
activities diminished.
The main rival to the PSP as the leading Nationalist group was the NLF, which
favoured an armed struggle to win independence, and relations between the two groups
were never very strong. Partly this was due to the difference over the use of violence,
but also because of a contest for Egyptian support, which had favoured al Asnag before
the creation of the Front. The NLF were supported by Egypt after their establishment,
but this favour did not necessarily extend to all the Front's members, in particular
Qahtan al-Sha'bi who found it very difficult to be accepted as the leader of the Front by
the older South Arabian dissidents. There was the report that Qahtan had been arrested
by the Egyptians in March 1964 for retaining part of a consignment of arms and
ammunition destined for the dissident tribes96. Moreover, British Intelligence was also
aware of the refusal ofMuhammad Aidrus and the Ahl Abu Bakr bin Farid to serve
under Qahtan97. These factors probably contributed to the British underestimating the
Front as they were unaware of the two-tier structure of the NLF, so that whilst Qahtan
was under arrest, the cells in the protectorate were still able to continue the revolution.
The continuation of the NLF campaign was pointed out by British Intelligence, but they
could not fully comprehend how the Front was able to maintain the state of unrest when
no
the question of leadership was unresolved
The PSP continued to receive Egyptian support, but also criticism for their non-violent
approach to the struggle for independence. According to Khodabux Khan (a member of
the Aden Legislative Council) al Asnag told the Egyptian authorities that he refused to
use violence on behalf of the NLF because he would not harm his own people, and that
95 PRO DEFE 11/523/3737 - op. cit.
96 PRO DEFE 11/424/2519 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 10 March 1964
97 PRO DEFE 11/423/2476 - Trevaskis to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 22 Feb. 1964
98 PRO CO 1055/62/17 - LIC Aden Monthly Intelligence Summary, March 1964
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the British base provided a livelihood for many workers in Aden". At about the same
time, Cairo's 'Voice of the Arabs' was criticising al Asnag for being too moderate,
which may have been a threat to the PSP to toe the Egyptian line with the NLF, who at
the time were the UAR's favourites10 . Kostiner believes al Asnag was leading the PSP
in a new version of 'positive neutralism' by maintaining a dialogue with the British, but
constantly criticising them as well101. This stance failed, however, due to the reluctance
of the British to negotiate with any Arab Nationalist, however moderate, but also
because the PSP was too reliant on Egyptian favour and aid to survive. The rise of the
NLF as the more successful Nationalist organisation was damaging to both the PSP and
al Asnag in his attempt to be the first leader of an independent South Arabian state.
However, all was not lost, in particular as Nasser was seeking to unite all the
Nationalist groups under his control, which al Asnag saw as an opportunity to re¬
establish his Nationalist credentials.
The Formation ofOLOS
The London conference of July and August 1964 was a major disappointment to al
1
Asnag, who had hoped for a more important role to play . However, he was once
again left on the sidelines as the British concentrated their efforts to achieve a stable
South Arabia through co-operation with the Federation. Moreover, the differences that
had developed between Egypt and the PSP over al Asnag's refusal to unite with the
NLF and opposition to violence were also weakening the PSP's cause103. According to
British sources, both al Asnag and the SAL leader Jifri were opposed to Qahtan's
leadership, which had been about the only agreement reached when the two met with
the ex-Sultan of Lahej, the ex-Fadhli Sultan, Muhammad Aidrus and Muhammad Abu
Bakr bin Farid in Cairo in September 1964104. This meeting was important, however,
as it underlined the opposition to Qahtan al-Sha'bi among the other dissident leaders,
99 PRO CO 1055/33/25 - Acting High Commissioner to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 16 Aug. 1964
100 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 111
101 ibid., p.lll
102 ibid., p. Ill & Lackner - op. cit., p. 31
103 PRO CO 1055/154/E90 - Present Policy of the P.S.P., LIC Aden Paper, 3 Nov. 1964
104 ibid.
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even if they found it hard to unite on other causes and methods. Moreover, there was
increasing opposition among many of the PSP to Egyptian dominance, in particular the
decision forced on the party to boycott the 1964 elections, which the PSP would
probably have won105. This was causing a split within the party between 'moderates'
and 'extremists', the latter possibly being attracted to the NLF, which was undermining
the strength of the PSP. There was a possibility for the British to exploit this split to
their advantage, but scepticism about al Asnag's intentions and the true depth of the
division between Cairo and the PSP ruled out any attempt to support the 'moderate'
Nationalists:
"We must question whether any Arab nationalist leader, let alone a small-time
one like al Asnaj, could fly in the face ofNasser. One would incline to the view
that he would have in the end to toe the Egyptian line to survive"106.
This was certainly true, but a more accepting attitude by the British may well have seen
al Asnag accommodated within a more broadly-based government, which would have
had a better chance of surviving the NLF/FLOSY assault of 1966-67 than the
Federation did.
The combination of the failed 1964 conference and the split with Egypt forced a re¬
think ofPSP policy on its leader, and there were attempts to regain Nasser's favour. Al
Asnag was helped in this by the unpopularity of Qahtan among the other Nationalist
leaders, and the PSP leader set about uniting the other parties into another front, the
Organisation for the Liberation of the South (OLOS). In July 1964 the PSP had
organised a counter-conference to the London one, an "Alignment ofNationalist
Forces" in Cairo, intending to bring other dissident leaders under al Asnag's control107.
There were no immediate decisions taken, but a further two conferences in March and
April 1965 were followed by talks between Basendwah (a member of the Legislative
Council), Jifri of the SAL, Muhammad Aidrus, the ex-Fadhli Sultan, the ex-Audhali
Naib Ja'bal and Nu'man (a YAR Minister and former Free Yemeni) which lead to the
105 ibid.
106 ibid.
107 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 111-2
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creation ofOLOS108. However, Jifri refused to merge the SAL with OLOS, which was
a blow as the SAL was the only organisation with the ability to gather support in the
Protectorate, even though it was no longer as powerful as it had been in the 1950s. The
SAL by this time was a Saudi-backed organisation, and Jifri's refusal to sever the links
with the kingdom and sink its identity into OLOS meant that there was no real
representation for the new organisation in the Protectorate109. Moreover, the refusal of
the NLF to join diminished the threat to the Federation and Colony, although the threat
was still considerable from the NLF alone.
A significant outcome of the creation ofOLOS was al Asnag's shift towards a policy of
violence, with the decision taken to "retaliate firmly" to British policy and to "execute
traitors"110. Moreover, the PSP were no longer calling for the union of the two
Yemens, dropping all reference to Aden being part of the Yemen, but instead calling for
the implementation of the UN resolutions of 1963111. These two developments, the
support of violence and no longer calling for a Yemeni union, were an attempt by al
Asnag to get closer to the Egyptian position and regain his position as head of the
Nationalists. His aims to unite the various Nationalist groups also met with Nasser's
approval as pressure was brought to bear on the NLF by the Egyptian intelligence
119 •
services to join with OLOS . Whilst there was agreement over certain aims, such as
the abolition of the base and unconditional independence, there was no actual merger.
This was partly due to the rise of the 'secondary leadership' within the NLF which was
opposed to being under the domination ofNasser. Moreover, there was also
competition between the two organisations to gather support, in particular with the
trade unions in Aden. Some of the unions had come under NLF control and agitated for
industrial action which the ATUC would try to curb, although thereby endangering their
• • • • 113 , • •Nationalist position . The NLF unions also moved to overthrow the ATUC executive
in November 1965, and cabled the Yemeni Prime Minister that Qadhi and al Asnag no
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longer represented the Aden labour movement114. In fact, the NLF succeeded in voting
out al Asnag as Secretary-General for the first time since the ATUC was established,
although they failed to oust Qadhi as President115.
The two groups, OLOS and NLF, by the end of 1965 were in reality far from merging
given their rivalry for Egyptian patronage and the emergence of the 'secondary
leadership' within the Front. OLOS was the weaker of the two at the time, although
according to British Intelligence they were more in favour with Cairo116. However, the
British were somewhat blinkered with the Nationalists as they believed that without the
support of the UAR, a group would not survive. This was true to an extent, but the
NLF would later prove this premise dangerously wrong. OLOS was limited to Aden
and could not compete with the Front in the Protectorate whilst the SAL remained
aloof. Attempts were made once more to unite all three groups with the announcement
that the NLF had merged with OLOS to create the Front for the Liberation of Occupied
South Yemen (FLOSY) in January 1966 (see Chapter Seven). However, this was later
denied by the secondary leadership, and the NLF leaders that had signed the agreement
were expelled, thereby cutting off their Egyptian aid. Unlike OLOS/FLOSY, though,
the NLF were able to survive without receiving supplies from the UAR, as they would
prove in the last two years ofBritish rule when the main focus was on who would
succeed the rapidly ailing Federation once the announcement ofwithdrawal was made.
Conclusion
The establishment of the NLF was a turning-point in the Nationalist campaign against
British rule in South Arabia. The Front was composed of groups representing a wide
variety of interests and concerns in both the Western and Eastern Protectorates,
although the ANM was the dominant faction, and could claim support throughout South
West Arabia. The NLF's tactics, moreover, were also new to both the British and the
Federation, as the Front aimed at symbolic victories, in particular the embarrassment of
114 PRO CO 1055/63/54 - LIC (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary, Nov. 1965
115 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 133
116 PRO DEFE 11/601/4831 - Situation Report week ending 8 Nov. 1965
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British forces, rather than the more tangible success of capturing a Federal fort. Whilst
there were internal weaknesses and divisions, the British and Federal forces were
unable to exploit them, largely because the cell structure of the NLF meant that the
capture of a Front member was unlikely to lead to more than the compromising of that
particular cell. The final notable point about the NLF was its eventual independence
from Nasser and Egypt which meant that the Front would not be suddenly deprived of
support after the Six Day War in June 1967, a fate which befell the UAR-backed
FLOSY. The combination of these factors meant that by the time the British
Government finally admitted it had to cut its commitments, the NLF were in a strong
position to be the dominant group in South Arabia after independence.
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Chapter Seven: The End of Empire?, 1966-67
Introduction
British policy towards South Arabia was to change radically from February 1966 when
the Defence White Paper was published by the Secretary of State, Denis Healey. From
then on the aim was to withdraw from the base in an orderly fashion and pass control of
South Arabia to the Federation, ifpossible since this was definitely a secondary priority.
The last eighteen months ofBritish rule, therefore, saw the Federation and the
Nationalist groups vying with each other for the power to run an independent State.
Meanwhile, the British Forces were trying to disengage themselves from an
increasingly confusing and fluid situation and at the same time bolster a Federation
which was politically unstable and losing the loyalty of its own forces.
The 1966 Defence White Paper
The Needfor Cuts
Since their election victory Labour had continued the east of Suez policy and Harold
Wilson and many of his Cabinet, like their Conservative predecessors, maintained their
belief in a world role for Britain (see above, Chapter 5). Therefore, the contents of the
White Paper (published on 22 February) came as a surprise to many in both London and
South Arabia. The decision to withdraw from Aden and grant independence in January
1968, after nearly 130 years of occupation, marked another blow to Britain's east of
Suez policy. It deserves be examined for the reasons behind the policy and the
implications it had for an independent South Arabia.
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According to the memoirs and diaries of Labour politicians, the reasons behind the
defence cuts and decisions to withdraw in the White Paper were primarily economic
rather than military and were largely driven by pressure from a Treasury anxious to
limit British spending. This in turn created difficulties for the Ministry of Defence
which had to juggle Treasury-imposed cuts with political commitments that the Foreign
Office were reluctant to relinquish. This left the Ministry of Defence under pressure
from two different directions:
"The Treasury, which sometimes seemed to know the price of everything and
the value of nothing, was always pressing me for further cuts in defence
spending. However, no government should cut a military capability without
cutting the political commitment which made that capability necessary. And
this the Foreign Office was usually reluctant to do; it seemed to regard every
commitment as an invaluable pearl without price. So I had to fight a war on two
fronts."1
However, Britain's increasing economic and financial problems meant cuts had to be
made and Healey was instructed to cut the previous Conservative government's planned
spending by £400 million (at 1964 prices) over five years. Further cuts were
implemented later as the economic difficulties continued (including the devaluation of
sterling) and in the end defence spending was reduced from over 7% of the nation's
output (GNP) to 5% with £5,000 million saved2.
The initial saving was primarily achieved by scrapping the aircraft carrier programme
(which caused the resignation of the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, the brother of Sir
William Luce, former Governor ofAden) and buying AmericanFill planes instead of
building new British ones3. This was not enough, as Healey pointed out, since the
Government could only save money by relinquishing commitments. British
commitments were needing more and more time, money and effort to defend due to the
increased military power of certain countries ("Wogs have Migs" as Julian Amery
offensively put it during the Suez debate4). The problem, though, was that withdrawal
1
Healey, Denis - The Time ofMy Life (Michael Joseph, London, 1989), p. 256
2 ibid., p. 270-1
3 ibid., p. 275-6
4 ibid., p. 279
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from Aden was unlikely to save manpower due to continuing commitments in the
Persian Gulf (Kuwait, the Trucial States). Furthermore, Britain could not reduce its
manpower in the Far East due to involvement in the conflict in Borneo. Ultimately,
however, the base in Aden had to be given up due to the worsening security situation
there which meant more British troops were involved in the defence of the base than
there were on standby for the defence ofGulf commitments (the main reason for the
presence in South Arabia).
The Conservative Government in 1962 had promised that British troops would stay in
Aden 'permanently'. This was then reversed and in 1964 it was announced that they
would grant independence in 1968. The Labour administration had also announced that
they would not relinquish the base, with Healey announcing as late as January 1966
(during his visit to Australia) that Britain "had no intention of ratting on her
commitments in the Middle East"5. However, the harsh reality of the economic
situation and the problems ofmaintaining the security of the base meant Aden and the
Federation had to be abandoned:
"Since the population was hostile to Britain, and deeply riven by internal
divisions, these two promises [the Conservative ones of 1962 and 1964] were
obviously incompatible. We found it impossible to make any constitution work,
and had to impose direct rule in 1965. So we decided to stick to the date for
independence but to remove our troops at the same time. All alternatives would
have been worse."6.
However, the White Paper was not well received in either London or South Arabia for
differing reasons. The Conservatives in the House ofCommons denounced the
withdrawal as a betrayal ofBritain's friends, especially as there was to be no military
assistance to the Federation after independence, and the left-wing of the Labour Party
called the cuts too little. Christopher Mayhew (Minister of State for the Navy) resigned
the day of publication due to the cuts in the defence programme with no comparable cut
• • 7 • • •
in commitments . Richard Crossman was also disappointed that the White Paper
5 Balfour-Paul, Glen - The end ofempire in the Middle East (CUP, Cambridge, 1991), p.85
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contained no immediate cut in commitments. Crossman noted in his diaries that during
a Commons debate on the reduction of the East of Suez policy (15 June 1966),
Callaghan whispered to him that he disagreed with Harold Wilson's line that "he would
o
never deny Britain the role of a world power" . Moreover, Callaghan believed that
Healey and George Brown were also unenthusiastic,
"East of Suez is solely the P.M.'s line - the P.M. with George Wigg's backing.
Undoubtedly, it's all a fantastic illusion. How can anyone build up Britain now
as a great power East of Suez when we can't even maintain the sterling area and
some of our leaders are having the idea of creeping inside Europe in order to
escape from our independence outside?"9.
Crossman believed he only held up his own hand in the vote because he was a Minister
and so was expected to support the Prime Minister10. This criticism ofWilson also
comes across in Healey's account of the debate over withdrawing from East of Suez.
Healey was initially in favour ofmaintaining the policy,
"But hard experience compelled me to recognise that the growth ofnationalism
would have made it politically unwise for Britain to maintain a military
presence in the Middle East and South East Asia, even if our economic situation
had permitted it"11.
He also maintained that the Government could not have withdrawn immediately due to
troops still fighting in South Arabia and Borneo, and the need for the consent of
Britain's partners. However, the other factor against an earlier withdrawal was that
"Harold Wilson had illusions of grandeur about our post-imperial role in Asia and
• 19
Africa; they endured even after his Cabinet had swung against it" . The Prime
Minister, however, believed that,
8
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"a majority, including myself, moved more by thoughts of a contribution to
international peace-keeping than by considerations of imperial splendour,
11
favoured the retention of a minimum force there [i.e. East of Suez]" .
Timing ofthe Announcement
According to Government documents, the decision to withdraw was taken by mid-
December 1965, at the latest since by 16 December, the Colonial Office had written a
memo on the outcome of the Defence Review14. Moreover, the Defence and Overseas
Policy Committee were discussing the issue of the timing of the announcement by 20
December15. This makes the decision to allow Lord Beswick (a junior Minister for the
Colonies) to visit South Arabia in November 1965 and announce that Britain would
stay in Aden to reassure the Federal Rulers either very shortsighted or very duplicitous.
Had the decision already been taken to withdraw then it seems highly unlikely that a
Government Minister would have been allowed to announce that Britain was staying.
This would suggest, therefore, that either the Government had not made the final
decision to withdraw, or if the decision had been taken, then a delay in announcing the
withdrawal was required. In fact, Beswick had telegrammed London to state that the
financial obligations needed to retain base were greater than previously thought16. The
fact that these obligations would have had to be met in order to secure the co-operation
of a future independent government (for road building, countering starvation in Fadhli)
could well have forced the Government's decision. The Government as a whole, and
the Treasury in particular, would have been very reluctant to sanction extra financial
support at a time of economic difficulties and cut-backs.
Once the decision had been taken, however, then the main question concerned the
timing of the announcement. The differences between the Whitehall departments again
spring to the surface with the Colonial Office and Ministry ofDefence in favour of an
13
Wilson, Harold - The Labour Government 1964-70: A Personal Record (Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
London, 1971), p. 276
14 PRO CAB 148/49 Outcome ofthe Defence Review: Aden Base, Memo by Colonial Office, 16 Dec.
1965
15 PRO CAB 148/49 Consequences ofannouncement ofout intention to withdraw from the Aden base,
Minutes of Sub-Committee Meeting, 20 Dec. 1965
16 PRO DEFE 11/601/4841 Lord Beswick to Secretary ofState for the Colonies, 11 Nov. 1965
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early announcement, but the Foreign Office wanting to delay it as long as possible. The
Colonial Office memo mentioned above argued that once the announcement was made
then the various interests in South Arabia would sink their differences and work
together17. If the announcement was delayed for long after the Defence Review was
finished, it continued, then withdrawal would be seen in the Middle East as the result of
UAR pressure. The memo acknowledges that foreign policy considerations militated
against an early announcement since it would be preferable to complete negotiations
with the Sultan ofMasirah about having a base there. Furthermore, there was the
danger that Nasser might have reversed the planned Egyptian withdrawal from the
Yemen to claim he drove the British out of South Arabia. On the other hand, D.J.
McCarthy at the Foreign Office stated that,
"The decision [to withdraw completely] will come as a shock. Most Adenis,
including A1 Asnag, have counted on our defence interest keeping us on their
10
side against their neighbours in the Federation" .
McCarthy pointed out that the NLF and Egyptians would not relax and would seek "to
show that our departure is their victory" and so the later the news broke the better19.
Moreover, the idea that an early announcement would enforce a free agreement between
the Adenis and the Federalis was misconceived since the Government would have lost
virtually the last sanction against either by announcing independence and withdrawal.
He also warned that the decision made the break-up of the Federation "a real
• • • 90
possibility", albeit not inevitable .
Ultimately, however, the decision went against the Foreign Office, although it would
appear that the reason for this was not due to political considerations in South Arabia.
The Foreign Office were proposing that reference to the withdrawal should be as vague
as possible in the White Paper. Healey, though, felt the Paper must contain some
indication of the intention not to retain the base:
17 PRO CAB 148/49 - Outcome ofDefence Review: Aden Base, 16 Dec. 1965
18 PRO CAB 148/49 Defence Review - Reactions to the provisional decision on Aden in the Federation




"He [Healey] appears to feel that the proposed departure from Aden is one of
the few concrete signs that can be given that the Defence Review really means
something in terms of a reduction of commitments and that in any case even if
the White Paper is fuzzy on the point it is going to be virtually impossible to
refuse significant clarifications in the lengthy Parliamentary discussions which
follow its publication"21.
Therefore, the arguments in favour of delaying the announcement to let the Egyptians
withdraw from the Yemen were ignored in favour of domestic politics. The implication
ofHealey's decision is that, had there been more substance to the White Paper, then the
decision to withdraw could have been announced at a later, more favourable date for the
British.
Once the Foreign Office had been defeated over the decision, the problem was how to
present the withdrawal to the Federation and to ensure that a friendly successor state
was in control when independence took place. The High Commissioner, Turnbull,
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believed that the timing of the announcement was not as important as the content . He
believed that an announcement without an offer of financial support and technical and
administrative aid would mean that the Federation would start to disintegrate almost
immediately. This would then lead to the need for an increased military effort for the
period up to independence to ensure an orderly withdrawal. The Foreign Office still
believed that the timing was creating the real difficulties, but recognised that continuing
support for the Federation might ensure its survival. Moreover, support for the Federal
rulers would also reassure the rulers in the Gulf that Britain would not abandon them,
"The moral of this is that we should perhaps support the High Commissioner in
his efforts to secure a continuing commitment at this stage, even though in our
hearts we may doubt the wisdom, and indeed the eventual feasibility, of such a
commitment to a ramshackle, disunited and probable unviable South Arabian
state. Such a commitment might, in short, enable us to turn an awkward comer
as regards the Gulf'23.
21 PRO FO 371/185180/B1071/3 Minute by B.A.B. Burrows, 7 Jan 1966
22 ibid.
23 PRO FO 371/185180/B1071/3 Minute by Roger Allen, 7 Jan 1966
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In the end, though, the main goal of all departments was, "to avoid, or minimize
Nasser's triumph and the extent to which he can exploit the announcement of our
withdrawal"24. Therefore, the priority driving British policy once the decision to
withdraw had been taken was not the establishment of a stable successor state in good
relations with Britain, but rather firstly to deny victory to Nasser and also keep the Gulf
Rulers happy.
Reaction to the White Paper
The reaction to the announcement in South Arabia was, as McCarthy had predicted, one
of shock and dismay. The Federal Ministers viewed the decision, "a breach of faith by
H.M.G.", and requested, "increased financial assistance and other help to make the
local security forces able to defend South Arabia after Independence" 25. Adeni opinion
was more divided; on the one hand there was, "publicly manifested satisfaction at the
planned early departure of the British", but on the other some were afraid that there
might be, "a clash between not only Adenis and other Federal subjects, but amongst
~)(\
Adenis themselves" .
The Federal Supreme Council were in fact informed of the decision by Lord Beswick,
just three months after his last visit to reassure them. They were bitter, not so much
because of the base closure, but because of the refusal to defend them after
independence. The Federal Ministers contrasted this refusal with the continued support
for Kuwait, and regarded it as a clear breach of the 1959 Treaty and 1964 White
27 • *i
Paper . Unsurprisingly, the independence and withdrawal announcement pushed the
Hone/Bell proposals into the background, and the prospect of constitutional advance
rapidly receded once the Federal Rulers realised they were no longer to receive British
support. This was alarming since the 'feudal'/tribal form of government in the
Federation was one of the main sources of propaganda for the Nationalist groups, and
the lack of constitutional advance would strengthen their hand. This in turn could have
24 ibid.
25 PRO DEFE 11/503/5038 Intelligence Reportfor February 1966
26 ibid.
27 PRO DEFE 11/502/4972 Lord Beswick to Secretary ofState for Colonies, 17 Feb. 1966
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disrupted a satisfactory (from a British point of view) withdrawal which in turn
threatened the proposed redeployment to the Gulf, especially as a Nationalist victory
meant potential instability in the region. Moreover, D.J. McCarthy at the Foreign
Office warned that the Federal Government may give up if there was no improvement
in terms, Aden dismissed Hone/Bell, and the few Adenis brought into the Federal fold
represented few people. Therefore he proposed offering support to the Federation
(although the Government could have hedged the commitment in order to promote
constitutional reform) the cost ofwhich should have been seen in the terms of the
alternatives and the possible disruption of the peninsula set-up and oil supply28. This,
eventually, did happen to a certain extent, but by the time the Government had
reconsidered, it was a case of too little, too late as far as the Federation was concerned.
The 1966 White Paper, therefore, marked the countdown to the end ofBritish rule in
Aden. The decision to implement defence cuts and withdraw from South Arabia was
largely due to financial expediency and the need to relinquish overseas commitments.
These cuts disappointed Wilson's desire for an international role for Britain, although
they did not go far enough for many in the Labour Party who wanted further
commitments cut. The White Paper's effect on South Arabia was in some ways to
increase the difficulties of the British administration there since it gave a boost to the
Nationalists, although it could be argued that it was fairly likely that the UAR would
not have withdrawn from the Yemen anyway. However, the decisions to withdraw and,
importantly, refusal to make a defence commitment, did undermine the Federal
Government who had now lost their source ofmilitary and financial support, which in
turn created instability and uncertainty as to the future of South Arabia. Healey
believed that it was the inherent weaknesses of the Federation and the policies of the
previous administration which caused its downfall rather than the White Paper and lack
ofBritish support, "South Arabia is a mess; but it was already an irredeemable mess
9Q
when the Wilson Government took over" . This could be viewed as passing the buck,
28 PRO FO 371/185179/B1052/81 Letter McCarthy to Allen, 3 Mar 1966 - in this letter, McCarthy
indulges in an 'I told you so' over his predictions for an early announcement, "Everyone in the know
here, in December, regarded the optimistic thesis as dangerously unsound" and "the Egyptian reaction
was exactly what the Department predicted"
29
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but it has to be admitted that the Federation was already weak and only survived with
British aid, which was clearly seen when that aid was withdrawn in the final months
before independence.
The Crater Mutiny and the Collapse of the Federation
Attempts to Strengthen the Federation
The 1966 White Paper announced independence and British withdrawal with the
intention ofpassing the reins ofpower to the Federation of South Arabia. However, as
noted above, there were warnings from British Government officials that the
announcement could well politically destabilise the Federation and demoralise the
Federal security forces. In contrast, the announcement was expected to encourage the
Nationalists who, with Egypt's support, would themselves seek to take credit for
driving the British out and take power once the colonial authorities had gone. The final
eighteen months ofBritish rule were, therefore, characterised by requests from the
Federal Rulers for support after independence and increased Nationalist attacks against
the Federation and the British. The demise of the Federation was not inevitable, but it
did become increasingly likely, and the attitude and loyalty of the Federal Forces
became more and more important since they were vital to the Rulers' survival as head
of an independent South Arabia. The final nail in the coffin, therefore, came when the
South Arabian Army and Armed Police mutinied, which confirmed what many had
suspected - that the Federation could not take control of an independent State and that
the British would have to deal with one or more of the Nationalist groups.
There were attempts by both the Federation and the British to broaden the basis of the
Federal government and attract support from the more 'moderate' Nationalists in order
to resist the Egyptian-backed, 'extremist' groups. These included FLOSY, the
successor to OLOS (see below) and the NLF, who were actually trying to distance
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themselves from Cairo's control during this period. The Federal reasoning for this was
obvious self-interest despite their earlier distaste for any form of constitutional advance
and rapprochement with any nationalist, whilst the British were keen to pass control to
a friendly government in order to prevent destabilising the region and threatening
Western interests in the Gulf (primarily oil supplies). Therefore from March 1966
onwards certain Federal Rulers had informal discussions with those dissident leaders
who had been creating tribal unrest in the mid-1950s and Federal defectors30. On 18
March, the Audhali and Fadhli Sultans and Naib Nasir al Audhali met Ahmad bin
Abdullah al Fadhli and Jabil bin Husain al Audhali (the former Sultan and Naib of that
state, both members ofFLOSY by this time) at Qarsh (near the Yemeni border), both
■31
sides stating they had much in common with the SAL . Then on 25 March, the SAL
leadership (with the support of some Protectorate rebels) met the Federal and FLOSY
representatives in Asmara, in Eritrea, having already met with al Asnag and Maqawi
"39
(also ofFLOSY) in Cairo . However, the presence ofAhmad al Fadhli and Jabil bin
Husain at Asmara and Qarsh was on their own initiative and not endorsed by the
FLOSY leadership, and so should not have been taken as a sign of any softening of the
FLOSY approach towards the Federation . Furthermore, the meeting between the SAL
and al Asnag and Maqawi in Cairo was probably more to persuade the League to join
FLOSY rather than an attempt to reach agreement on joining with the Federation. This
was underlined by the refusal of al Asnag and Maqawi to attend the meeting between
the Federal representatives and the SAL leaders in Beirut in late March/early April
196634. Al Asnag and Maqawi were supposed to have been at the meeting, but didn't
if
go, probably because ofEgyptian pressure .
At this stage, whilst the British were still expecting the Federal Supreme Council to
disintegrate if there was no aid promised, the talks between the Federation and the SAL
and certain elements ofFLOSY gave some hope for the future. However, this did not
30 For example, see PRO DEFE 11/503/5044 - L.I.C. (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summery for March,
1966, which talks of these meetings as "one ray of light in the present dark situation"
31 PRO DEFE 11/503/5044 - L.I.C. (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summaryfor March, 1966
32 ibid.
33 Kostiner, Joseph - The Struggle for South Yemen (Croom Helm, London, 1984), p. 131
34 PRO DEFE 11/503/5044 - op. cit.
35 ibid.
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last long. By the end of 1966 the Federal (and British) position in South Arabia was
clearly on the verge of collapsing unless radical measures were introduced. This was
underlined by the visit of the Chairman (C.F.R. Barclay) and Deputy Chairman (N.St.G.
Gribbon) of the South Arabian Action Group (SAAG), a committee made up of
members of the Colonial Office, Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence which was
established to oversee the withdrawal of British forces. The report of this visit is
important as it presented the reality of the situation facing Britain and the Federation.
Whilst there had been previous warnings from Government officials working in South
Arabia that the British position was in danger of being undermined unless action was
taken, the SAAG report highlighted that the situation was almost irredeemable. The
report pointed out that,
"It seems very possible that unless the present prospects alter significantly, the
Egyptians will succeed in establishing their authority over the Western end of
South Arabia, including Aden, during 1968" .
The Chairman and his Deputy set out the main factors affecting "the South Arabian
situation" and put forward recommendations to preserve British interests. The
dominating factor, according to them, was the Egyptian presence in the Yemen which,
combined with "Egyptian organised intimidation", was "inhibiting all normal political
development"37. The security situation was in a bad state with the British forces having
the problem of "running down the base on the one hand, whilst maintaining the
operational units at peak efficiency ready to meet the uncertain military situation ahead
38 • • • •
on the other" . Moreover, since security measures, especially in Aden, were in the
hands ofBritish forces, once they withdrew, the survival of the Federation would rely
on the loyalty and efficiency of the Federal Army. Another major weakness was that,
"an overall lack of confidence in the future of the Federation is leading to an
unwillingness on the part ofmany Federal authorities to commit themselves
wholeheartedly to building up their country on present lines. This is tending to
• 3Q
affect the security situation adversely" .
36 PRO DEFE 11/506 - South Arabia Action Group: Report by Chairman and Deputy Chairman on their




Furthermore, there was a severe lack of intelligence information which was hampering
the ability of the security forces to counter the threat to the Federation and arrange an
orderly withdrawal. To fulfill British aims, the SAAG recommended that the
Government did everything possible to: undermine the Egyptian position in the
Yemen; establish a full time Intelligence Staff; give the Federation all possible
administrative help to strengthen its forces; use retaliatory action over the Yemeni
border; and strengthen the power of South Arabian broadcasting to counter
propaganda. The report concluded that "the chief importance of achieving a secure and
stable situation in South Arabia was the effect that this, or rather the lack of this, would
have on the Persian Gulf'40. However, the report also warned that,
"the security prospects for South Arabia, both before and after Independence,
are bad. It is too late now to introduce measures that might have been effective
a year or two ago. Without the Egyptian presence in the Yemen the new
Federation might be able to work out its own salvation and become viable and
stable by local standards. If, however, the Egyptian threat remains, it seems
likely to us that the security situation will deteriorate seriously between now and
Independence. We further doubt whether the Federation will survive for long
after Independence unless it receives effective support either from the United
Nations or from a friendly power."41.
This bleak warning was repeated in other documents from the time with the common
factors being the threat ofEgyptian influence via the YAR and the necessity of loyalty
among the Federal Forces42.
Federal Forces
The question of the morale and reliability of the Federal Regular Army and Federal
Guard was important since the Federation could not survive without armed forces to
support it against the different Nationalist groups. However, it became clear that the
different forces which were supposed to be under the control of the Federal Rulers were
in fact increasingly disillusioned with their masters. Furthermore, there was also
40 ibid.
41 ibid.
42 for example see PRO DEFE 11/525 - Situation Report on South Arabia, January-23 February 1967,
DEFE 11/525 - Possible Steps over South Arabia,
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increasing evidence that the security forces had been infiltrated by one or more of the
Nationalist groups:
"The morale of the Aden Police is low and their reliability, particularly in the
event of serious disturbances ofpolitical origin, is questionable. Their value
against terrorism is negligible"43.
The Aden Police did seem to be the worst affected by low morale and infiltration, and
the arrest of Chief Inspector Husain Jawi for complicity in terrorism was an indication
of the severity of the situation44. However, it was not the only force involved since the
FRA, the FG and Aden Armed Police had all also been compromised by Nationalist
infiltration45. This was later shown by the Crater Mutiny and the refusal/inability of the
Federal forces to combat the NLF or FLOSY seizing control of different Federal states
following the collapse of the ruler's control in the hinterland and the British withdrawal
(see below). This was a major worry for British plans for an orderly evacuation since,
"Federal forces must begin to take over the full burden [ofmaintaining security],
whereas hitherto they have had British air, logistic and other backing"46. In order to
bolster the Federation and enable an orderly withdrawal, therefore, the British tried to
gain international recognition for an independent South Arabia through the United
Nations. However, the visit of a UN Mission to Aden was a disaster (April 1967) from
that point of view as none of the Nationalist parties agreed to meet the Mission unless it
was recognised as the sole representative of the South Arabian peoples (see below).
Doubts about the Federal Forces continued, especially as the dates for handing over
power drew near47. The Federal Government, in fact, wanted the surrender of British
sovereignty to be brought forward, although they were in no hurry for independence.
The rulers wanted the freedom to deal with their opponents as they saw fit without
having to worry about international condemnation (as the British did), but at the same
43 PRO FO 371/185311 - Note on the Morale and reliability ofthe Aden Police, 1966
44 ibid.
45 Kostiner - op. cit., p. 101
46 PRO DEFE 11/525 - Possible Steps over South Arabia,
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time were unwilling to be left without British military support if things went wrong.
They argued that
"terrorism in Aden must be dealt with effectively before independence if the
future state is to survive; that our [i.e. British] methods cannot deal with it; that
their methods could, but not if they have to be applied in conditions ofBritish
• 48
sovereignty and British Parliamentary supervision" .
Britain was unwilling to do this since, once sovereignty was surrendered, then they
could not reassert it. Therefore, if the Federation were defeated by the Nationalists,
then the port, Khormaksar airfield and water supplies (all ofwhich were vital supply
lines for the base) would be under the control of a group/groups opposed to the British.
The Federation also continued to try to broaden their political base and by the end of
February 1967 had completed a draft constitution which provided for a President, a
Prime Minister and Deputy and a single chamber Parliament49. However, the Sharif of
Beihan, the most respected and most popular of the Federal rulers - at least among the
other rulers and Ministers - refused the Presidency50. This resulted in disputes over
who would take which position in the government and threatened to split the Supreme
Council.
The Crater Mutiny
Ultimately the lack of confidence in the Federation, its inability to stand on its own two
feet without British support and the low morale of its forces were its downfall. Events
reached a predictable conclusion when the South Arabian forces mutinied and the
British and Federal Governments lost control ofCrater for two weeks after 20 June
1967. The spark that set off the events of 20 June lay in tribal rivalry and the structure
of the Federal forces, in particular the predominance of officers and troops from Aulaqi
tribes. In the FRA, 37% of officers and 23% ofmen, including the Commander-
designate, the Deputy Commander-designate and seven of the ten commanding officers
48 PRO DEFE 11/525 - Possible Steps over South Arabia,
49 PRO DEFE 11/526 - Situation Report on South Arabia, 24 February-17 March, 1967
50 PRO DEFE 11/525/5621 - Situation Reportfor Week Ending 6 Mar 1967
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were all Aulaqi51. This had caused resentment among officers and men from other
tribes, which was greatly exacerbated by the appointment as Commander-Designate of
'Aqeed' (Colonel) Nasser Buraik Aulaqi in May 1967. The appointment had been
opposed by both the High Commissioner and the Commander in Chief of British
Middle East Land Forces. The latter commented that Buraik was,
"a manipulator with strong Aulaqi bias. As soon as his appointment is
confirmed it is probable that he will try to manipulate his Army posts to his
• • • S9
advantage. He already has many enemies and the number will increase" .
However, as the High Commissioner suggested, the Federal Supreme Council failed to
appreciate the widespread opposition to Buraik . They wanted their own man on
whose loyalty they could rely and the appointment was confirmed. The depth of
feelings against him was shown by the petition signed by 11 senior Arab officers - 4 of
the 6 'Aqeeds' and 7 of the 15 'Quaids' (Lieutenant-Colonels) - and presented to the
Federal Ministry ofDefence on 3 June. However, the matter was put on hold until the
British Commander of the South Arabian Army (SAA), Brigadier Dye, returned from
leave on 16 June.
Another factor which played a part in the Mutiny was the demoralising effect of the
Arab defeat in the Six Day War (5-10 June): "the effect of rumours on groups of
tribesmen in uniform already subject to overstrain and always tending to be
emotional"54. This view, despite its patronising overtones of the colonial attitude
towards indigenous troops, showed how wide an impact the Israeli victory over Egypt,
Syria and Jordan had on the rest of the Middle East. The Six Day war was
demoralising for Arab Nationalists in general, although the NLF did benefit from
Nasser's defeat as Egypt could no longer afford - militarily, financially, or politically -
to support FLOSY in their South Arabian campaign (see below).
51 PRO DEFE 11/533/E6456 - Report on the Mutinies within the South Arabian Forces on 20 June 1967,
HQMEC, 26 Oct. 1967
52 PRO DEFE 11/527/5796 - MELF to MoD Army, 6 May 1967
53 PRO DEFE 11/527/5789 - Telegram from High Commissioner to Foreign Office, 4 May 1967
54 PRO DEFE 11/533/E6456 - op. cit.
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The other notable event behind the Crater Mutiny was the actual reorganisation of the
Federal security forces in June 1967. Ironically, the aim of this reorganisation had been
to help the Federation prepare for independence and enable it to defend itself from
outside attack without British support. The reverse, in fact, happened, as the
restructuring of the FRA, FG and Police forces saw a further dip in morale and a
corresponding dip in efficacy. The creation of a unified Federal Police force had made
little progress as State Rulers were reluctant to lose control of their forces. The morale
of the South Arabian Police (SAP) was poor, whilst the Aden Police were intimidated
by the "terrorist organisations"55. Some Police officers and men gave active support to
these organisations, and since few criminals were tried, the Police had little incentive to
make arrests. The FG2 was ill-disciplined, poorly trained, poorly administered and
badly equipped - for example 40% of the soldiers ofFG2 in April 1967 were without
uniforms56. As regards the SAA, morale had deteriorated as "Arabisation" of the force
had produced lower standards of efficiency, junior officers were unhappy with their
senior (and sometimes less competent) officers. Finally, expansion of the Federal
Guard had not 'detribalised' FG 1 to the same extent as the FRA had been, and the
operational efficiency of these units was below that of the old FRA. The report on the
Mutiny summarised the effects of the reorganisation on the new forces, with particular
emphasis on the different Police forces who would prove to be the most difficult of the
mutineers to appease:
"On 1st June, 1967, the SAA and SAP came into being. The SAA was formed
by an amalgamation of the Federal Regular Army (FRA) consisting of five
battalions, with the bulk (four battalions) of the Federal Guard 1 (FG 1). This
amalgamation became a fact. In contrast the SAP's amalgamation was - and
still is - in name only; it is still the eventual intention to amalgamate the Federal
Guard 2 (FG2), the Aden Armed and Civil Police, the Lahej State Police, and
the remnant ofFG 1 to form this force. On June 20th and still today these four








Thus, with low morale, strong tribal influences, ill-discipline in certain units, little
progress in creating a unified Police force and lower efficiency, the Federal security
forces were already in a state of tension. The appointment of Buraik, therefore, can be
seen as the straw that finally broke the camel's back.
When Brigadier Dye returned, he recommended suspension of the four 'Aqeeds' who
had signed the petition, which the Supreme Council duly endorsed (17 June) . The
'Aqeeds' were incensed and planned to demonstrate the depth of feeling against the
Aulaqis in the SAA, and at least one British official received information that
demonstrations were planned for Monday 19 June. In the event, that day passed off
quietly, but reports about the state of unrest among the SAA were received and
seemingly discounted. Although reports of unrest were no indication of the violence
that occurred on 20 June, the British should have been more aware of the low morale
and high tensions running through the SAA and SAP. The report into the Mutiny
pointed out that, "it is not intended to suggest that these reports indicated that there was
any possibility of violence. They did, however, indicate unrest and dissatisfaction."59.
This "unrest and dissatisfaction" was, however, largely ignored. Therefore, although
the Commander SAA doubled the guard on the armouries, the assurance that everything
was quiet during the 19th, meant that the events of the 20th came as a surprise:
"when the mutinies began on the morning of 20th June 1967, the British forces
were unaware of the state of tension that had been reached within the South
Arabian Army and which was to percolate down to the South Arabian Police
and Aden Armed Police"60.
Given the repeated warnings from the SAAG and, before that, the Western Aden
Protectorate Security Committee in 1962 and 1965 about the poor state of the Federal
forces, this ignorance is surprising. Furthermore, this lack of awareness about the





The first incident was at the main SAA training camp at Lake Lines where a
demonstration by youths from the Apprentices School led to a crowd forming which
tried to get into the armoury, but was foiled by Arab officers and NCOs61. At about the
same time (10 a.m.), the Federal Minister ofDefence ordered Dye to reinstate the four
'Aqeeds', presumably in order to lower tensions within the SAA. At Champion Lines
barracks, however, an order, from the Federal Ministry of Internal Security, was given
fO
to form two riot squads to help deal with the troubles at Lake Lines . Significantly,
though, senior British and Arab officers, who might have disputed the action, did not
see the order. As a result the squads refused to go on parade having heard and believed
a rumour that the British had fired on the SAA in Lake Lines. A crowd ofArab troops
then barricaded themselves inside the Northern end of the camp and firing began (at
about 10:15 a.m.) which became intense, and British personnel were blockaded inside
the guardroom. There was also fire directed at Radfan camp and at RAF Khormaksar
as rumours spread about the British firing on Arab troops. However, the return of a
senior Arab officer to Champion Lines and actions by British troops restored order and
stability to the barracks by the early afternoon (1:30 p.m.) . Even so, the mutiny
highlighted the speed at which such an incident could happen under the conditions in
South Arabia, and also that the Arab officers were unable to control their men as the
situation got out of hand. Moreover, the news that the British had opened fire in
Champion lines also reached Crater where it was to have far-reaching and drastic
effects.
Rumours of the disturbances reached Crater at about 1100 hours, and they spread
rapidly, including one that an attack on the Armed Police Barracks was imminent. This
caused a state of near-panic and arms were forcibly taken (some 400 rifles and 35 semi¬
automatic machine guns). Unfortunately, two land rovers ofBritish troops were in
Crater, and were fired upon by the Armed Police, and eight of the nine men were killed.
In fact the presence of the two land rovers was down to poor communications on the




Commander had feared for their safety when firing was heard. They went into Crater to
investigate whilst the platoon had withdrawn from the area by another route and radio
contact had been lost due to being screened by a range of hills. The platoon was then
ordered back into Crater to investigate what had happened to the land rovers, and also
came under fire, with four men presumed killed (their bodies were never seen). The
only survivor from the land rovers was actually rescued by the Armed Police and
evacuated from Crater in the evening of the 20th. After this, no British troop was to
enter Crater for thirteen days until the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders re-entered the
town on 3 July.
The conclusions of the report into the mutinies again underlined the realities of the
Federal and British positions in South Arabia, and showed the mistakes made by both
in the previous months. Whilst the report was not finished until late October 1967, the
criticisms it made about the state of the Federal forces were not new. The mutinies,
"proved that the Federal Government had little or no control over the situation
and did not command the respect or loyalty of it own Forces It was plain that
the Federal Government could only survive with British presence and backing
and that some other form of administration must take over responsibility, and
the sooner the better."64
The British Government had been made aware of the political and military weakness of
the Federation by successive Governors and High Commissioner, as well as reports into
the situation. For whatever reasons, largely a fear of international condemnation and
the harming ofBritish interests elsewhere, little had been done to bolster the Federation
and harm its enemies. The covert operations in favour of the Royalists in the Yemen
were the sole actions taken by the British against the Nationalists (see Chapter Six).
However, these operations achieved little in terms ofmaking the Federation a more
substantial institution, especially as they could not be used for propaganda purposes due
to the very nature of the actions.
64 ibid.
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The major weakness of the fight against the Nationalists, though, was the almost
complete lack of useful Intelligence information the Federation had and the British
received. The Federal Government had claimed to have access to Intelligence which
they would not release to the British, but this was shown to have little foundation:
"The paucity ofBritish Intelligence information had long been realised by the
authorities, but it had been thought in some quarters that the Federal Rulers
knew a great deal. They did not."65.
If the British believed that the Federal rulers had such information, however, why was
there no attempt to share the intelligence? The weakness ofvalid British Intelligence
had again been a repeated criticism of Johnston, Trevaskis and the Western Aden
Protectorate Security Committee. This was also never properly remedied, but if the
reason for that was the reliance on possible Federal Intelligence, then it is not surprising
that the British authorities were unaware of the tensions running through the Federal
forces.
Admittedly, the British authorities had no prior warning of the mutinies. The Federal
Government had failed to pass on the warnings they had received. It is possible that
had British Intelligence received any warnings then action could have been taken which
might well have prevented some of the loss of life and tragedy in Crater. However, that
is not really any excuse, since the British should have ensured that they had their own
adequate Intelligence to listen to:
"The need for Intelligence has been stressed over and again. To be satisfactory,
Intelligence must be organised before an emergency and sources protected both
before and during it. This is a lesson that British authorities have repeatedly
failed to leam, with expensive consequences."66.
If, however, the tensions within the SAA were known, then it was a serious





The report concluded by pointing out that the evidence suggested there was no pre¬
planned intention of armed mutiny. However, the blame lay with the Federal Forces as
a whole. Furthermore, the risk of repetition remained whilst tribal suspicion and
distrust exist. Finally, the presence of British troops and their bravery probably
prevented a complete disintegration of the local forces.
The Federation survived the Crater Mutiny, but was fatally damaged by it as it was clear
to all that the SAA and SAP had no confidence in the Supreme Council, their morale
was low and efficiency poor. Even without the Crater Mutiny it was highly unlikely
that the Federation would have survived beyond independence as by June 1967 it was
clearly beginning to fall apart. In short, the Federal Rulers could only have survived
with British financial and military help, but even this was unlikely to be enough without
the actual presence ofBritish troops. Therefore, the mutinies of 20 June finally proved
to Her Majesty's Government that they would have to look elsewhere for a successor to
their rule in South Arabia, and this meant having to deal with the Nationalists.
FLOSY vs. NLF: The Final Battle
Establishment ofFLOSY
As the Federation was becoming increasingly vulnerable after the publication of the
1966 White Paper, the different Nationalist groups were conducting their own
campaigns to try to succeed to power after the British withdrawal and Independence.
After the events of 20 June, when it was clear to everybody that the Federation (at least
in its present form) could not survive, attempts were made to bring the SAL, FLOSY
and the NLF into the equation. However, with neither group willing to work with the
other, and Nasser still having a large degree of influence over certain figures, this
process was never going to be easy. Ultimately, the struggle to control an independent
South Arabia boiled down to a military confrontation between FLOSY and the NLF.
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This was occurring at the same time as the British were disengaging themselves and
trying to maintain an orderly withdrawal.
The creation ofOrganisation for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS) in May
1965 failed in its primary aim of giving Nasser overall control of the Nationalist
campaign in South Arabia. Only a few of the NLF's leaders joined whilst the majority
of the rank and file, the secondary leadership, continued their own campaigns
independently of the UAR (see Chapter 6). The attempt to merge all the Nationalist
groups under Egyptian control was repeated in January 1966 when the remnants of the
PSP and most of the NLF leadership set up the Front for the Liberation ofOccupied
South Yemen (FLOSY). Once again this was not successful in amalgamating the
Nationalist groups since most of the NLF cells remained aloof. FLOSY did survive as
an organisation until independence, and was a major force in South Arabia, largely due
to its Egyptian patronage. However, it was never able to convince the majority ofNLF
followers to join its campaign. Moreover, since neither group would cede sole
representation of the people of South Arabia to the other, one of them had to give way,
which made armed conflict almost inevitable.
The introduction ofFLOSY onto the South Arabian scene caused political uncertainty
with prolonged discussions between al Asnag, Maqawi and al Sallami (a former NLF
leader). This resulted only in a statement from Cairo Radio on 25 February that an
announcement would soon be made "defining the type ofpopular revolutionary action
f\1
to be adopted" . There were rumours that a 'government-in-exile' would be formed,
although in the end a "Revolutionary Council" (not a government-in-exile) was
established with Maqawi as President, al Asnag a leading member, and six old NLF
/TO
men (led by al Sallami) among the twelve of the twenty members named . One
possible reason for the lack of authoritative statements concerning FLOSY may well
have been a need for a re-think in tactics and strategy following the publication of the
Defence White Paper. What was evident, however, was that the Egyptians were putting
their full weight behind FLOSY rather than the NLF whose supply of arms was stopped
67 PRO DEFE 11/503/5038 - Aden: Intelligence Reportfor February 1966, 22 Mar. 1966
68 ibid.
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and in Taiz measures were taken to neutralise those unwilling to join FLOSY. The
result was that the "militant" NLF members were "leaderless and confused" and the
number of "terrorist incidents" in Aden dropped to seven69. Six of these were
indiscriminate grenade attacks, but one was notable as Ali Husain Qadhi, President of
the ATUC, was assassinated. Qadhi was a moderate and his removal would ease NLF
efforts to take control of the labour movement70.
Despite this lull in activity, British Intelligence (such as it was following the NLF's
campaign against Arab Special Branch, see Chapter Six) rightly pointed out that in the
future there would be a resurgence of attacks. The Sha'bi faction of the NLF were re¬
grouping and FLOSY's attempts to set up a political party would probably face
difficulty in gaining support outside Aden and so may have to resort to "further
71 • • • • •
terrorism" . This was borne out by the number of incidents in Aden increasing again
in March to 34, some by FLOSY, but others by Qahtan al Sha'bi's NLF, and some of
the Assassinations were believed to have been organised directly by Egyptian
Intelligence in Taiz72.
In international terms, FLOSY was effective since,
"It is accepted by the Afro-Asians who run the United Nations Committee of 24
as the authentic, and only, organ representative of South Arabia; it is similarly
accepted by left-wing groups in other countries not excluding the United
Kingdom, and it has been given some acceptance, under Egyptian pressure, by
70
most Arab governments" .
However, in other respects it was also a failure since it was never able to dominate the
political scene in South Arabia in the way the Egyptians had hoped. The South Arabian




72 PRO DEFE 11/503/5044 - L.I.C. (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary for March, 1966 - although
this report also points out the lack of cohesive effort continued in the Federation where there were only
three major attacks, which were directed by the Egyptians, and the leaders were from the old NLF
73 PRO FO/371/185240/BA10112/58 - The Frontfor the Liberation ofOccupied South Yemen (FLOSY),
FO Brief, 19 Oct. 1966
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leaders (like Mohammed Aidrus) remained apart, and then the former Sultan and Naib
of Fadhli were expelled for attending the talks with the Federal leaders in Beirut (July
1966, see above). Even in "terrorist terms" there was only limited success as, "Some
hard core terrorists and extremists of the old NLF refused to accept the new direction
and continued to operate independently ofFLOSY"74. This led to a less coherent
campaign against the British (especially in comparison to 1965) which reflected the
political divisions among the Nationalists (which had also thrown the trades unions into
confusion):
"As both a political and terrorist organisation FLOSY is now unconvincing and
in disarray. Politically, Asnag and Makkawi, and probably Mohammed Salem
Basendwah, are at odds with one another. Some of the old NLF, such as Saif
Dhalai and Sallami have stuck with Makkawi, while others have stayed with the
hard core ANM/NLF ... The terrorist element has remained inhibited by
Egyptian mistrust, again by the divisions of the political leadership, and by the
nc
growing disenchantment of the population up-country" .
However, the Foreign Office did still warn that despite this disarray, FLOSY were still
potentially the most dangerous opposition organisation for the British in South Arabia.
They were recognised by the UN, and they had Egyptian backing - although, this was
also increasingly a hindrance given the growing opposition to Egyptian rule among
Yemenis.
NLFActivities
The NLF on the other hand, during this period, were noted for their independence from
Egypt. This could have been a damaging blow to the Front as Egypt was the main
source for money and arms for any Nationalists to continue their campaign against the
British. In fact, largely due to British Intelligence successes, the NLF had suffered a
series of setbacks towards the end of 1965 (see Chapter Six). The Front's campaign
actually ceased for a period when FLOSY was formed in January 1966 and the NLF




"The N.L.F. like F.L.O.S.Y. has never been free from internal rivalries and
dissension and the resultant weakness in the N.L.F. leadership was possibly a
reason why one N.L.F. faction under 'Ali Ahmad Nasir al Sallami accepted
union with O.L.O.S. and later F.L.O.S.Y., leaving the tougher N.L.F. element to
continue independent terrorism.... and the tussle between the A.N.M.- backed
independent N.L.F. and the Egyptian-backed F.L.O.S.Y. militants has resulted
in much dissipation of effort and limitation of terrorist potential."76.
What was notable, however, was that the most efficient FLOSY activists were in fact
old NLF men who joined the merger because of loyalties to certain FLOSY leaders.
There was, despite the setbacks of 1966, a resurgence in NLF activity towards the end
of that year. This was largely at the expense ofFLOSY which was itself suffering as al
Asnag and Maqawi tried to stifle opposition to themselves and unite the various
factions under their leadership(summer 1966)77. British Intelligence was aware of the
fortunes of the two groups, albeit often after the fact and this knowledge rarely owed
much to Intelligence actions. Nevertheless, it is still important to note that the British
realised that:
"From late 1966 it was obvious that the NLF was gaining ground. Having lost
Egyptian backing in 1965/66 it benefited from appearing genuinely South
70
Arabian by comparison with FLOSY" .
Shortly after this (early 1967), the first NLF propaganda for some time appeared,
7Q
denouncing "dubious and malicious elements" (presumably FLOSY) . However, by
the end of 1966 British Intelligence was receiving reports that Maqawi had effected a
detente with the NLF, the Egyptians were renewing their overtures to them, and that
Qahtan was back in favour. The only evidence supporting this, though, was that Saif
Ahmad Salih al Dhala'i (from the old NLF) had taken al Asnag's place in FLOSY's
delegation to the UN.
Throughout 1966, the NLF was troubled by internal disputes, as British Intelligence
discovered. However, due to the basis of the organisation with small independent cells,
76 PRO FO 371/185233/BA1016/42 - A Note on Terrorism in Aden, Aden Intelligence Centre, 6 Dec.
1966
77 ibid.
78 PRO DEFE 11/533/E6407 - The problem ofSouth Arabia, FO Draft Paper, 12 Oct. 1967
79 ibid.
253
it was able to maintain its activity, despite the schism that occurred between the leaders
and the rank and file. The Egyptians, in trying to control all the Nationalists, had
detained the leaders of the NLF in Cairo from March 1966, but this merely allowed the
cells in South Arabia to grow more independent and develop their own strategies. They
• 80 • •
held a second NLF Congress at Jibla in June 1966 , during which the three who had
gone to Cairo to announce the creation of FLOSY in January 1966 (Taha Moqbel,
Salem Zain, Ali Salami) were expelled, as well as both al-Sha'bis, and a new eleven-
man Politburo was elected reflecting the rise of the more militant cadres. Moreover,
after Egypt had cut off supplies to the NLF, they were forced to get supplies
independently. Increased political contributions were supplemented by bank robberies
• ... 81
and "expropriation ofmoney from the capitalist companies" . The success of these
ventures meant the NLF were no longer vulnerable to external threats to follow Cairo's
policy. Thus, when the 'Alexandria Agreement' was announced in August 1966 to
merge the NLF with FLOSY, and signed by Qahtan and Feisal al-Sha'bi and Abdul
Fatah Ismail, the 'secondary leadership' was able to ignore it.
Moreover, after the return of those leaders from Cairo (September), pressure mounted
for a formal break with FLOSY, which duly happened at the Third Congress at Khamr
89
in November . However, this Congress also saw Qahtan's faction re-integrated and
ten people added to the General Command. These ten included Qahtan and Feisal al-
Sha'bi, which meant that the old, semi-Nasserite NLF was back inside the
• • 8T ... ■ • • •
organisation . Also, the decision to increase co-operation with sympathizers in the
Army and Police opened the Front to further 'right-wing' influence and meant that the
internal struggles were far from over. What was clear, however, was that there was a
powerful and independent group within the NLF who would never accept union with
FLOSY. This group, unlike Qahtan's faction, was unresponsive to pressure from
Egypt.
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NLF-FLOSYConflict
1967, therefore, was characterised by periods of conflict between the NLF and FLOSY.
There were also, though, periods of truce as Nasser tried to re-assert control over the
Nationalist campaign in South Arabia. The first serious fighting broke out in January
1966, and there were further outbreaks in June and September, before the final battle in
early November saw the NLF, with SAA support, mop up the last FLOSY resistance.
The latter were, in many ways, hampered by their Egyptian link since many people in
South Arabia began to realise they did not want British rule swapped for Egyptian rule.
84
In contrast, the NLF were "much more South Arabian" . Moreover, whilst the NLF
had internal disputes, FLOSY's leaders were even more divisive, vying with each other
for Egyptian recognition. They were also split over the use of violence with, on the one
hand, al Asnag, Obeid and Salami opposed, which meant they were of little use to the
QC
Egyptians, and, on the other, Maqawi and Basendwah who were more willing . The
actual numbers of active members of both organisation in Aden was remarkably small.
British Intelligence believed there were only 25 activists in FLOSY, 25-30 in FLOSY's
military group, the Popular Organisation ofRevolutionary Forces (PORF), and 10 in the
NLF86. These small numbers were, however, able to command support from among the
trades unions, the police, students, tribesmen and the FRA/SAA.
FLOSY, in the end were largely undone by Egypt's defeat by Israel and Nasser having
to withdraw his troops from the Yemen (in return for Saudi subsidies agreed at the
Khartoum Arab Summit, 31 August 1967). This is not to say that FLOSY quickly
declined, for they were still a force until early November. However, they lost their
patron and the supply of arms and money dried up and their dependence on Egypt was
the cause. There were still benefits to be had from that link, in particular the
propaganda factor. According to Cairo Radio FLOSY were responsible for all major
Nationalist successes in South Arabia, despite the majority being achieved by the
84 PRO DEFE 13/572/13 - Letter Trevelyan to George Brown, 2 Jun. 1967
85 PRO DEFE 11/527/5845 - South Arabia - FLOSY/NLF, Report by Brigadier N.St.G. Gribbon, 12 May
1967
86 ibid. - these figures were from a source with access to FLOSY affairs
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NLF87. British Intelligence was not completely fooled by this and recognised that the
latter were becoming the dominant force in South Arabia:
"Our recent assessments have been that NLF were far stronger then FLOSY up
country and growing stronger in Aden ... NLF have shown that they are the
dominant extremist element in both Crater and Sheikh Othman and that they
have a large measure of support in the South Arabian Forces. To avenge the
murder of an NLF leader they have issued what amounts to a declaration ofwar
on FLOSY and FLOSY leaders hardly dare to show their faces in Aden"88.
The relative strengths of the two Fronts can be seen by their abilities to move into areas
once the British had started their withdrawal and the Federal rulers control collapsed.
From June 1967 the Protectorate states saw British personnel evacuated from the
Protectorate, then shortly afterwards either the NLF or FLOSY would move in. The
first to fall to the Nationalists was Dhala which was taken by the NLF Radfanis on 20
June89. Then in August, after the Crater Mutiny had discredited the Federal
Government once and for all, the rest of the Protectorate was overrun90. The NLF's
operations in the Federation from 1963 onwards had given them the advantage and all
the States, except for Aulaqi, fell to them rather than to FLOSY.
AttemptedNegotiations
At the same time as the NLF and FLOSY were taking control of the Protectorate, once
it was clear to the British that the Federation was finished, overtures were made to both
Nationalist groups to form a National coalition government. The aim was to persuade
the opposition leaders to work with the UN Mission, which was now in Geneva having
failed to meet any of the possible leaders of South Arabia during their visit. FLOSY
were still claiming sole representation for South Arabia and refused to participate in
talks in Geneva,
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"if subservient elements, which do not represent the people attend. FLOSY has
informed the UN Mission that it is the sole legitimate representative of the local
people and that it will declare a total general strike throughout the Occupied
South on the day the so-called meetings are due to open"91.
FLOSY's claim to be the "sole legitimate representative" was somewhat exaggerated as
at the time they were losing ground to the NLF throughout the Protectorate - the
exceptions being Wahidi, the upper Aulaqi sheikhdom and the upper Aulaqi sultanate.
Moreover, FLOSY were split among themselves, although there was still the
propaganda backing ofCairo, which was an important weapon despite Nasser's need to
withdraw from the Yemen. At the same time, it was becoming clear that the NLF had
the support of the SAA officers who came from the states they had overrun, whilst the
Aulaqi officers (under Nasser Buraik) had joined FLOSY92.
With the collapse of the Federation confirmed, Humphrey Trevelyan (the last British
High Commissioner, appointed in April 1967 to oversee the withdrawal) announced in
a Press statement on 1 September that:
"The Federal Government has ceased to govern. It no longer exercises control
in the Federation, it is urgently necessary that a new Government should take
over. I am satisfied that an effective Government can be formed by the political
groups known as the NLF and FLOSY. I am ready to enter discussions
• • • Q-J
immediately with these groups" .
However, both groups refused to negotiate with the British, although FLOSY now met
with the UN Mission in Cairo (6 September)94. Both organisation were, in reality,
probably more interested in defeating the other than forming a coalition government.
There was further fighting between the two in September, followed by an attempted
ceasefire announced by Maqawi and Feisal al-Sha'bi on 25 September, which was
enforced by the SAA. The Army, in fact, was holding the balance ofpower since
whichever group it supported would win, and if it decided to seize power itself it could
have probably done so. However, at first the leading officers attempted to get the NLF
91 PRO DEFE 11/530/6154 - FO to Aden, 3 Aug. 1967
92 PRO DEFE 11/531/E6259/1 - Reportfor CoS Meeting, 31 Aug. 1967
93 PRO DEFE 11/531/6266/1 - Trevelyan to FO, 31 August 1967
94 PRO DEFE 11/532/E6304 - Reportfor CoSMeeting, 11 Sep. 1967
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and FLOSY to negotiate with each other, as well as with the UK95. As the NLF became
increasingly confident of victory, however, then the SAA had to choose between the
two. Thus, at a meeting on 6 November the SAA came out in favour of the NLF96.
This was no great surprise as it had been thought that the Army had closer ties to the
NLF for a couple ofmonths at least97. Moreover, FLOSY by this time was all but
wiped out and the final fighting on 7 November saw the last resistance of
FLOSY/PORF ended in Mansoura district.
The final victory of the NLF meant that the British had only one group to negotiate
with. This was something of a relief as their attempts to involve either the NLF or
FLOSY in a coalition government to take control of an independent South Arabia had
been a failure. The reasons for the NLF victory are difficult to decipher, but one factor
was that their formation and structure meant they could survive independently from
Egypt. FLOSY proved they needed Nasser's patronage once it was withdrawn after the
Six Day War. Moreover, the Egyptians themselves were becoming unpopular in both
the Yemen and South Arabia and they came to be seen as an external power dominating
smaller states themselves. Another factor could well have been the initial NLF success
which set them out from other groups as they were seen to take on the British and cause
them trouble, in particular in the Radfan. Furthermore, their ability to limit the amount
of Intelligence the British received about them meant that the NLF suffered rare defeats.
The Front's grassroots support throughout the Protectorate was vital to their success,
especially in comparison to FLOSY's "urban based movement" and neglect of the rural
areas98. Finally, the infiltration of the Federal forces, which ensured the support of the
SAA, meant that the final victory was assured. A combination of all these factors saw
the NLF survive the struggle against the British and rival Nationalist groups and take
control of the new, independent South Arabia.
95 PRO DEFE 11/531/6294 - CinCME to MoD UK, 7 Sep. 1967
96 PRO DEFE 11/534/E6495 - Situation Reportfor Week Ending 7 Nov. 1967
97 PRO DEFE 11/530/E6185 - Trevelyan to FO, 13 Aug. 1967, "The South Arabian Army is more
closely aligned with the N.L.F. than with FLOSY", the High Commissioner expected the Army to either
battle with the Nationalists or deal with them as they take over each area
98 Lackner - op. cit., p. 48
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'Fings ain't wot they used to be': An OrderlyWithdrawal?
UN Involvement
The two main priorities concerning the British once the decision to withdraw had been
taken were the safe evacuation of troops and, "if possible", to leave behind a viable
independent state". Unfortunately, the British seemed to be reacting to events, rather
than pre-empting them, largely due to the lack of decent Intelligence information (see
above). It therefore became impossible to preserve the Federation, which might not
have been preservable anyway given its political and military weaknesses. The result
was that the dates and operations for withdrawal had to be changed several times.
Nevertheless, efforts were made to achieve the two aims ofpreserving the Federation
and ensuring an orderly withdrawal. To this end, the British asked for UN
involvement, attempted to make contact with opposition groups, and tried to reform the
Federation to make it a more attractive option to the people of South Arabia. All these
failed and the final decision about who would take control once they left was taken out
ofBritish hands by the NLF victory over FLOSY.
In order to gain international recognition, and so bolster the Federation, the question of
UN involvement was raised in Whitehall. The Foreign Office, on the whole, was in
favour as, although asking the UN for help could be regarded as "an ignominious
scuttle", the alternative was to maintain "a ramshackle, disunited and probably unviable
South Arabian state, at great cost to the British taxpayer"100. Hopes for a successful UN
visit were not rated as highly, but "in U.N. terms something might be gained by our
having shown readiness to undertake this cooperation with the U.N."101. In other
words, if it doesn't go well for South Arabia, then at least Britain might gain some
99 PRO DEFE 11/525/5592 - Possible Steps over South Arabia, FO Note, 24 Feb. 1967
100 PRO FO 371/185180/B1071/3 - Minute from S. Falle to D. Greenhill, 14 Jan 1966, Greenhill was in
agreement, but Roger Allen at the FO was afraid of the consequences for the Persian Gulf
101 PRO FO 371/185180/B1071/6 - UN Involvement in South Arabia, Paper by R. Jackling and F. Brown,
Feb. 1966, Jackling in a letter to Roger Allen stresses the risks, but if there is no other option then could
get advantage from associating the UN with South Arabia, 12 Feb.
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credit from at least having tried. Britain's ambassador to the United Nations, Lord
Caradon, was also in favour of the proposal since creating a viable single State in South
Arabia was going to be difficult enough. However, the ambassador argued, "it will
become impossible ifwe try to do the job on our own in isolation and in defiance of the
109 .
Afro-Asian opposition which would mount as the months went by" . The Foreign
Secretary came out in support of Lord Caradon's view that UN observers, even only on
the Federal side of the border was desirable since it was the Federation's best hope for
• • • 1fH . ,
international support once the British had withdrawn . There was opposition to the
proposal from the Chiefs of Staff who feared UN observers would:
"provide a cloak for UAR inspired dissident activity and, by making it very
difficult for us to continue with deniable operations, given the political risks
which would be involved, would hamper our ability to deal with the
dissidents"104.
The "deniable operations" in question meant the covert support for the Royalists in
Yemen. Therefore, if there were UN observers then the Defence Chiefs were concerned
about maintaining the supplies to the Royalists across the Federal-Yemen border. The
political value of these operations was questionable, but it was certainly preferable from
a British point of view to keep them secret.
Eventually, it was agreed to invite a UN Mission to Aden to achieve what the British
had so far failed to do: namely create an agreement between the Federal Ministers and
the Nationalists. The hope was that the Mission would accept draft constitutional
proposals put forward by the Federation as a basis for a future conference on the future
government of South Arabia105. When the UN Mission did visit Aden (2-7 April,
1967), however, they refused to meet with the Federal representatives106. On the other
hand, though, both the NLF and FLOSY refused to meet them, rendering the visit a
failure. In fact, the arrival of the Mission was met by strikes and demonstrations
102 PRO DEFE 11/504/5241A - Lord Caradon to Mrs. White (FO), 23 Aug. 1966
103 PRO DEFE 11/505/5283 - Letter CoS to MoD, 23 Sep. 1966
104 PRO DEFE 11/505/5297 - Acting ChiefofDefence Staff to the Secretary ofState for Defence, Sep.
1966
105 PRO DEFE 11/525/5592 - op. cit.
106 Kostiner, Joseph - op. cit., p. 146-7
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organised by the Nationalists who were determined to undermine colonial rule and
portray the situation in South Arabia as out of Federal and British control (which it was
to a fairly large extent). Later attempts to persuade the Mission to meet with Federal
representatives in Geneva became increasingly pointless as the NLF and FLOSY were
destroying the Federation107. Once again, an attempt to preserve the Federation had
proved fruitless and came too late to achieve anything.
Attempts to Broaden the Federation
Politically, British attempts to stabilise the country so as to make withdrawal easier,
concentrated on broadening the basis and content of the Federal Government. Initial
efforts were to reform the constitution and contact the South Arabian League and, later,
FLOSY. The British were aware that the Federation would be dangerously weakened
by their withdrawal, and, for the most part, were not optimistic about the future since
i no
"South Arabia is stony soil in which to set down the grass-roots of democracy" .
However, there was no obvious alternative to giving all the factions the opportunity "to
behave in a civilised and democratic manner"109. It was only when the constitution
proposals and intention to withdraw were announced that "the pressures be generated
which will mould into shape - or disintegrate - the constituent parts of South Arabia"110.
There was also an increased feeling among Adeni and Federal politicians that it might
be necessary to invite back former opponents like al Asnag, Maqawi and other exiles
for discussions about the future, a trend to which Tumbull gave secret
encouragement111. Thus, informal talks were held between Federal representatives and
SAL leaders as well as some non-Adeni members ofFLOSY in March 1966 at Qarsh
and Asmara, which were friendly but achieved little, especially as al Asnag and Maqawi
119 •
did not turn up . A side benefit of these talks was that the presence ofProtectorate
dissident leaders meant that anti-Federal activity was minimal. However, the lull in the
107 ibid.




111 PRO DEFE 11/503/5013 - Turnbull to Marnham (CO), 7 Mar 1966
112 PRO DEFE 11/504/5044 - L.I. C. (Aden) Monthly Intelligence Summary for March, 1966
261
unrest was also caused by the confusion among Nationalist leaders following the
creation ofFLOSY.
At the same time the Supreme Council was accepting the need for constitutional
reform, and appeared willing to implement the UN Resolutions of 1949 and 1963
(calling for the end of British rule, free elections, universal suffrage and political
• • • • 113
reform) once discussions among all the political parties had taken place . However,
they were finding this difficult to achieve and had to postpone the proposed
constitutional conference in London in August 1966 because most of the parties refused
their invitations" . The Supreme Council also called for twenty Adeni delegates to sit
on the Federal Council to discuss reform, and by 23 August 1966, all twenty seats had
been filled. However, after one delegate was assassinated three more withdrew115.
The attempts to involve the SAL in the political process continued, with the High
Commissioner meeting Abdullah al-Jifri (brother of the SAL President) and
Mohammed Salim Bawazir. Turnbull tried to get SAL help in establishing a South
Arabian Government, and complained that so far "they had done precisely nothing but
complain about being neglected"116. Jifri wanted the Western Aden Protectorate
(WAP) Office to help the SAL arbitrate with the Federation, but Turnbull refused
saying it needed an Arab arbitrator. Talks between the Federation and the SAL
continued in October 1966, but again ended inconclusively with the SAL not yet willing
to co-operate with the Federal Government117. The League were the people that the
British Government most wanted to encourage, which was why attempts to include
them in a South Arabian government persisted: "They are probably the best, or least
bad, available combination of enough nationalism to be respectable with enough sense
to be useful"118. In contrast FLOSY, NLF, OLOS and PSP were "bits of glass in the
UAR-dominated kaleidoscope" varying in their "addiction to terrorism"119.
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Furthermore, Qahtan al-Sha'bi was an "unrepentant terrorist", Maqawi was "no longer
taken seriously", al Asnag was a "windbag" and all of them, with the possible exception
of al Asnag, were "a Bad Thing"120. These views raise the question ofhow British
policy was determined since, by November 1966 when J.E. Marnham of the Foreign
Office wrote this 'analysis', the SAL were no longer a major Nationalist force. They
relied on Saudi Arabian aid, commanded minimal support in Aden, and even in the
Protectorate they were losing followers to the more radical (and effective) NLF and, to
a lesser degree, FLOSY. However, they would have provided the Federation with at
least a gloss ofNationalist credit if they had co-operated, but they continued to hold off,
191
probably out of fear of being labeled British stooges .
The reasons given by the League for non-co-operation were that the Federation had to
accept the UN Resolutions (which they did in May 1966), then that the British should
(did so in August). The final reason given was that they could not work with what the
Committee of 24 called an "unrepresentative regime" until a UN Mission said what
should be done122. Once the UN Mission was confirmed, the SAL again held off, still
probably because they were afraid of what might happen if they were seen to co-operate
with the British and Federation123. This again suggests that the SAL were not as
powerful a force as the British seemed to think, otherwise they might have risked the
NLF/FLOSY reprisals to stake a claim to Government. This was confirmed during
1967, and in particular once the British commenced their withdrawal from the
Protectorate, as the SAL began to disappear from the scene. By the time the
disintegration of the Federation was confirmed in September 1967, the only two
Nationalist groups left were the NLF and FLOSY.
120 ibid.
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Defence Agreements
Whilst attempts to broaden the basis of the Federal Government were taking place, the
Supreme Council was also trying to ensure its survival by appealing to Britain for
military aid, or at least a Defence Treaty after independence. The White Paper had
annulled the 1959 Treaty and 1963 White Paper which had promised British aid to the
Federation in case of external attack. The decision to withdraw and withhold defence
aid was denounced as a betrayal by both the Federal Rulers and the Conservative
Opposition in London. A letter from the Supreme Council asked for promises that
Britain would come to their aid if attacked after independence since "without this
support it is possible that 130 years ofBritish rule in South Arabia will end in
disaster"124. This situation was not helped by the attack on Nuqub in Beihan by
Yemeni/UAR aircraft in September 1966 which, like earlier infringements of the
border, caused a split among British policy-makers and between Aden and London.
Turnbull, like Johnston and Trevaskis before him, warned of the danger ofno
retaliation undermining the British position and demoralising Federal Forces since,
"Another wave of resentment and disillusion could put at hazard our whole programme
19S
of extricating ourselves from South Arabia" . However, once again, London vetoed
any retaliation, much to the disgust of the Supreme Council and to the disappointment
of the High Commissioner and the military in Aden. The Ministry of Defence
highlighted the lack of action as a serious mistake since:
"probably no single factor has done more to undermine the confidence of the
Federal Government and local rulers in British policy than our failure to respond
to the Nuqub air attack and our continued refusal to give any guarantee of
196
reprisal against future aggressive incursion of this type" .
There was eventually to be a re-thinking ofpolicy, however, as it dawned on the policy¬
makers after repeated warnings from the military and the Foreign Office of the
consequences of doing nothing. The Defence Chiefs argued that nothing short of a
124 PRO DEFE 11/504/5259 - Letterfrom Chairman ofthe Federal Supreme Council to the Prime
Minister, 1 Sep. 1966
125 PRO DEFE 11/505/5291 - Turnbull to FO, 28 Sep. 1966
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British undertaking to protect South Arabia after independence until the main UAR
threat had been removed would,
"suffice to give us a chance ofmaking South Arabia ready for meaningful
independence, or to prevent a calamitous loss of confidence in Britain
throughout the Area and especially in the Persian Gulf'127.
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There was never a question of reversing the decision to withdraw as soon as possible .
Nevertheless, there was a realisation that to prevent a loss ofprestige and avoid
instability in the region, then a defence commitment to South Arabia might well be
necessary. The overriding priority here, though, was not concern for the future of an
independent South Arabia, but concern for an orderly evacuation and for Britain's
interests in the Gulf. Without a defence agreement, Federal forces would find it
difficult to maintain internal security, let alone an external attack from the UAR, which
would have had serious consequences for British interests:
"The consequences of this situation on internal security up to withdrawal, on the
future British position in the Persian Gulf, and on the future stability of South
19Q
Arabia, have either not been grasped or have been discounted" .
The situation in South Arabia was, however, getting to the stage where even a defence
agreement might not save the Federation. Tumbull was warned by the Foreign Office
that "The chance of our being able to set up a lasting, unified and viable state in South
Arabia after 1968 are, as we must recognise, small", but Britain should still try to grant
a degree of self-reliance to the new state130. To this end, there was a reversal of policy
as the decision was taken to grant promises of defence aid to the future independent
South Arabia. The obstacles to securing an orderly withdrawal and leaving a viable
state behind were highlighted as: the Federal forces having to take over the full security
burden; the lack of friends abroad the Federation had; and that,
127 PRO DEFE 11/506/5415 - Brieffor Secretary ofState for Defence for OPD Meeting, 2 Dec. 1966
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"the terrorist campaign in Aden ... has not been defeated. It has terrorised Aden
not only out of effective co-operation in Federal constitutional advance but out
• *1^1
ofparticipation in matters that are specifically Adeni" .
Therefore to achieve Britain's stated aims, there was a need to equip an independent
state with the means to preserve itself, encourage constitutional progress and gain
international recognition for the emerging state. The Federal Government, in fact,
wanted Britain to relinquish sovereignty in the near future, but Britain was loathe to
lose control over the port, Khormaksar airfield and water supplies. Therefore, the
Foreign Office proposed to grant independence on 1 November 1967 and support an
application by the Federation for membership of the UN. Furthermore Britain would
leave ground forces in South Arabia until 31 January 1968, and a small air contingent
until 30 April 1968132. However, the Foreign Office also warned that, "The alternative
[to granting these concession] might very well be a degree of disintegration in South
• • • 133
Arabia which would prevent achievement of either of the objectives" .
This would give the new state time to establish itself, and also meant that the onus of
"any later collapse would be on that state's weakness rather than on our own abrupt
departure"134. These proposals were put to the Federal Government, who felt they were
inadequate, but asked for time to consider them . The Ministers then rejected them as
they wanted discussions with the UN Mission (who then refused to meet with the
1 36
Federal representatives) . The Ministers deferral of a decision, therefore, made the
date for the final withdrawal uncertain, which in turn made the plans for evacuation
very difficult137.
Final Attempts to Save the Federation
There were further attempts to give the Supreme Council aid. Lord Shackleton (then
temporary resident Minister in Aden) flew out to South Arabia in April 1967. Despite
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restoring the date for independence to 1 January 1968 and promising to station a naval
force in the area for six months after, the post-independence proposals were again
rejected by the Federal Ministers138. Part of the problem was that the main reason for
withdrawing was to cut costs in the Defence budget, but now there appeared a need for
increased spending to build up the Federation into a viable state. In fact, Britain
promised military aid amounting to £5.5m capital expenditure plus £10.25m each year
for three years, but Trevelyan pointed out this was not enough to make the Federal
1 "3Q
forces strong enough to hold their own . Increasingly, however, these promises
became meaningless, especially after the Crater Mutiny which meant another re-think
ofBritish policy was needed. Trevelyan warned that:
"Radical measures are necessary. The Federal Government in its present form
will never be able to govern nor control its armed forces. We cannot take firm
measures to control security because, ifwe do, there will be a mutiny in the
South Arabian Forces. It is essential that there should be a Government which
can control its forces and to which those forces can be loyal."14 .
The same telegram stated that "Most of the Sultans and their representatives should go
home" and that a broad-based government should be formed. This was to include
elements from the present government, the forces, the civil service, trades unions, NLF
and SAL (all the FLOSY leaders were out of the country). This would have been
difficult but,
"Ifwe do nothing, we shall be faced with a worsening situation and unless we
re-establish confidence within the South Arabian Army we risk simultaneous
FLOSY/NLF terrorism and collapse of the South Arabian forces"141.
There were attempts to achieve the broad-based government, but neither FLOSY nor
the NLF responded to British or Federal overtures and opposed last-minute attempts by
Hasan Bayumi to form a broadly based provisional administration142. The policy of
138 PRO DEFE 11.527/5800 - Cabinet Paper on South Arabia, 8 May 1967, DEFE 11/528/5885 -
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widening the appeal of the Federal Government was maintained, but eventually the
British had to admit defeat and announce the end of the Federation. The result was that,
as Trevelyan had predicted might happen, the British had "to sit and watch the battle
being fought out, while we are still responsible for what is happening"143.
Once the Federation had collapsed, all the British could do was concentrate on security
for their own people and installations and appeal in vain for talks with FLOSY and NLF
whilst they were fighting each other. On 2 November, 1967, the British announced the
complete withdrawal of their forces by the end of the month and after the NLF claimed
control ofAden preparations were made for the negotiation to hand over power. These
took place in Geneva from 21 November to the 29th, the main problem being the
question of aid as the British, "mean as ever" according to Halliday and using the
excuse of financial limitations, bartered the NLF down from their original demand of
£60 million144. Eventually an agreement was reached involving £12 million (including
military equipment) which was conditional on "good behaviour"145. All that was left
was for the final evacuation of troops to take place.
Conclusion
The final British troops had withdrawn by 3 p.m. on 29 November, 1967146. The
following day the People's Republic of South Yemen was proclaimed, with the leader
of the NLF, Qahtan al Sha'bi, as its first President. The final months had seen the
majority of the institutions set up in nearly 129 years ofBritish rule either collapse or
taken over by the most extreme Nationalist group in South Arabia, making South
Yemen the only Marxist state in the Middle East. The failure of the British to preserve
the Federation, in particular after the Crater Mutiny in June 1967, should not have been
a surprise given the repeated warnings of Luce, Johnston, Trevaskis and Turnbull
(Trevelyan's main task was to arrange for a safe withdrawal). The lack of attention
143 PRO DEFE 11/530/E6182/1 - H.C. Aden to Foreign Office, 10 Aug. 1967
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paid to the Colonial Office representatives in South Arabia was a costly mistake from a
British point of view. Had more effort been made to bolster the Federation and broaden
its political base, then the newly independent state might well have maintained friendly
relations with the UK. By November 1967 and the NLF victory, however, the British
were relieved to be rid of the burden of South Arabia. This was reflected in the reaction
of Richard Crossman, a Labour Cabinet Minister, to Foreign Secretary George Brown's
announcement that the withdrawal would be over by the end ofNovember rather than
January 1968:
"That the regime he [Brown] backed should have been overthrown by terrorists
and has forced our speedy withdrawal is nothing but good fortune. It now looks
as though we shall get out ofAden without losing a British soldier, chaos will
rule soon after we've gone, and there'll be one major commitment cut - thank
God"147.
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The withdrawal from Aden was not, strictly speaking 'the end ofEmpire', given the
continued presence ofBritish troops in the Gulf and the Far East as well as certain
smaller territories in the Caribbean, South Atlantic and Pacific (which are still British
'Overseas Territories' to this day). However, it was certainly the beginning of the end,
at the very least. Whilst it would be more accurate to say that the end of the Indian
Empire or the Suez Crisis marked the beginning of the end, in the minds ofWhitehall
policy makers Great Britain still had a role 'east of Suez' following the debacle of
1956. Therefore, the 'Empire' continued until the late 1960s, despite the increasing
evidence that Britain was no longer able to maintain such a costly overseas presence.
The defeat at the hands of the diverse Arab Nationalist groups in South Arabia was
merely the final nail in the coffin and hastened the military withdrawal from the Gulf
and Far East by the early 1970s. British policy towards Aden and the Protectorate from
1945 onwards had aimed at maintaining an international presence for Great Britain, at
least in one region of the world. In other words, the continuation of colonial rule in
South West Arabia in the 1950s and 1960s was an attempt to avert the end ofEmpire.
Ultimately, though, the reality of the international and domestic situation forced the
issue upon Wilson's Labour Government.
Whilst the withdrawal from Aden became increasingly inevitable during the 1960s, as
the burden of overseas commitments was straining the domestic economy, the manner
ofwithdrawal remained unclear. There were numerous occasions when British
policymakers and/or colonial officials could have improved the situation and relieved
the pressure on the Legislative Council or Federation, their only allies in South Arabia.
Instead, the opposition to British rule and the Federation grew to such an extent that the
most extreme of the Nationalists, the National Liberation Front, were able to claim
victory over the traditional notables and establish the only 'Marxist' state in the Middle
East. They were also the sole group linked to the Arab Nationalist Movement to
achieve power in the region, a feat achieved independently of the dominant Arab
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Nationalist power, Egypt. The success of the NLF meant that the People's Republic of
South Yemen, later the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen, was one of the
few former colonies or mandates to break all links to the former colonial power in the
region from the moment of independence.
British policy towards Aden, and in fact towards the entire 'east of Suez' region which
dominated foreign and defence policy during the 1950s and 1960s, was hampered by
the lack of co-operation between the various Whitehall departments with interests in the
region, and also by poor communications between Aden and London. The prime
example of this was the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Colonial
Office, with the former seeking to establish long-term military bases in successive
colonies whilst the latter was looking to withdraw from empire. This was shown in
Singapore, Kenya and Aden; on each occasion the military were assuming long-term
sovereignty for their plans whilst colonial officials were assuming self-government
would be implemented for the colony in question. Iain Macleod, as Secretary of State
for the Colonies between 1959 and 1961, was one of the prime instigators of the
withdrawal from empire. This was especially true following Harold Macmillan's
'winds of change' speech in 1959 which led to independence being granted to the
African colonies. Therefore, the decision to proceed with the construction of the
military base in Kenya in 1957 preceded the shift in colonial policy, but was still short¬
sighted. The Defence chiefs, despite the grant of independence to Ghana, and the
imminent grant of independence to Nigeria, maintained the view that colonial rule in
Kenya would survive for many years. This view continued until 1960 despite
Macleod's announcement the previous year that a sweeping transfer ofpower was
necessary in East Africa. Therefore by the time Kenya was granted independence in
1961, the Army had invested millions ofpounds in a base which had hardly been used.
The actual decision-making process regarding Aden and the Protectorate hardly helped
the British situation. After 1945, the Colonial Office, Ministry of Defence, Foreign
Office and Treasury were all involved in the process. The final word usually lay with
the Treasury given that any policy shift involved expenditure of some form. Therefore,
hanging over every debate between the other three departments regarding British policy
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in South Arabia was the knowledge that the Treasury's view had to be taken into
account. In fact, it was the need for cuts in British expenditure which forced the final
decision to withdraw. However, the other departments involved still had an important
voice in deciding how to best work within Treasury limitations. The Colonial Office
was the Department with immediate responsibility for Aden and the Protectorate, and
so frequently had the most influence. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defence, which was
responsible for the base itself, had to be consulted, whilst the Foreign Office, with its
concern for the Britain's standing in the world at large, always had an opinion.
Given their experiences in Kenya it is difficult to understand why the military were
willing to invest so much money in an enlarged base in Aden, especially after Macleod
had announced in 1961 that retaining bases in colonial or newly independent countries
was an unworkable policy. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defence proceeded with the
construction of the base, trusting in the belief that independence was years away and
ignoring the rising tide of nationalist opposition to British rule in South Arabia. Under
Sandys, however, the Colonial Office was more sympathetic to the Army's base
strategy, as shown by the, frequently acrimonious, communications between the
Colonial Office and Sir Kennedy Trevaskis in Aden over the best policy to maintain the
base for the foreseeable future, and beyond independence if possible. The fact that the
base strategy itselfwas severely flawed was a view that rarely surfaced, despite the
forced withdrawals from the Canal Zone, Cyprus and Kenya within six years (1954 to
1960). Admittedly the base in Aden had been used to protect British interests in Oman
(from 1957), in Kuwait (1961) and in East Africa (the mutinies in Kenya, Tanganyika
and Uganda in 1964). However, the base itselfwas coming under increasing attacks
from Nationalists in Aden, and was politically and financially a very expensive method
of defending British interests.
The Army was the strongest adherent to the base strategy. It was the service with the
most to lose if defence policy priority had been shifted to air and naval mobility, with
the reliance on small, tactically mobile forces which could be flown/sailed into trouble
spots at short notice. The inter-service rivalry did not help the development of this
policy. The reluctance to alter the base strategy meant that, despite Sir William Luce's
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predictions in the late 1950s of independence for Aden within ten years, the defence of
British interests overseas continued to rely on large bases. The fact that these bases
were clearly unpopular with large sections of the local population did not seem to affect
British military thinking or planning, which was why millions more pounds were
pumped into the Aden base in the early 1960s.
The situation in Aden and the Protectorate by the early 1960s, though, should have sent
warning signals to the defence chiefs that history was repeating itself again. The
troubles of the mid-1950s had shown the difficulty of quelling tribal dissidence in the
Protectorate, whilst the strikes and demonstrations of the trade unions were evidence of
the rise ofArab Nationalism in the Colony. Nevertheless, the massive construction
programme at Khormaksar was implemented in 1959, although within five years the
troops stationed there were more involved with defending the base than defending
British overseas interests. The aim of the base was to defend Western oil concerns in
the Persian Gulf, and the Kuwait operation of 1961 was used as the prime example to
back this up. However, by the mid-1960s, the Commander-in-Chief ofMiddle East
Forces was having to ask for reinforcements in order to provide the minimum number
of troops necessary to mount an offensive operation in Kuwait should it be threatened
by Iraq again. The reason for this was that extra troops were having to be sent into the
Protectorate to deal with the NLF-led rebellion, as well as security operations within the
Colony itself. Therefore, the actual value of the base by the mid-1960s was
questionable since it was uncertain how many acclimatised troops could have been
spared to deal with an Iraqi threat without threatening the entire British situation in
South Arabia.
When the decision to withdraw was actually taken, however, it was not due to concerns
about the military efficacy of the base, or its increasingly questionable value. Instead, it
was British domestic economic concerns which forced the issue, since Healey was
willing to continue maintaining overseas interests had the US been willing to fund the
expense of them. It was only after Washington had rejected this request that the
Defence Secretary had to take the decision to cut overseas commitments in February
1966 in order to relieve the economic burden on the UK. From that point on, not only
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was Aden and the Federation to achieve the political independence promised in 1964,
but it was also to be militarily independent since there was to be no British base or
defence commitment to the new state. This was then confirmed by the success of the
NLF, a group which the British Government were unwilling to defend after
independence, as they had considered with the Federation). The NLF, in turn, were
equally unwilling to be defended by the former colonial power.
The end ofBritish rule in Aden could have been very different however, had London
listened to their officials living and working in the colony. William Luce's warnings
and advice in the late 1950s, about the course of events that was likely to occur, proved
remarkably accurate. The Colonial Office would have done well to heed the
Governor's warning that unless substantial political and constitutional concessions were
granted to the Colony, then British rule would not last more than another ten years. The
belief that sovereignty was vital in order to control the base, however, meant that
Luce's advice to gradually relinquish control was ignored. British priorities were the
base and interests in the Gulf first, with the needs and interests of the Colony a distant
second. However, had more concessions been granted to the 'moderates' in Aden, or
attempts made at an earlier date to negotiate with the Nationalists like Abdullah al
Asnag, then the situation could have concluded very differently. Use of the base could
have been extended, especially if the British had concentrated on promoting the
economic benefits of their presence since al Asnag admitted that he did not want to see
the base evacuated given its value to the local economy. However, the view that
sovereignty over, at the very least, the base areas meant that concessions and
negotiations with the Nationalists were never granted until it was too late. The belief
was that to have done so would have been undermining British rule. The often
expressed view of the military that sovereignty was useless without local goodwill was
largely ignored by the politicians, in particular Duncan Sandys, until it was effectively
too late.
The other major failing ofBritish policy was the combination of over reliance on the
traditional rulers in the Protectorate and Federation, and inability to fully support them
when they came under attack from the NLF and FLOSY in the 1960s. The British links
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with the rulers dated back to the 1840s and Haines' attempts to extend trading links
from Aden into the hinterland. However, the real extension ofBritish influence into the
hinterland only took place with the signing ofProtectorate treaties in the 1890s and
1900s, and the advisory treaties in the 1930s and 1940s. These treaties, though, linked
the British in Aden to one ruler or tribe, which often aroused the opposition of a rival
tribe. This rival tribe were then usually supported by either the Ottomans or the Imam
in an attempt to destabilise the hinterland to the detriment ofBritish interests.
Furthermore, the advisory treaties involved increased British interference in the
traditional livelihood ofmany of the tribes, not least the building of roads and
introduction ofmotorised transport damaging the transportation of goods by camel, a
source of income for many of the tribes. Instead of subsidising these tribes for their
loss of income, no real attempt was made to improve the livelihood of those affected,
which created a large number of disaffected tribesmen and potential dissidents. The
almost inevitable outbreak of unrest in the 1950s was a major setback for British
attempts at modernising the Protectorate but once more, instead of compensating the
disaffected for their loss of income, the British made no attempt at subsidising the
development of the region.
The creation of the Federation in 1959 was another opportunity for the political and
economic development of the hinterland, but instead reinforced the feudal rule of the
shaikhs and sultans. Had these rulers been persuaded to introduce political concessions
to their opponents and the British invested more money into the construction of roads,
schools, hospitals and economic development, then it was very possible that many of
the grievances of the dissident tribes could have been alleviated. Admittedly it was also
very possible that this could have backfired and further destabilised the region, but it
was still better than maintaining the status quo which was a series of tribal revolts in the
1950s and 1960s. This situation was then exploited by the NLF to their advantage,
using the tribal dissidence to further their own ambitions of a 'national revolution'.
Even when this rebellion increased to the level of attacks on the Federation from across
the border by Yemeni and Egyptian artillery and aeroplanes, the British response was
muted. Instead ofwholeheartedly supporting their few allies in the Federation, the
rulers, by fighting fire with fire, as successive High Commissioners demanded, London
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rarely did more than complain at the United Nations. There were attempts to
undermine the Yemeni Republicans and Egyptians through covert support for the
Royalists in the civil war, but this achieved little in terms of stabilising the Federation.
This combination of supporting the increasingly unpopular, traditional, feudal rulers,
but only to a certain extent, meant that the Federation was continually undermined by
the NLF and FLOSY-led rebellion.
British policy in South Arabia after World War Two, therefore, had little success to
show for all the money invested in the base (but not the Federation or Colony) and the
effort exerted by those officials who knew the area best. Whilst it is always easier to
criticise with the advantage ofhindsight, there were many at the time who tried to point
out the failings ofBritish policy, not least the last Governors and High Commissioners,
Tom Hickinbotham, William Luce, Charles Johnson, Kennedy Trevaskis, Richard
Turnbull and Humphrey Trevelyan. All these men attempted to warn the Colonial
Office of the dangers in not granting more concessions or giving more financial support
to their few allies in South Arabia, the 'moderate' politicians in the Colony, and the
rulers in the Federation. However, the overriding priority of British policy, whether
under a Conservative or Labour Government, was maintenance of a military base to
defend overseas interests and the east of Suez policy. This meant that the base came
before everything and was the only institution to receive any real political or financial
support from London. Had more concern been shown for the political and economic
development and diversification ofAden and the Federation, then the situation could
have been a lot different. However, the end result was yet another example of a forced
military withdrawal and the establishment of an unfriendly successor government. The
difference with South Yemen, in comparison to other former colonies, was the absence
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